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加州上诉法院维持裁定,VXI 客服员工的仲裁协议不可执行

Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions

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加州第二上诉区第八庭于 11 月 13 日维持洛杉矶县高等法院裁定,拒绝执行 VXI Global Solutions 与客服员工 Tracie Bennett 签署的仲裁协议。

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加州上诉法院维持原判,认定客服公司让新员工签的仲裁协议范围过宽、无限期且单方受益,不可分割,员工可直接起诉。

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Nov. 13, 2026

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Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions

California Court of Appeal

Combined Opinion


Filed 11/13/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

             SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT  

                    DIVISION EIGHT  

TRACIE BENNETT, B346763

    Plaintiff and Respondent,     (Los Angeles County  
                                  Super. Ct. No. 23STCV24278)  
    v.  

VXI GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC,

    Defendant and Appellant.  

  APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of  

Los Angeles County. David S. Cunningham III, Judge. Affirmed.
Lathrop GPM, Laura Reathaford and Jeffrey Richmond for
Defendant and Appellant.
Lavi & Ebrahimian, Joseph Lavi, Jordan D. Bello, and
Brett Szmanda for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant VXI Global Solutions, LLC (Global) appeals
from the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel
arbitration of plaintiff Tracie Bennett’s claims arising out of her
employment with the company. The trial court refused to enforce
an arbitration agreement between the parties after finding it was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and that the
unconscionability could not be cured through severance. We
affirm.
Although the execution of the parties’ arbitration
agreement involved a low degree of procedural unconscionability,
the agreement contains several substantively unconscionable
provisions, including an unreasonably broad scope, unlimited
duration, and lopsided application in favor of Global and the
agreement’s third party beneficiaries. Because the agreement is
permeated with illegality and its unconscionability cannot be
cured through severance, we conclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to enforce the agreement.
BACKGROUND
Global runs customer service call centers throughout the
country. Global hired Bennett, who has a high school education,
as an account associate in February 2023. Bennett worked for
Global until April 2023.
When Global hired Bennett, it gave her an approximately
100-page new hire packet, which included various policies and
forms. An arbitration agreement and a confidentiality agreement
were included in the middle of the packet. Bennett understood
that she was required to sign the arbitration and confidentiality
agreements as part of her hiring.

                            2  

Bennett signed the arbitration and confidentiality
agreements. Bennett did not consult an attorney before signing
them. Global’s corporate counsel testified that Bennett “was
provided with the opportunity during the new hire orientation to
review the new hire packet before signing it.”
The arbitration agreement, which was drafted by Global
and reads as if it was written from Bennett’s point of view, states
in pertinent part:
“I recognize that differences may arise between [Global]
(the “Company”) and me during or after my employment with the
Company and that those differences may or may not be related to
my employment.… [¶] I understand that any reference in this
Agreement to the Company will be a reference to the Company
and all of its past and present partners, officers, directors and
employees; all subsidiary and affiliate entities, all benefit plans,
the benefit plans’ sponsors, fiduciaries, administrators, affiliates
and all successors and assigns of any of them.
“1. Claims Covered by this Agreement. The Company and I
agree to resolve, by arbitration, all individual claims or
controversies, except as excluded in paragraph 2 below, involving
the Company and any of its past or present partners, officers,
employees or agents, whether or not those claims or controversies
arise out of my employment with the Company or the
termination of my employment (“Claims”). Subject to the
exclusions in paragraph 2, the Claims covered by this Agreement
include, but are not limited to, claims for wages, bonuses,
commissions or any other form of compensation; claims for breach
of any contract, express or implied; tort claims; claims for
discrimination or harassment, including but not limited to
discrimination or harassment based on race, sex, religion,

                             3  

national origin, age, marital status, physical or mental disability,
medical condition or sexual orientation; claims for benefits; all
claims for violation of or damages under any federal, state or
other governmental law, statute, ordinance, Executive Order or
regulation; and claims by the Company for injunctive and/or
other equitable relief for, among other claims, unfair competition,
the use or unauthorized disclosure or misappropriation of trade
secrets or client information, the disclosure of any other
confidential information or the violation of any confidentiality
agreement which may be in effect between me and the Company.
“2. Claims not Covered by the Agreement. This Agreement
does not apply to or cover claims by me for workers’ compensation
benefits or unemployment compensation benefits; claims based
upon an employee pension or benefit plan, the terms of which
may contain an arbitration or other dispute resolution procedure,
in which case the provisions of such plan shall control; charges
filed with any administrative or government agency (e.g., the
National Labor Relations Board or the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission); and any other claim that cannot be
referred to arbitration as a matter of law.”
“5. Arbitration Fees and Costs. The Company shall pay the
fees and costs of the arbitrator to the full extent required by law.
The Company will deposit such funds for the Arbitrator’s fee, as
the Arbitrator may determine to be necessary. Both the
Company and I will pay our own costs and attorneys’ fees, unless
otherwise required by law.
“6. Interstate Commerce. I understand and agree that the
Company is engaged in transactions involving interstate
commerce and that my employment involves such commerce.

                             4  

“7. Requirements for Modification or Revocation. This
Agreement can only be revoked or modified by a writing signed
by all of the partners of the Company and me which specifically
states intent by both of us to revoke or modify this Agreement.
“8. Sole and Entire Agreement. This is the complete
agreement between the Company and me on the subject of the
arbitration of disputes (except for any arbitration agreement in
connection with any pension or benefit plan). This Agreement
supersedes any prior or contemporaneous oral or written
understanding on the subject. Neither the company nor I is
relying on any representations, oral or written, on the subject of
the effect, enforceability or meaning of this Agreement except as
specifically set forth in this Agreement.
“9. Construction. If any provision of this Agreement is
determined to be void or otherwise unenforceable, in whole or in
part, such determination shall not affect the validity of the
remainder of this Agreement.”
“11. Survival of Provisions. This Agreement to arbitrate
shall survive the termination of my employment and shall apply
to any Claims whether they arise or are made during or after the
ending of my employment or other relationship with the
Company.”
Finally, on its stand-alone signature page, the arbitration
agreement states: “The Company and I acknowledge that we
have both carefully read this Agreement, that all understandings
between me and the Company relating to the subject matter of
arbitration are contained in it, … and that … we have had an
opportunity to discuss this Agreement with attorneys of our
choice prior to signing it and we have used that opportunity to
the extent we wish to do so.”

                            5  

The confidentiality agreement, which Bennett signed on
the same day she signed the arbitration agreement, provides in
pertinent part:
“EMPLOYEE agrees that disclosure or use of confidential
information by EMPLOYEE, other than for the sole benefit of
[Global] or by any nonsupervisory employees to engage in
protected concerted activities under the [National Labor
Relations Act], would be wrongful and would cause irreparable
harm to [Global]. If EMPLOYEE is in doubt as to whether
certain information is confidential, EMPLOYEE will treat such
information as Confidential and proprietary information.”
“EMPLOYEE agrees that he or she will not solicit any of
[Global’s] employees for a competing business or otherwise induce
or attempt to induce such employees to terminate their
employment with [Global] during his or her employment and for
a period of one (1) year following the termination of such
employment.”
“EMPLOYEE agrees that it would be difficult to measure
damages to [Global] from any breach by EMPLOYEE of this
Agreement, and that any harm to [Global] caused by such a
breach would be difficult to calculate. For these reasons, money
damages may be an inadequate remedy to [Global] for
EMPLOYEE’S breach of this Agreement. EMPLOYEE
acknowledges that, in addition to all other remedies it may have,
[Global] will be entitled to temporary and permanent injunctive
relief to enforce the provisions of the Agreement, and that such
relief may be granted without prior actual notice and without the
necessity of proving actual damages sustained by [Global].”
In October 2023, Bennett filed a class action lawsuit
against Global, asserting 10 causes of action, including claims for

                            6  

failure to pay minimum wages and overtime, and failure to
provide adequate meal and rest breaks.
Global moved to compel arbitration of Bennett’s claims
based on the arbitration agreement that Bennett signed. Bennett
opposed Global’s motion, arguing, among other things, that the
agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable
and that the court should refuse to enforce the agreement
because it was drafted in bad faith and permeated with illegality,
and its unconscionable aspects could not be removed or limited
without rewriting its terms.
The trial court denied Global’s motion to compel
arbitration. As a threshold matter, the court found that the
arbitration agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). The court found that the
agreement contained a low degree of procedural
unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion.
Following the decision in Cook v. University of Southern
California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 (Cook), the trial court
found that at least two aspects of the arbitration agreement were
substantively unconscionable: (1) the scope of the agreement was
unreasonably overbroad because it expressly applies to claims
unrelated to Bennett’s employment; and (2) the duration of the
agreement was unreasonably long because it survived the
termination of Bennett’s employment and could only be revoked
or terminated by agreement between Bennett and Global. The
court rejected Bennett’s other arguments that the agreement was
substantively unconscionable, including her claims that it
impermissibly restricted her ability to recover attorney fees and
required her to waive her right to pursue a public injunction and
a representative action under the Private Attorney Generals Act

                            7  

of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). The court did not
address Bennett’s arguments that the confidentiality agreement’s
noncompete and nonsolicitation clauses, which she argued should
be read together with the arbitration agreement, were
unconscionable. Nevertheless, the court found that the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable because its
unconscionable aspects could not be severed or restricted without
rewriting its terms.
Global appeals.
DISCUSSION

  1. General legal principles
    Where, as here, an arbitration agreement is governed by
    the FAA, the agreement is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
    save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
    revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Generally applicable
    contract defenses, like unconscionability, may be used to
    invalidate arbitration agreements without violating the FAA.
    (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 (OTO); Viking
    River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 650 (Viking
    River).)
    “A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a
    meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract
    contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other
    party.” (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 125.) The party resisting
    enforcement of an arbitration agreement has the burden to
    establish unconscionability. (Ramirez v. Charter
    Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 492 (Ramirez).)
    Unconscionability has procedural and substantive
    elements. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 492.) Procedural
    unconscionability looks at the “ ‘circumstances of contract

                           8
    

negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due
to unequal bargaining power.’ ” (Ibid.) This element typically is
established by showing the agreement is a contract of adhesion,
which is a standardized contract that is imposed and drafted by
the party with superior bargaining power and relegates to the
other party only the opportunity to sign or reject it. (Ibid.)
Substantive unconscionability focuses on the “ ‘fairness of
an agreement’s actual terms,’ ” looking at whether the agreement
will create unfair or one-sided results. (Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 493.) “Substantively unconscionable contractual
clauses ‘reallocate risks in an objectively unreasonable or
unexpected manner.’ ” (Ibid.)
Both procedural and substantive elements must be present
to deem an agreement’s term unconscionable, but they need not
be present to the same degree. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 493.) Courts apply a sliding scale analysis, where the more
procedurally unconscionable a contract term is, the less evidence
of substantive unconscionability is required to conclude the term
is unenforceable, and vice versa. (Ibid.) Unconscionability is
determined with reference to when the contract was formed “and
cannot be resolved by hindsight by considering circumstances of
which the contracting parties were unaware.” (Ibid.)
Where, as here, the evidence is undisputed, we review de
novo a trial court’s order denying arbitration on the grounds that
the agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable. (Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 493.)
2. The arbitration agreement and the confidentiality
agreement should be read together
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the
arbitration agreement and the confidentiality agreement should

                            9  

be read together when evaluating whether the arbitration
agreement is unconscionable. We conclude that they should.
Under Civil Code section 1642, separate agreements that
relate to the same subject matter and were executed in the same
transaction should be construed together as one contract.
(§ 1642; Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 109
(Fuentes).) “According to that rule, documents executed as part of
a single transaction are construed together, even if they do not
expressly refer to one another.” (Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 490 (Alberto).)
The arbitration agreement and the confidentiality
agreement were included in Bennett’s new hire packet and
signed by Bennett on the same day. They were executed as part
of the same transaction—Bennett’s hiring—and they address
similar subject matters—the resolution of disputes between
Bennett and Global. The arbitration agreement broadly
addresses how disputes between Bennett and Global are to be
resolved, while the confidentiality agreement addresses, among
other things, how disputes over alleged breaches of the
confidentiality agreement are to be resolved.
Because the arbitration agreement and the confidentiality
agreement were executed as part of the same transaction and
address similar subject matters, they should be read together.
(Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 490–491.) Failing to read
these two agreements together “artificially segments the parties’
contractual relationship. Treating them separately fails to
account for the overall dispute resolution process the parties
agreed upon.” (Id. at p. 491.) Unconscionability in the
confidentiality agreement will, therefore, affect whether the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable. (Ibid.)

                           10  

3. Procedural unconscionability
The trial court found that the arbitration agreement had a
low degree of procedural unconscionability because it was a
contract of adhesion. Global does not contest this finding. While
Bennett agrees that the agreement is an adhesion contract, she
argues “significantly more procedural unconscionability existed”
because she also presented evidence of oppression and surprise.
As we explain, the agreement’s formation involved a low degree
of procedural unconscionability.
Adhesion contracts ordinarily contain at least a low degree
of procedural unconscionability. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 494.) Whether even closer scrutiny of an adhesion contract’s
fairness is required turns on the level of oppression and surprise
that were involved in the agreement’s formation. (Fuentes,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 104.)
Oppression exists when a contract involves a lack of
negotiation and meaningful choice. (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 126.) The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression
include the amount of time the weaker party is given to consider
the proposed contract, the amount and type of pressure exerted
on that party to sign the proposed contract, and the length of the
proposed contract and the length and complexity of the
challenged provision. (Id. at pp. 126–127.)
Here, there is little evidence of additional oppression, aside
from the fact that the arbitration agreement is an adhesion
contract. There is no evidence that Global pressured Bennett to
sign the agreement in a short period of time. Likewise, there is
no evidence that Bennett was not afforded a reasonable
opportunity to review the agreement, either by herself or with the
aid of an attorney, before she signed it. Indeed, the last page of

                             11  

the agreement, which includes Bennett’s signature, states in
clear and simple language that Bennett acknowledged she
“carefully read” the agreement, that “all understandings”
between Global and Bennett were contained in the agreement,
and that Bennett “had an opportunity to discuss the Agreement
with attorneys” and “used that opportunity to the extent [she]
wish[ed]” before signing the agreement.
Bennett points to evidence that she has only a high school
education and was unfamiliar with arbitration and arbitration
agreements when she signed the agreement in this case. Bennett
did not, however, testify that she had difficulty understanding
the terms of the agreement, nor does she otherwise explain how
her education level limited her ability to understand the
agreement’s terms.
As for the length and complexity of the agreement, Bennett
does not argue that the agreement is unreasonably long. She
does contend, however, that the agreement is complex and
difficult to parse. We disagree. While some of the sentences in
the agreement are long—one sentence identifying the covered
claims spans 15 lines—its language is not particularly complex or
difficult to understand. Indeed, the agreement describes the
types of covered and excluded claims in clear and relatively
simple language without being riddled with “statutory references
and legal jargon.” (See OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 128.)
In sum, the parties’ execution of the arbitration agreement
involved a low degree of procedural unconscionability.
Accordingly, a high degree of substantive unconscionability is
required to render the agreement unenforceable. (Ramirez,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493.)

                           12  

4. Substantive unconscionability
“The substantive unconscionability analysis ‘examines the
fairness of a contract’s terms. This analysis “ensures that
contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms
that have been variously described as ‘ “ ‘overly harsh’ ” ’
[citation], “ ‘unduly oppressive’ ” [citation], “ ‘so one-sided as to
“shock the conscience” ’ ” [citation], or ‘unfairly one-sided’
[citation]. All of these formulations point to the central idea that
the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-
fashioned bad bargain’ [citation], but with terms that are
‘unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.’ ” ’ ”
(Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 106.)
The trial court found two aspects of the arbitration
agreement were substantively unconscionable—its scope and
duration. We agree that the arbitration agreement’s scope and
duration are substantively unconscionable, but we also conclude
that other aspects of the agreement are unconscionable. We
discuss each aspect in turn.
4.1. The arbitration agreement’s unreasonable scope,
unlimited duration, and lopsided application are
substantively unconscionable
The arbitration agreement’s opening paragraph states that
Bennett recognizes that “differences may arise” between herself
and Global, and that “those differences may or may not be related
to [her] employment.” The agreement later states that Bennett
must arbitrate “all individual claims or controversies,” except
certain claims excluded elsewhere in the agreement, “whether or
not those claims or controversies arise out of [her] employment
with the Company or the termination of [her] employment.” The
agreement also provides that it “shall survive the termination of

                             13  

[Bennett’s] employment and shall apply to any Claims whether
they arise or are made during or after the ending of [her]
employment or other relationship with [Global,” and that it
cannot be modified or revoked except by a written agreement to
do so signed by the parties.
When these provisions are read together, the arbitration
agreement’s plain language requires Bennett to arbitrate any
claim she has against Global (except for a narrow class of
expressly excluded claims), even if her claim is wholly unrelated
to her employment and arises well after she stopped working for
the company. In other words, the agreement requires Bennett to
arbitrate nearly any claim she could have against the company
for the rest of her life, until she and Global agree to terminate
the agreement.
Several other courts have found substantively
unconscionable similar language included in employment-related
arbitration agreements. (See, e.g., Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 321–325 [agreement requiring for an indefinite duration
the arbitration of “ ‘all claims, whether or not arising out of
Employee’s University employment, remuneration or
termination’ ”]; Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026)
120 Cal.App.5th 91, 107–108 [agreement requiring arbitration for
an indefinite duration of “ ‘any and all claims, disputes, or
controversies between the Company and me, including, without
limitation, claims arising out of or relating to’ ” hiring process,
employment, or termination]; Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc.
(2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 641, 654–656 [agreement requiring
arbitration for an indefinite duration of “ ‘any claims’ ” the
employee may have against the employer “ ‘that currently exist or
that may arise in the future’ including ‘any and all claims which

                            14  

arise out of the employment context or any other
interaction/relationship we had, have or may have in the
future’ ”].)
Global does not dispute that it would be unconscionable to
require Bennett to arbitrate claims wholly unrelated to her
employment, including claims that arise or accrue well after her
employment has ended. Instead, Global contends that we should
read the arbitration agreement in a manner that limits its
application only to claims that are related to Bennett’s
employment.
The company argues that it would have been unreasonable
at the time the agreement was executed for the company or
Bennett to expect the agreement’s scope to encompass claims
unrelated to her employment. As a company that operates call
centers, Global argues it is highly unlikely that Bennett and the
company would ever interact with each other outside the context
of Bennett’s employment. This is a far cry, Global claims, from
the circumstances in Cook, where it was much more likely that
the plaintiff employee could develop claims against the defendant
university (or vice versa) for conduct unrelated to, or occurring
after the completion of, the employee’s employment. (See Cook,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.) Global asserts that the
likelihood that Bennett or the company would ever “actually
develop[] claims against one another that are unrelated to
Bennett’s employment is infinitesimal.”
We reject this argument for a couple of reasons. First, it
asks us to ignore the agreement’s terms. As we noted above, the
agreement expressly states that Bennett must arbitrate “all
individual claims or controversies … whether or not those claims
or controversies arise out of [her] employment with the Company

                           15  

or the termination of [her] employment.” (Italics added.) To
endorse a reading of the agreement that limits its application
only to claims related to Bennett’s employment would require us
to ignore the italicized language or render that language
surplusage. Such a reading “ ‘violates fundamental principles of
contract interpretation.’ ” (Jenkins v. Dermatology Management,
LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 633, 647.) Had Global intended for
its arbitration agreement to apply only to claims related to
Bennett’s employment, such as claims stemming from her hiring,
her work for the company, her remuneration, or her termination,
it easily could have used language to that effect.
Second, Global’s argument that there is an infinitesimal
chance that Bennett and the company would develop claims
against each other that are unrelated to Bennett’s employment is
undermined by another provision in the arbitration agreement,
which defines the company in an exceedingly broad manner.
The agreement’s second opening paragraph states that Bennett
“understand[s] that any reference in this Agreement to [Global]
will be a reference to the Company and all of its past and present
partners, officers, directors and employees; all subsidiary and
affiliate entities, all benefit plans, the benefit plans’ sponsors,
fiduciaries, administrators, affiliates and all successors and
assigns of any of them.” (Italics added.) Further, Paragraph 1 of
the agreement states that Bennett agrees to arbitrate “all
individual claims or controversies … involving the Company and
any of its past or present partners, officers, employees or agents
… .” (Italics added.) Even assuming the odds are infinitesimally
small that Bennett and Global would ever develop claims against
each other unrelated to Bennett’s employment, the same cannot
be said when the arbitration agreement requires Bennett to

                            16  

arbitrate any claim she has against a broad class of individuals
and entities.
That Bennett must arbitrate any claim she has against
Global’s past or present employees, officers, administrators, and
agents also creates an issue of mutuality, which is a “paramount
consideration” in evaluating the conscionability of a contract.
(Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.) By expressly defining
Global to include all past or present employees, officers,
administrators, and agents, those individuals and entities are
third party beneficiaries of the agreement. (Ronay Family
Limited Partnership v. Tweed (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 830, 839
[by expressly requiring arbitration of claims against the
company’s “agents and registered representatives, the arbitration
clause was intended to benefit” those third parties].) As such,
those third parties can compel Bennett to arbitrate any claims
she may have against them, regardless of whether they are
related to her employment. (Ibid.) The same is not true,
however, for claims that those third party beneficiaries may bring
against Bennett, even if the claims do not relate to her
employment. That is, Bennett cannot compel to arbitration
claims brought by those third party beneficiaries without first
making a showing that those beneficiaries accepted some benefit
under the agreement. (Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 328.)
The agreement, therefore, creates a one-sided benefit in favor of
its third party beneficiaries, a benefit that Global does not
attempt to justify based on any legitimate “ ‘business realities.’ ”
(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 83, 117–118 (Armendariz).)
In short, we conclude the arbitration agreement is
substantively unconscionable because it requires Bennett to

                            17  

arbitrate any claim she has against Global and all of its past or
present employees, officers, administrators, and agents, even if
her claims are wholly unrelated to her employment, and it
requires her to do so until she and Global agree to terminate the
agreement. Such a requirement reallocates risks in favor of
Global and its third party beneficiaries in an objectively
unreasonable manner. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493.)
4.2. The confidentiality agreement is substantively
unconscionable
Bennett also contends that the confidentiality agreement’s
injunctive relief and noncompete provisions are substantively
unconscionable. We agree.
A contract provision is substantively unconscionable if it
“ ‘authorizes the stronger party to obtain injunctive relief without
establishing all of the essential elements for the issuance of an
injunction.’ ” (Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
436, 451 (Lange).) That is so because such a provision lacks
mutuality and exceeds the employer’s legitimate need for a
“ ‘margin of safety.’ ” (Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 492.)
Here, the confidentiality agreement states that Bennett
agrees her unauthorized disclosure or use of Global’s confidential
information “would be wrongful and would cause irreparable
harm to” Global. The confidentiality agreement also states that
Global “will be entitled to temporary and permanent injunctive
relief to enforce” the agreement, and “that such relief may be
granted without prior actual notice and without the necessity of
proving actual damages sustained by” the company. In other
words, the confidentiality agreement entitles Global to injunctive
relief for any breach of its terms by Bennett, without any
requirement that the company prove the element of irreparable

                            18  

harm. (See Jay Bharat Developers, Inc. v. Minidis (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 437, 446 [irreparable harm is one of the factors
courts must consider when deciding whether to issue an
injunction].) Because Global identifies no legitimate commercial
reason for a contractual provision that relieves it of the need to
establish essential elements for the issuance of an injunction, the
injunctive relief provision of the confidentiality agreement is
substantively unconscionable. (Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 449–451.)
The agreement’s nonsolicitation clause also is
unconscionable. Business and Professions Code section 16600
renders void “every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.”
(AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 923, 935 (AMN).) Under this statute, an
employer generally may not contract to prohibit a former
employee from soliciting business from the employer’s other
employees or clients. (Id. at pp. 936–939.) One exception exists
where the nonsolicitation prohibition is tied to the former
employee’s use of illegal means to solicit business, such as by
using the employer’s trade secrets or confidential information.
(ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017.)
Here, the confidentiality agreement states that Bennett
“agrees that … she will not solicit any of [Global’s] employees for
a competing business or otherwise induce or attempt to induce
such employees to terminate their employment with [Global]
during his or her employment and for a period of one (1) year
following the termination of such employment.” Because this
provision is not limited to restricting Bennett from using illegal

                            19  

means to solicit business from Global’s employees, it is invalid.
(AMN, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 936–939.)
Because we must read the arbitration agreement together
with the confidentiality agreement, the substantive
unconscionability of the confidentiality agreement’s noncompete
and injunctive relief provisions further render the arbitration
agreement substantively unconscionable.
4.3. Conclusion
Considering the arbitration agreement and confidentiality
agreement together, we conclude that the arbitration agreement
contains a high degree of substantive unconscionability.
Accordingly, we need not address Bennett’s arguments that other
provisions in the agreement are substantively unconscionable.
We now turn our analysis to whether the trial court correctly
refused to enforce the agreement.
5. Severance
Under Civil Code section 1670.5, subdivision (a), if a
contract or any term of a contract is unconscionable, the trial
court may: (1) “refuse to enforce the contract”; (2) sever the
unconscionable clause and “enforce the remainder of the
contract”; or (3) “limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.” (See Ramirez,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 513.)
When determining whether to enforce an unconscionable
contract, the court should consider whether its “ ‘central purpose
… is tainted with illegality.’ ” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 516.) If it is, the unconscionability cannot be cured, and the
court should refuse to enforce the contract. (Ibid.) At this stage
of the analysis, “no bright-line rule requires a court to refuse
enforcement if a contract has more than one unconscionable

                            20  

term.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, “it is fair to say that the greater the
number of unconscionable provisions a contract contains the less
likely it is that severance will be the appropriate remedy.” (Id. at
p. 517.)
If the contract’s central purpose is not tainted with
illegality, the court should determine whether it can cure the
contract’s unconscionability by severing or restricting the
unconscionable terms. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 516.) If
the court cannot cure the unconscionability without augmenting
or rewriting the contract’s terms, it “should refuse to enforce the
contract.” (Ibid.) “Courts cannot ‘rewrite agreements and impose
terms to which neither party has agreed.’ ” (Ibid.)
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision
whether to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract or sever
its problematic terms. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 513.)
Although the trial court did not engage in an extensive
discussion of why it refused to enforce the parties’ arbitration
agreement, it found that it could not cure the agreement’s central
unconscionability—i.e., its overbroad scope—“without rewriting
the agreement.” As we explain, the court was correct in
determining that the agreement’s unconscionability cannot be
cured without reforming or rewriting its terms. We also explain
why the agreement is tainted with illegality and for that
additional reason, the court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to enforce it. (See D’Amico v. Board of Medical
Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18–19 [we review the trial court’s
ruling, not its reasoning].)
Although there is no bright-line rule rendering an
arbitration agreement unenforceable based on the sheer number
of its unconscionable terms, the greater the number of

                            21  

unconscionable provisions, “the less likely it is that severance will
be the appropriate remedy.” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 517.) Here, we have determined that the agreement, when
read together with the confidentiality agreement, includes at
least five substantively unconscionable provisions, a considerable
number. In addition, one of the central mechanisms of the
arbitration agreement is riddled with overreach and unfairness—
i.e., the requirement that Bennett arbitrate all present and
future claims she may have against not just Global, but a broadly
defined group of third party beneficiaries, regardless of whether
any of those claims have anything to do with her employment or
arise well after her employment ends, and without any reciprocal
requirement that would force those third party beneficiaries to
submit to arbitration any claims they may have against Bennett,
whether related to her employment or not. Because
unconscionability permeates the arbitration agreement, the trial
court correctly refused to enforce it. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 516.)
Even if the arbitration agreement were not tainted with
illegality, its unconscionability cannot be severed or limited
without rewriting the agreement’s terms. To be sure, the
problematic portions of the confidentiality agreement—the
injunctive relief and nonsolicitation provisions—could be severed
without fundamentally altering the arbitration agreement. But
the same cannot be said for the unconscionable provisions
contained in the arbitration agreement itself.
For instance, Global asserts that we can strike from the
agreement the phrases “and that those differences may or may
not be related to [Bennett’s] employment” and “whether or not
those claims or controversies arise out of [Bennett’s]

                             22  

employment” to ensure the agreement applies only to claims
relating to, or arising out of, Bennett’s employment. We disagree.
Nothing in the agreement’s remaining language would limit its
scope only to employment-related claims. Rather, after removing
the language proposed by Global, the agreement would now state
that it applies to “all individual claims or controversies” involving
Global. That language, on its face, would still include any claims
involving Global, including those unrelated to Bennett’s
employment. To properly limit the scope of the agreement, we
would need to add language that requires the parties to arbitrate
only employment-related claims. As we already explained, courts
cannot rewrite contracts or add terms to them to remove their
unconscionable aspects. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 516.)
In short, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it found that the arbitration agreement’s central
unconscionability could not be severed and refused to enforce the
agreement.
6. Our unconscionability analysis is not preempted by the
FAA
Finally, the dissent argues that our use of the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate the parties’ arbitration
agreement is preempted by the FAA. By refusing to enforce the
parties’ arbitration agreement, the dissent argues that our
decision and others like it, such as Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th
312, display “an antipathy to arbitration” that contravenes the
FAA and United States Supreme Court precedent requiring state
courts “to place arbitration agreements ‘on equal footing with all
other contracts.’ ” (Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark (2017)
581 U.S. 246, 248 (Kindred Nursing).) This rule precludes state
courts from “singl[ing] out arbitration agreements for disfavored

                             23  

treatment.” (Ibid.) Instead, courts may invalidate arbitration
agreements only on “ ‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.’ ” (DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (2015)
577 U.S. 47, 54 (DIRECTV), quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2.) As we explain
below, the FAA does not preempt the use of the unconscionability
doctrine in this case.
In Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109 (Sonic), the California Supreme Court rejected a similar
concern to the one raised by the dissent. There, the Court
addressed the viability of the unconscionability doctrine as
applied to arbitration agreements following AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339–341 (Concepcion). (See
Sonic, at pp. 1142–1145.)
The California Supreme Court began its discussion “by
noting that after Concepcion, unconscionability remains a valid
defense to a petition to compel arbitration. Quoting the FAA’s
saving clause, Concepcion reaffirmed that the FAA ‘permits
arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable “upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract” ’ (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at
p. 1746], quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2), including ‘ “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability … ”
[citations]’ (Concepcion, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1746]).” (Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1142–1143.) The California Supreme
Court reiterated that “it has long been the proper role of courts
enforcing the common law to ensure that the terms of a bargain
are not unreasonably harsh, oppressive, or one-sided.” (Id. at
p. 1143.)
The California Supreme Court then addressed what limits
Concepcion and the FAA place on state unconscionability rules as

                             24  

they apply to arbitration agreements. (Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at pp. 1143–1144.) The Court explained that state
unconscionability rules “must not facially discriminate against
arbitration and must be enforced evenhandedly.” (Id. at p. 1143.)
Nor may such rules, “even when facially nondiscriminatory, …
disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing procedural
requirements that ‘interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of
arbitration,’ especially its ‘ “lower costs, greater efficiency and
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Concepcion, supra,
563 U.S. at p. 348.)
Notably, the Court explained that “state law rules that do
not ‘interfere[ ] with fundamental attributes of arbitration’
(Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1748]) do not
implicate Concepcion’s limits on state unconscionability rules.”
(Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1143.) This means, the Court
observed, that “a facially neutral state law rule is not preempted
simply because its evenhanded application ‘would have a
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.’ (Concepcion,
at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1747].) Under Concepcion, a state law
rule is preempted when its impact is such that it interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration. (Id. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at
p. 1748].)” (Sonic, at p. 1144.)
The Court pointed to examples of arbitration agreements
that have been found to be unconscionable for reasons “that have
nothing to do with fundamental attributes of arbitration.” (Sonic,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1144.) For instance, the Court previously
“found unconscionable a $50,000 threshold for an arbitration
appeal that decidedly favored defendants in employment contract
disputes.” (Ibid., citing Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003)

                            25  

29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071–1074.) The Court also pointed to two
Court of Appeal decisions. The first “found unconscionable an
arbitration agreement with a damages limitation clause under
which ‘the customer does not even have the theoretical possibility
he or she can be made whole.’ ” (Sonic, at p. 1144, citing Harper
v. Ultimo (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1407.) The second “found
unconscionable an arbitration agreement that, among other
things, ‘impos[ed] upon [the employee] the obligation to pay [the
employer’s] attorney fees if [the employer] prevails in the
proceeding, without granting her the right to recoup her own
attorney fees if she prevails.’ ” (Sonic, at p. 1144, citing Ajamian
v. CantoCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 799–800.)
The California Supreme Court explained that these
examples show that “the core concern of the unconscionability
doctrine is the ‘ “ ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.’ ” ’ ” (Sonic, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) “These include ‘terms that impair the
integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the
public interest or public policy; terms (usually of an adhesion or
boilerplate nature) that attempt to alter in an impermissible
manner fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law, fine-
print terms, or provisions that seek to negate the reasonable
expectations of the nondrafting party, or unreasonably and
unexpectedly harsh terms having to do with price or other central
aspects of the transaction.’ ” (Ibid.)
The Court reaffirmed that “[a]fter Concepcion, courts may
continue to apply the unconscionability doctrine to arbitration
agreements.” (Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) “As the FAA
contemplates in its savings clause (9 U.S.C. § 2), courts may

                            26  

examine the terms of adhesive arbitration agreements to
determine whether they are unreasonably one-sided. What
courts may not do, in applying the unconscionability doctrine, is
to mandate procedural rules that are inconsistent with
fundamental attributes of arbitration, even if such rules are
‘desirable for unrelated reasons.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Concepcion,
supra, 563 U.S. at p. 351.)
The dissent contends that this portion of Sonic “cannot be
valid” following the United States Supreme Court’s post-
Concepcion arbitration decisions. We disagree with the dissent’s
critique of Sonic.
Assuming Sonic’s discussion of the unconscionability
doctrine’s viability is only dicta, it is well settled that dicta from
the California Supreme Court should be followed, especially
where, as in Sonic, the Court conducted a thorough analysis of
the issues. (Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College
Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 981, 990.) The dissent points to no
case from the California Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court, and we are aware of none, that expressly calls
into question or overrules Sonic’s discussion of the viability of
California’s unconscionability doctrine after Concepcion.
Indeed, the California Supreme Court continues to follow
that portion of Sonic and, as recently as 2024, has applied the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration agreements that are
governed by the FAA. (See, e.g., OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at
pp. 123–138 [2019 decision following Sonic and refusing to
enforce arbitration agreement on unconscionability grounds];
Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 492–519 [2024 decision finding
arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively

                              27  

unconscionable and reaffirming that the FAA does not preempt
California’s unconscionability doctrine].)
Even the Ninth Circuit continues to apply California’s
unconscionability doctrine to refuse to enforce arbitration
agreements that are governed by the FAA. (See Ronderos v. USF
Reddaway (9th Cir. 2024) 114 F.4th 1080, 1094–1099 (Ronderos);
Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024)
120 F.4th 670, 680–689.) And in at least one of those decisions, a
majority of the panel relied on the portion of Sonic discussed
above to reject a preemption argument like the one raised by the
dissent in this case. (See Ronderos, at p. 1103, citing Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1142–1145.) Notably, these Ninth
Circuit decisions invalidated arbitration agreements based on
unfairly one-sided provisions that are more commonly found in
the arbitration context, an approach that is consistent with the
one approved by the Court in Sonic. (See, e.g., Ronderos, at
pp. 1094–1099 [refusing to enforce arbitration agreement that:
(1) imposed on just the employee a one-year limitations period for
initiating claims in arbitration; and (2) permitted the employer to
bring claims for injunctive relief against the employee in court];
Heckman, at pp. 681–689 [refusing to enforce arbitration
agreement that imposed the following provisions that favored the
drafting party: (1) unfairly one-sided mass arbitration protocols;
(2) unduly restrictive limitations on discovery and briefing in
arbitration; (3) an unfairly one-sided right to appeal an
arbitrator’s decision; and (4) an unfairly one-sided procedure for
selecting an arbitrator].)
For these reasons, we continue to follow Sonic and the
California Supreme Court’s other recent decisions that hold our
state’s unconscionability doctrine remains a viable defense to

                            28  

arbitration agreements that are governed by the FAA. (See Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455–
456 [we are generally bound by decisions of the California
Supreme Court].)
We also disagree with the dissent’s assertion that
Concepcion and the United States Supreme Court’s other
decisions addressing arbitration undermine our application of the
unconscionability doctrine to the parties’ arbitration agreement
in this case. In Concepcion, the Court considered whether the
FAA preempts California’s rule rendering unconscionable certain
class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. (See
Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 340–341.) The Court observed
that although unconscionability is “a doctrine normally thought
to be generally applicable,” courts cannot rely on “ ‘the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.’ ” (Id. at
p. 341.)
The Court then held that California’s rule against class
waivers was preempted by the FAA. (Concepcion, supra,
563 U.S. at pp. 344–352.) The Court’s analysis focused on how
such a rule “interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration
and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” (Id. at
p. 344.) The Court explained that “the switch from bilateral to
class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of
arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.” (Id. at p. 348.) According to the Court, “class
arbitration requires procedural formality” beyond what is
normally involved in individual arbitration, because if
“procedures are too informal,” due process considerations would

                           29  

prevent absent class members from being bound by the
arbitration. (Id. at p. 349.) The Court also noted that “class
arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants” because it
increases the stakes beyond what is typically involved in
individual arbitration with limited appellate review. (Id. at
pp. 350–351.) Because California’s class waiver rule “ ‘stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress,’ ” the Court concluded that
it contravenes the FAA’s objectives. (Id. at p. 352.)
Although Concepcion’s preemption analysis focused on the
way California’s anti-class waiver rule created a procedure that
“interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration”
(Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 344; see also id. at pp. 344–
352), the dissent homes in on the high Court’s observation in an
earlier portion of the opinion that some facially neutral state
rules can “have a disproportionate impact on arbitration
agreements” (Concepcion, at p. 342). The dissent then conducts a
statistical analysis to illustrate how in the past five years,
California courts have used the unconscionability doctrine to
invalidate arbitration agreements at a higher rate than other
types of contracts. The dissent claims these statistics show that
California courts use the unconscionability doctrine in a manner
that disfavors arbitration and is preempted by the FAA.
But the high Court in Concepcion noted a similar trend, at
least as it existed in California in 2011, and it did not disapprove
of our courts’ general application of the unconscionability
doctrine to arbitration agreements that are governed by the FAA.
Specifically, the Court observed that “California’s courts have
been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable
than other contracts.” (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 342.)

                             30  

Rather than relying on those statistics to preempt our courts’ use
of the doctrine as applied to arbitration agreements, the Court
noted that the statistics were “not definitive.” (Ibid.) The dissent
cites no high Court decision, and we are aware of none, that has
since preempted or otherwise undermined a general application
of California’s unconscionability doctrine to arbitration
agreements. In fact, the high Court continues to acknowledge
that unconscionability remains a viable defense to arbitration
agreements under the FAA. (See Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 650 [“ ‘A court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based
on “generally applicable contract defenses” like fraud or
unconscionability, but not on legal rules that “apply only to
arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue” ’ ”].)
The other United States Supreme Court’s decisions that the
dissent cites invalidated California rules that require the
availability of judicial or administrative forums for certain
classes of claims or preclude the waiver of the right to pursue
class or representative claims in arbitration. (See, e.g.,
Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1 [statute requiring
judicial consideration of claims brought under franchise
investment statute]; Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483
[statute permitting wage collection actions to be brought in court
regardless of any agreement to arbitrate such claims]; Preston v.
Ferrer (2008) 552 U.S. 346 [statute granting state labor
commissioner exclusive jurisdiction over issues that the parties
agreed to arbitrate]; DIRECTV, supra, 577 U.S. 47 [courts’
continued use of the class waiver rule that was invalidated in
Concepcion]; Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176
[contract interpretation principle used to find ambiguous

                            31  

arbitration provisions provide for class arbitration]; Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. 639 [rule invalidating agreements to arbitrate
only individual component of a representative claim for certain
labor violations].) In addition, Kindred Nursing held that the
FAA preempts a Kentucky rule that renders arbitration
agreements unenforceable if they are not executed by principals
or representatives who are expressly authorized to waive the
principal’s access to the courts. (See Kindred Nursing, supra,
581 U.S. 246.) All these decisions disapproved state-created rules
that impose blanket prohibitions on arbitration in certain
contexts or impose procedures that are inconsistent with the
“fundamental attributes of arbitration” and create “scheme[s]
inconsistent with the FAA.” (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at
p. 344.)
None of these decisions preclude a court from engaging in a
“straightforward application” of California’s standards for
determining unconscionability and the severability of
unconscionable provisions. (Ronderos, supra, 114 F.4th at p. 1103.) It is still “the proper role of courts enforcing the
common law to ensure that the terms of a bargain are not
unreasonably harsh, oppressive, or one-sided.” (Sonic, supra,
57 Cal.4th at p. 1143.)
Nor do the statistics that the dissent has gathered
otherwise suggest that California courts use unconscionability to
single out arbitration. Black letter law shows that adhesive
contracts, regardless of whether they contain arbitration
provisions, are particularly susceptible to an unconscionability
defense, while negotiated contracts, even those containing
arbitration provisions, are rarely subject to such a defense.

                            32  

As noted above, any successful unconscionability defense
requires that a litigant establish both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 492–493.)
Because virtually all adhesive contracts are procedurally
unconscionable, a signatory to such a contract, as was the case
here, will generally be able to meet this prong. (Baltazar v.
Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244 (Baltazar).)
Negotiated contracts, on the other hand, are rarely procedurally
unconscionable. (Ibid.) Unconscionability, therefore, has little
application to negotiated contracts. For these reasons,
unconscionability is a contract defense that is well suited for
challenging adhesive, but not negotiated, contracts. (See, e.g.,
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989)
211 Cal.App.3d 758, 769 [non-arbitration case noting the
“significant overlap” between adhesive contracts and the
unconscionability doctrine]; California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of
America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 214 (California Grocers
Assn.) [non-arbitration case explaining that “[t]he notion of
‘procedural’ unconscionability merely addresses the question
whether a contract is adhesive”].)
Adhesion contracts are a common vessel for arbitration
provisions. For instance, such provisions often appear in
employment and consumer contracts, which businesses typically
present to employees and consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. (See Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 115–116.) It
follows, then, that unconscionability is a common defense to
motions to compel arbitration that are based on adhesive
employment or consumer contracts.
But arbitration provisions also appear in non-adhesive
negotiated contracts. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College

                            33  

Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1446–1448
[appeal from order compelling college district and faculty
association to arbitrate their claims under an arbitration
provision included in an arms’ length bargaining agreement].)
Yet those contracts rarely are struck down as unconscionable
because only in unusual cases will there exist procedural
unconscionability when both parties to the contract have strong,
if not equal, bargaining power. Indeed, our Supreme Court has
recognized that there is no procedural unconscionability in
“contracts that have been freely negotiated by roughly equal
parties.” (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) Instead, other
types of defenses or challenges to the enforceability of a
contract—like impossibility, illegality, rescission, mistake, and
frustration of purpose—are better suited for challenging arms’
length contracts because those doctrines do not require a showing
of procedural unconscionability. (See Civ. Code, § 1441
[requirements for voiding contractual provisions due to
impossibility of performance]; Civ. Code, § 1608 [requirements for
voiding contract as illegal]; Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b)
[requirements for unilaterally rescinding a contract]; Meyer v.
Benko (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 937, 944 [requirements for proving
affirmative contract defense of unilateral mistake of fact]; Dorn v.
Goetz (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 407, 410–413 [requirements for
establishing frustration of purpose defense to enforcement of a
contract].) It is, therefore, unsurprising that some contractual
defenses, like unconscionability, will have broader application in
an adhesive context, while other defenses will more broadly apply
in non-adhesive contexts.
Consequently, adhesive contracts, regardless of whether
they include arbitration provisions, have long been a target of

                            34  

unconscionability challenges. (See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862, 879 [non-arbitration case
noting that for adhesive contracts, “California courts have long
been disinclined to effectuate clauses of limitation of liability
which are … unconscionable”]; Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
(2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 589 and cases discussed therein [non-
arbitration cases applying unconscionability analyses to forum
selection clauses contained in recreational vehicle manufacturers’
adhesive warranty agreements]; California Grocers Assn., supra,
22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 214–217 [non-arbitration case noting that
the “preliminary question” for court’s unconscionability analysis
“is whether we have a contract of adhesion”].)
In addition, our Legislature has made orders denying
motions to compel arbitration immediately appealable, a
procedural posture advantaging parties seeking to enforce
arbitration agreements. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).)
As a result, unconscionability challenges to adhesive contracts
that contain arbitration provisions more frequently make their
way to California’s appellate courts. This procedural quirk that
treats unsuccessful attempts to enforce arbitration provisions
more favorably than other appeals, in turn, generates more
appellate decisions on this topic than it would for other cases. In
contrast, parties litigating unconscionability or other contractual
theories outside of the arbitration context typically cannot appeal
until the entirety of their case has been resolved via a demurrer,
summary judgment, or trial because of California’s one final
judgment rule. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).)
Relatedly, for contract defenses outside of the fast track
that the Legislature has created for orders denying motions to
compel arbitration, the parties will have far greater opportunity

                            35  

to reach resolution and avoid any appeal at all. Indeed, it would
appear that forum disputes, like disputes over the enforcement of
arbitration provisions, are less likely to resolve through
settlement than other types of contractual disputes, where the
disputes primarily revolve around money. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that appeals addressing whether adhesive arbitration
provisions are unconscionable are relatively common in the
California appellate docket, while unconscionability decisions for
other contract cases are harder to find.
Put simply, arbitration provisions appear in both adhesive
and negotiated contracts. But only those provisions that are
included in adhesive contracts generally will be susceptible to
unconscionability challenges. The difference between these two
types of cases is that one involves adhesive contracts while the
other does not. California’s courts, therefore, are not singling out
arbitration for disfavored treatment under the unconscionability
doctrine. They simply are applying the unconscionability
doctrine in a manner consistent with its purpose—as a defense to
adhesive contracts.
Finally, the dissent accuses us of inventing “hypothetical”
concerns to justify our substantive unconscionability analysis,
even though the dissent engages in the same analysis to conclude
the confidentiality agreement’s nonsolicitation clause is
unenforceable without any evidence that Bennett has engaged in
conduct that could implicate that clause. An unconscionability
analysis requires courts to evaluate legality at the time the
contract is created—i.e., before either party has had an
opportunity to perform under its terms. (See Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 493.)

                             36  

In sum, our analysis of the parties’ arbitration agreement
in this case applies these well-settled and generally applicable
rules of unconscionability. The arbitration provision in this case
is unconscionable because it is part of an adhesive employment
contract that secures arbitration indefinitely. The provision also
compels Bennett to arbitrate claims that are wholly unrelated to
her employment with Global, against a wide range of people and
entities that are not her employer, and it does not give her a
reciprocal right to compel those third parties to arbitrate any
claims they may bring against her. It also imposes an illegal
nonsolicitation provision on Bennett and allows Global to secure
injunctive relief against Bennett without proving irreparable
harm. As our case law shows, the law gives parties with superior
bargaining power significant leeway to draft adhesive contracts
that include arbitration provisions. (See, e.g., Tiri v. Lucky
Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 243–250 [rejecting
unconscionability challenge to delegation clause in adhesive
arbitration agreement because the clause did not lack mutuality,
as it required both sides to arbitrate any disputes between them];
Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 894–897
[rejecting unconscionability challenge to adhesive arbitration
agreement’s delegation clause]; Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd.,
LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 178–185 [severing
unconscionable attorney fees provision but otherwise rejecting
unconscionability challenge to arbitration agreement because it
included a bilateral arbitration requirement binding both
parties].) The law does not, however, permit stronger parties to
draft adhesive contracts that are oppressively harsh or unfairly
one-sided. (See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 571, 585, citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.

                            37  

(1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817–818.) The contract in this case fails
this basic test.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Global’s motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Bennett shall recover her costs on appeal.

                                        VIRAMONTES, J.  



 I CONCUR:  



                   STRATTON, P. J.  




                           38  

WILEY, J., Dissenting:

   The majority opinion uses a prohibited state law method to  

invalidate federally protected arbitration. The Supreme Court of
the United States prohibits this method because of its negative
and highly disproportionate impact on arbitration. (See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 341–342
(Concepcion).) The majority opinion invites preemption—again.
California courts have developed a special branch of the
general unconscionability doctrine to squelch arbitration
whenever we state judges think the details of arbitration need
regulating. The doctrine is at odds with general California
contract law. This special branch arose only in, and it applies
only to, arbitration.
This branch of California law is an arbitration special.
That is, it is a state contract law rule that applies only to, or that
derives its meaning from the fact that the subject is, arbitration.
Federal law preempts a state rule like that. Instead, state
contract law rules must be generally applicable and not specific to
arbitration cases.
This is the rule of equal treatment. (Hohenshelt v. Superior
Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 327 (Hohenshelt).)
There is no equal treatment in this case. The majority
takes apart this arbitration contract using a 20-pound
sledgehammer found nowhere else in general contract law.
California state arbitration law and the supreme federal
preemption power have been butting heads for years. In these
collisions, California state law always loses.
Our record is dispiriting. Consider our defeats:

                              1  

1. Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 16–17
[preempting California arbitration law];
2. Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 491 (Perry)
[same];
3. Preston v. Ferrer (2008) 552 U.S. 346, 349–350, 355–
356, 359 (Preston) [same];
4. Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 337–338, 352
[same];
5. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC v. Fowler (2014)
571 U.S. 1189 [preempting California arbitration law;
petition for writ of certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded for further consideration
in light of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant (2013) 570 U.S. 228];
6. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (2015) 577 U.S. 47, 53
(DIRECTV) [preempting California arbitration law,
and scolding California state courts for intransigence
on arbitration];
7. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176, 189
(Lamps Plus) [preempting California arbitration
law]; and
8. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 649, 662 (Viking River) [same].
From 1984 through 2022, a span of less than 40 years,
there have been eight arbitration preemptions. On average,
there has been one every four or five years. The last one was in
2022, so a believer in simple averages might predict another one
soon. I write in the hopes that California state law will draw
back from this brink.

                            2  

I
Tracie Bennett worked at VXI Global Solutions, LLC for
less than two months. When her employment ended, she filed a
class action against Global. She alleged 10 standard class action
employment claims: minimum wage, meal and rest breaks, and
so forth. Global moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court
denied the motion.
Additional facts are scanty because each party filed but one
skeletal declaration in the trial court. The employer’s declaration
had only six substantive sentences. Bennett’s declaration also
was brief.
We do know Bennett’s job title was “account associate” and
she worked at Global for about six weeks. We do not know if she
was fired or whether she quit.
Bennett stated her education ended with her high school
diploma.
Global ran telephone call centers and handled calls for its
clients. The operations are spread across the United States. We
do not know much else about the company: its size, its affiliated
entities, if any, or whether it does anything besides operate call
centers.
The details of contract formation also are sparse.
The agreement reported, with our italics, Bennett and
Global acknowledged “that we have had an opportunity to discuss
this Agreement with attorneys of our choice prior to signing it
and we have used that opportunity to the extent we wish to do so.”
The employer stated “Plaintiff Bennett received a new-hire
packet. As with all new hires, Plaintiff Bennett was provided
with the opportunity during the new hire orientation to review

                             3  

the new hire packet before signing it.” Bennett signed the
included arbitration agreement on February 28, 2023.
Global did not pressure Bennett to sign. Bennett did not
claim Global rushed her with a tight deadline, or used
intimidation, or the like. Bennett averred she was required to
sign the documents by a certain date, but she does not say when
she got the documents.
Bennett apparently had the opportunity to consult a lawyer
but decided against it. She swore in her declaration that “I did
not have any assistance from an attorney to review the hiring
documents, including the arbitration agreement, before I signed
the documents.”
Nothing suggests Global restricted Bennett’s access to
counsel.
We do not know whether the materials Global presented
Bennett were paper copies or whether everything was online.
Neither do we know if there was face-to-face interaction during
the process, or whether it was partly or entirely remote.
The parties’ agreement states that Global engaged in
interstate commerce and that Bennett’s employment involved
interstate commerce. This point is vital, because it opened the
door to preemptive federal scrutiny.
The trial court denied Global’s motion to compel
arbitration. First, it determined the Federal Arbitration Act
governed the contract. Then it ruled “the degree of procedural
unconscionability is low.” The trial court decided the contract
was substantively unconscionable and the offending defects could
not be severed.
The trial court did not accept all of Bennett’s arguments
about substantive unconscionability. It rejected her claims that

                           4  

the agreement altered Bennett’s entitlement to attorney fees, or
that it waived either her representative PAGA claims or her right
to seek a public injunction. The court also ruled the jury waiver
was not overbroad.
II
The contracts were not unconscionable. The levels of
procedural and substantive unconscionability were low. One
provision in the confidentiality agreement ran afoul of state law
but had nothing to do with arbitration or with the facts of this
case. The trial court easily and conventionally should have
severed this provision. I would remand for the trial court to send
the case to arbitration.
Two flaws infect the majority’s contrary approach: (1) a
harsh and arbitration-specific method, (2) which leads to results
that interfere with arbitration to a far greater extent than with
any other kind of contract.
The harsh method faults this contract on grounds that are
used nowhere else in contract law: scope, duration, clause-by-
clause demands for mutuality in hypothetical situations, and
restrictive severance of objectionable but irrelevant contract
terms. After putting this contract through this arbitration-
specific wringer, the disproportionate result then is predictable.
“California’s courts have been more likely to hold contracts to
arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts.” (Concepcion,
supra, 563 U.S. at p. 342, internal quotations omitted.) I survey
recent cases to illustrate this forbidden consequence.
A
The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving
the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1128.) Global

                            5  

established the arbitration agreement exists. Bennett does not
dispute she signed it.
Unconscionability is a venerable and desirable contract law
doctrine. The doctrine is about someone using oppressive power
over another to force them into an unfair deal.
An antebellum exemplar arose when the ship Richmond, a
whaling vessel, ran aground in arctic waters 5,000 miles from the
nearest port. Winter was near, meaning sea ice soon would crush
the ship and destroy its full cargo of valuable oil. The only three
ships in the neighborhood rescued the crew. These other whaling
ships did not have full holds. With the supposed assent of the
Richmond’s master, the other three captains held an “auction”
and bought the Richmond’s oil for cents on the dollar. Once back
home, however, the owner of the Richmond sued to void the so-
called auction and to recover the true market value of the oil.
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed this “auction”
contract was unconscionable: “The contrivance of an auction sale,
under such circumstances, where the master of the Richmond
was hopeless, helpless, and passive—where there was no market,
no money, no competition—where one party had absolute power,
and the other no choice but submission—where the vendor must
take what is offered or get nothing—is a transaction which has no
characteristic of a valid contract.” (Post v. Jones (1857) 60 U.S. 150, 159.)
As the party opposing enforcement of the contract, Bennett
bore the burden of establishing her claim of unconscionability.
She had to show unfairness both in the procedure by which her
contract was formed and the substance of its terms. (Fuentes v.
Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 99 (Fuentes).)

                            6  

This distinction between procedural and substantive
unconscionability is fundamental. Yale Professor Arthur Allen
Leff devised it in his landmark article, Unconscionability and the
Code—The Emperor’s New Clause (1967) 115 U.Pa. L.Rev. 485,
487, 488, 489, 509 (Leff).
As Professor Peters wrote, since Leff’s 1967 article, “no one
has ever again been able to address the problem of
unconscionability without incorporating the watershed
distinctions” Leff created. (Peters, Arthur Leff as a Scholar of
Commercial and Contract Law (1981) 91 Yale L.J. 230, 231.)
Leff critiqued the 21 years of effort—1941 to 1962—the
American Law Institute spent trying to clarify the concept of
unconscionability. Leff famously concluded ALI’s decades of work
resulted only in “amorphous unintelligibility.” To boot, Leff
condemned the ALI’s commentary accompanying that work on
unconscionability as irrelevant. (Leff, supra, 115 U.Pa. L.Rev. at
p. 488.) The Restatement’s entire formulation of
unconscionability, Leff charged, was vacuous. (Id. at p. 541.)
Leff concluded “it is easy to say nothing with words.” (Id. at p.
559.)
Leff’s penetrating analysis retains its power. For instance,
he mercilessly dissected Judge Skelly Wright’s much-cited
unconscionability decision in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co. (D.C. Cir. 1965) 350 F.2d 445. (Leff, supra, 115
U.Pa. L.Rev. at pp. 551–557.) I have looked, and to my
knowledge no one has rebutted Leff’s scathing critique.
Historically, then, the doctrine of unconscionability has
been a difficult creature to identify and capture. “[S]cholars
uniformly describe unconscionability as an ambiguous and
undefinable concept.” (Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of

                            7  

the Doctrine of Unconscionability (2003) 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513,
1514; see also 1513–1514 [after well over one hundred law review
articles, legal scholars believed “they were unable to provide
courts with a “reasoned elaboration of what is unconscionable”].)
More than half a century later, however, some things are
clear.
A written arbitration agreement is valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except on grounds for the revocation of any contract.
This principle establishes an equal-treatment rule: a court may
invalidate an arbitration agreement based on generally
applicable contract defenses, but the court may not formulate
rules that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 341; see also Kindred
Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark (2017) 581 U.S. 246, 248 (Kindred)
[federal law preempts state rules that single out arbitration
agreements for disfavored treatment].)
The equal-treatment rule means California courts may not
create unconscionability rules that apply only in arbitration
cases. The highest courts of our state and nation condemn that
sort of selective contract law. The law requires Bennett to
advance generally applicable arguments, not ones specific to
arbitration contracts.
B
The trial court was right to find “the degree of procedural
unconscionability is low.”
Global apparently gave Bennett a meaningful opportunity
to review the written material, given that the burden was on
Bennett and she offered no contrary evidence. Bennett thus had
ample time to consider the contract. Global did not block Bennett

                            8  

from asking questions about the agreement. Neither did it tell
her to hurry up. Bennett reported neither surprise nor high-
pressure tactics. The font was easily readable. There was no
language barrier. The contract language was straightforward:
the words were not complex and there were no 900-word
paragraphs. (Cf. Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 104–105
[agreement was one mammoth paragraph of about 900 words
squeezed into about three vertical inches of text].)
The contract was a form, but that does not change this
assessment. The form is Global’s, as its logo at the top makes
clear. We can presume Global presented its form to Bennett on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis: even if she had tried, Bennett would
have been powerless to bargain over terms. Absent evidence on
this point, of which there is none, this presumption accords with
common experience. Some employees enjoy strong bargaining
positions, but they are the exceptions and not the rule. (See, e.g.,
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 83, 115 (Armendariz); Lab. Code, § 515, subd. (a).)
Form contracts often are pejoratively called contracts of
adhesion. But they could just as well be called contracts of
convenience.
“Form contracts have social utility. ‘Through advance
knowledge on the part of the enterprise offering the contract that
its relationship with each individual consumer or offeree will be
uniform, standard and fixed, the device of form contracts
introduces a degree of efficiency, simplicity, and stability. When
such contracts are used widely, the savings in cost and energy
can be substantial. An additional benefit is that the goods and
services which are covered by these contracts are put within the
reach of the general public, whose sheer size might prohibit

                             9  

widespread distribution if the necessary contractual relationships
had to be individualized. Transactional costs, and therefore the
possible prices of these goods and services, are reduced. [¶] In
short, form contracts appear to be a necessary concomitant of a
sophisticated, mass-consumption economy. They have social and
economic utility.’ ” (Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 818, fn. 15; see also Leff, supra, p. 504; Karl Llewellen, Book
Review (1939) 52 Harv. L.Rev. 700, 701.)
Half a century ago, the scholarly view was that “Standard
form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine
percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have
difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than
by standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they
probably never have. But if they are active, they contract by
standard form several times a day. Parking lot and theater
tickets, package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas
station credit card purchase slips are all standard form
contracts.” (Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 529.)
This view is dated. In the last 50 years, forms have become
more common because technology, prominently including the
internet, has continued to drive down transaction costs. In 2026,
many buyers want one-click transactions that get the item here
by 11 a.m. tomorrow. The idea of devoting time to customizing a
contract may strike the typical 2026 consumer as bothersome at
best.
This point is profound: for most modern commerce, for
most people, for most of the time, all contracts are forms. A
major reason is convenience. This is not some trick a cabal of
corporations foisted on protesting consumers. It is what people

                            10  

generally want, because people generally prefer spending less
time studying transactions and spending more time doing things
they enjoy.
Nevertheless, California law holds that some procedural
unconscionability exists in every standardized contract that,
“imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity
to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th
at p. 103.)
Some procedural unconscionability existed. The court
correctly assessed its level as low.
Citing Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 478, 492, 494 (Ramirez), Bennett concedes, as she must,
that the simple existence of an adhesion contract establishes only
a low degree of procedural unconscionability.
Bennett nevertheless launches many attacks on the form of
the contract, and then she does the same for the substance of the
contract. I will treat the full multitude of Bennett’s complaints
because their profusion is so typical of the way modern California
counsel are accustomed to attacking every conceivable detail of
arbitration contracts. California trial judges handling a civil
docket are familiar with this gamut, on both procedural and
substantive grounds. The majority opinion picks out some
offerings on this menu ultimately to craft a punishing method of
review that exists only when arbitration is the issue. The
common result is predictable: death to you, arbitration.
Bennett argues the font size was too small. The record
shows the text is easily readable, however, and different from the
“nearly unreadable” font size in the Fuentes case. (Fuentes,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 100; see also Fuentes v. Empire Nissan,

                            11  

Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 919, 923 [“strikingly minute,” “tiny
and blurred,” “largely unreadable”].)
If we assume Global gave Bennett material online, then
small font was irrelevant because the interested reader can use a
device to enlarge text on the screen. (See Basith v. Lithia Motors,
Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 951, 955 [“Technology made the online
image adjustable. Viewers could use a bigger monitor or
keyboard strokes to magnify the size of the words”].)
If we assume the materials were hard copies, then there
exists a tradeoff between font size and document size: larger
fonts use up more paper. The font is small on an average grocery
receipt, for instance, because the store wants to fit a lot of useful
information on a scrap of paper. The same goes for prescription
printouts and medication labels. These small fonts are not
unfair. They are typical and rational.
The font in Global’s agreement was Arial 9.2. This font size
is innocuous. It is larger font than in the heading of decisions
from this court explaining the prohibition on citing unpublished
opinions. It is larger than footnotes in the Official California
Reports, which are in 9 point font. According to the most recent
U.S. Government Publishing Office Style Manual published in
2016 (see p. 307), federal agencies generally set footnotes in 7, 8,
or 9 point font (<https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/GPO-
STYLEMANUAL-2016/pdf/GPO-STYLEMANUAL-2016.pdf> [as
of Nov. 8, 2026], archived at https://perma.cc/WLU5-LB3Z]; cf.
21 C.F.R. § 101.2(c) [federal regulations on food labeling require
information to “appear prominently and conspicuously, but in no
case may the letters and/or numbers be less than one-sixteenth
inch in height”].)

                             12  

Bennett cites no non-arbitration case holding Arial 9.2 to be
a procedurally unconscionable contract font size. This font size
argument fails.
Bennett likewise asserts the arbitration agreement was
“buried” in 100 pages of documents Global gave her. “Buried” is
pejorative. Bennett does not identify material Global gave her
that was unnecessary filler designed only to discourage curiosity.
Employers are rarely faulted for giving new hires too much
information about the new job.
The employer highlighted the importance of the arbitration
agreement. It included its proposed contract as an appendix to
other materials. It required her to sign this three-page
document. Global also required Bennett to sign a confidentiality
agreement. These signature requirements emphasized the
importance of these two contracts and distinguished them from
accompanying materials.
Bennett also argues she had a high school diploma only and
was unfamiliar with the topic of arbitration. Her briefing
characterizes the arbitration agreement as “complex, including
statutory references and legal jargon … .” The record debunks
the supposed semantic complexity of this document. For a
legally-binding document, this wording is pedestrian. It is
neither see-Spot-run nor unnecessarily prolix.
No general contract rule states the contracting process is
suspect when one side writes down legalistic language and the
other side lacks a college degree. Were that true, it would cast
unwarranted doubt, for instance, on many real estate
transactions and car loans.
In short, the trial court properly rated the level of
procedural unconscionability as low. I agree with my colleagues

                            13  

in the majority on this point. The level of procedural
unconscionability was as close to zero as any form can get.
Procedurally, then, this contract was just like what everyone uses
all the time.
C
There was no substantive unconscionability (1) that
mattered on these facts and (2) that could not easily and simply
be severed.
The trial court faulted two aspects of the deal: scope and
duration. Bennett endorses these criticisms and piles on many
more. The majority accepts some of these points, adds others,
and ignores the rest. Again I go through the panoply because
this mass of special attacks is standard in California arbitration
law today. California judges have lived in this atmosphere so
long that we mistake it for normal, even though it utterly departs
from general contract law.
1
The trial court ruled the scope of the contract was unfair
because it covered non-employment as well as employment
claims. This, however, was not overly harsh or so one-sided that
it shocks the conscience. It was not even close.
Bennett claimed the contract was unfair because it was
“overbroad in scope.” General contract law, however, has never
contained a doctrine of “overbreadth.” The contrary is true. The
familiar principle of contract law is to allow parties to determine
the scope of their relationship. (E.g., Civ. Code, § 1636 [interpret
contracts to effectuate the mutual intention of the parties].)
This freedom to construct a world of private ordering allows
parties to make their own law tailored to their particular plans.
Bennett does not elaborate or defend the notion that courts

                            14  

generally will oversee the “proper” scope of all contracts.
Bennett’s notion is another arbitration-specific invention running
hard against the grain of general contract law.
Apart from the non-existence of a general overbreadth
doctrine, Bennett in particular fails to explain what was unfair
about this contract’s scope. She offers three speculative
hypotheticals: her conceivable slip-and-fall in the Global parking
lot outside of work hours; an imaginary mishap as a customer of
one of Global’s call centers; and a theoretical plaintiff suing a co-
worker at Global for “claims unrelated to her employment, like
defamation, conversion, stalking, assault, or other common
claims … .” The majority endorses Bennett’s attack.
This scope is not unfair. Contracts commonly have a scope
that is sweeping. Standard settlement contracts, for instance,
commonly attempt to expand their scope to the maximum extent
the English language permits.
For instance, encompassing words like the following are
routine in non-arbitration contracts, as every experienced trial
judge will recognize: “claimants, for themselves and each of their
present and former heirs, trustees, executors, administrators,
partners, sureties, employees, attorneys, agents, representatives,
predecessors, successors, and assigns.” These people
“unconditionally and irrevocably waive, release, and forever
discharge the defendant and each of its present, former and
future parents, predecessors, successors, assignees, affiliates,
subsidiaries, principals, shareholders, joint ventures, officers and
directors, attorneys, agents, representatives, and employees from
and against any and all past and present claims (including
subrogation claims), counterclaims, actions, causes of action,
lawsuits, fees, costs, losses, controversies, promises, demands, or

                             15  

liabilities, of whatever kind or character, whether known or
unknown.”
Lawyers often generate, and trial courts often encounter,
these feats of semantic indulgence. The drafting lawyers are
trying to visualize every possible circumstance and to capture
them all. That is not unfair. It is customary and usual, because
clients commonly want the deal to cover every eventuality, no
matter how remote or outlandish the prospect might seem at
first. Lawyers write this way because experience has taught the
profession to be prudent and detail-oriented. Clients want
competent contract attorneys who anticipate problems and plug
potential holes.
Bennett cites a number of cases to support her claim. Later
I discuss Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 312 (Cook). This and all the other unconscionability
precedents Bennett or the majority cite are arbitration cases.
None manifests an equal-treatment rule.
In sum, Bennett’s scope argument founders.
The majority does not attempt to show its scope critique
appears anywhere in contract law outside of arbitration. This
scope critique is an arbitration special. It is not evenhanded.
2
Bennett argues the agreement was unfair because of its
duration: it survived her employment and could be revoked or
modified only in a writing signed by Bennett and all of Global’s
partners. The indefinite nature of the contract’s duration, she
contends, shows it was unfair.
Nonsense.
No general contract law doctrine holds that indefinite
contract duration is unfair. General law is to the contrary.

                           16  

Parties often strike deals that are to remain in place indefinitely
or until all parties agree to end them.
Alternatively, parties may specify their contracts have a
lengthy duration, or courts may interpret the contract to imply
such a term. (E.g., RMR Equipment Rental, Inc. v. Residential
Fund 1347, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 [long term water
requirements contract]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 413–414 [long term employee commission
contract]; Thomson v. Hodgson (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1097,
1105–1107 [long term musical royalties contract].)
Long lasting arrangements are commonplace throughout
the economy and over the breadth of general contract law. Long
term relationships—made binding by long term contracts—can be
important for the parties by helping them to achieve long term
goals.
When parties embark on an enormous venture, the time
frame can stretch far into the future. Dams, power plants,
underground subways, towering skyscrapers, enormous
cathedrals, mighty bridges: the planned duration can stretch
over many decades.
The duration of associated contracts can match the
mammoth scale of these projects. Contract law lets people think
big. It makes spectacular achievements possible by enforcing
reliable trust over the very long run. This aspect of contract law
has tremendous utility. It enables our civilization to construct
what is monumental and enduring.
In the context of this case, it can be rational for the parties
to set a duration that extends past the end date of employment.
Trial judges familiar with employment lawsuits know many are
filed after employment ended, as in this case. What then would

                             17  

be the logical end date for an employment contract? That would
depend on the statute of limitations, whether there might be
estoppel or tolling of the statute for some reason, and whether
these and other relevant doctrines might evolve in the future.
The parties may believe these matters cannot be predicted with
certainty. A sensible conclusion would be to extend the contract
until all sides are satisfied its purpose has run its course. If the
relationship ends, the contract may become moot as a practical
matter. Then no one need do anything.
For these reasons, the duration of this contract was logical.
This term corresponded to the situation and the interests at
stake. It was not unfair.
Flexibility about duration is another aspect of the freedom
of contract. The contrary view is peculiar to arbitration.
The majority does not attempt to show its duration critique
appears anywhere in contract law outside of arbitration. This
duration critique is an arbitration special. It is not evenhanded.
3
The majority joins with Bennett by faulting this arbitration
contract because it lacks mutuality. The majority asserts this
issue of mutuality arises because “Bennett must arbitrate any
claim she has against Global’s past or present employees, officers,
administrators, and agents.” The result makes these other
people into third party beneficiaries of this contract, reasons the
majority, and hypothetically these others can force Bennett into
arbitration while she would not be able to do the same to them.
“The agreement, therefore, creates a one-sided benefit in favor of
its third-party beneficiaries,” concludes the majority. This is a
fatal offense to the paramount consideration of mutuality,
concludes the majority.

                            18  

This concern is strictly hypothetical. It has no basis in the
facts Bennett alleged in her complaint. The majority thus
invents a hypothetical mutuality concern to invalidate this
arbitration contract.
This technique is powerfully destructive. It also has no
parallel in general contract law.
General contract law does not require mutuality. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that, “[i]f the
requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional
requirement of
(a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss,
disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee; or
(b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or
(c) ‘mutuality of obligation.’ ” (Rest. (2d) Contracts § 79,
italics added.)
Mutuality is not a general contract law rule. (See, e.g., 3
Williston of Contracts (4th ed. 2026 May 2026 Update) § 7:22.)
Recall that line about the peppercorn being enough.
(https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/chappell-v-nestle.php.)
The unconscionability doctrine is centrally concerned with
overall contract unfairness that shocks the conscience, but the
majority offers no example of an unconscionability case—outside
the arbitration context, that is—where a court goes through the
contract in search of hypothetical problems to destroy the deal.
Demanding equivalence in the values exchanged for every
clause, for every imaginable hypothetical case, increases the
power of California courts to regulate arbitration to our
standards of fairness.
No other branch of contract law, however, uses imaginary
hypotheticals to flyspeck contracts to death.

                             19  

Justice Kagan condemned a method that “hypothesized a
slim set of both patently objectionable and utterly fanciful”
situations as a method of disfavoring arbitration. (Kindred,
supra, 581 U.S. at p. 253.) That style of analysis “reveals the
kind of ‘hostility to arbitration’ that led Congress to enact the
[Federal Arbitration Act].” (Id. at p. 254, citing Concepcion,
supra, 563 U.S., at 339.) “And doing so only makes clear the
arbitration-specific character of the rule, much as if it were made
applicable to arbitration agreements and black swans.” (Ibid.)
Stephen Broome wrote in 2006 that the “mutuality test
evidences an overt bias against arbitration by the California
courts … .” (Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are
Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act (2006) 3 Hastings Bus.
L.J. 39, 40 (Broome).) The Supreme Court of the United States
cited Broome’s article. (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S at p. 342.)
The majority does not attempt to show its hypothetical
mutuality critique appears anywhere in contract law outside of
arbitration. This hypothetical mutuality critique is an
arbitration special. It is not evenhanded.
4
Bennett argues the confidentiality agreement lacks
mutuality because it permits Global to seek injunctive relief, “but
requires that Bennett concede factors favoring injunctive relief,
i.e., agree that disclosure would cause irreparable harm, agree
that any damages would be difficult to measure for a breach that
injunctive relief be granted, agree that injunctive relief be
granted, and agree that [Global] is entitled to immediate
injunctive relief.” The majority endorses this argument.

                            20  

For the sake of argument, I will assume it is proper to read
the arbitration contract and the confidentiality contract as one.
This attack still fails. Global’s interest in getting injunctive
relief for trade secret violations was valid and typical. The only
authority Bennett or the majority muster are arbitration cases.
Bennett and the majority cannot identify a rule of general
applicability that casts doubt on a trade secret holder’s power to
include provisions of this kind in its confidentiality agreements.
Global’s interest in protecting its trade secrets was
legitimate. Injunctive relief is a key way to protect trade secrets.
The primary purpose of California’s trade secret law is to
promote and reward innovation and technological development
and to maintain commercial ethics. (DVD Copy Control Assn.,
Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 878 (Bunner).)
“Injunctions issued under California’s trade secret law
serve significant government interests. The logic of the law of
trade secrets recognizes that private parties invest extensively in
certain information that loses its value when published to the
world at large. Trade secret law thus creates a property right
defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his
interest from disclosure to others. By doing so, it allows the trade
secret owner to reap the fruits of its labor and protects the
owner’s moral entitlement to these fruits. Trade secrets thus
have been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible
property interest. By creating a limited property right in
information, trade secret law creates an incentive for investment
in innovation. Trade secret law prompts innovators to proceed
with the discovery and exploitation of their inventions. Without
trade secret protection, organized scientific and technological

                              21  

research could become fragmented, and society as a whole would
suffer.” (Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 880–881.)
“Trade secret law also maintains standards of commercial
ethics. It minimizes the inevitable cost to the basic decency of
society when one steals from another. It thereby recognizes that
good faith and honest, fair dealing is the life and spirit of the
commercial world.” (Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
“[P]rohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets acquired by
improper means is the only way to preserve the property interest
created by trade secret law and its concomitant ability to
encourage invention.” (Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
A trade secret is a peculiar kind of property because its
only value consists in keeping it private. The right to exclude
others thus is central to the definition of this property interest.
(Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
Once the information constituting a trade secret is
disclosed to others, the holder of the trade secret has lost its
property interest in the information. “The protection of trade
secrets and the benefits to research and development derived
from the government’s recognition of this property right depend
on the judiciary’s power to enjoin disclosures by those who know
or have reason to know of their misappropriation.” (Bunner,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881, italics added.)
There is no less restrictive way of protecting an owner’s
constitutionally recognized property interest in its trade secrets.
(Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
Injunctive relief thus is central to trade secret protection.
As a trade secret holder, Global’s contractual effort to make this
remedy readily available to it was usual and proper.

                            22  

Once again, Bennett’s only authorities for attacking these
provisions are decisions about arbitration agreements. (See
Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 486–487,
492–493 (Alberto) [arbitration case]; Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 233 [same]; Carmona v. Lincoln
Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 78
[same].)
If there is a general rule disfavoring contractual efforts to
make injunctive relief more easily available in trade secret cases,
Bennett has not identified it. She gives us only arbitration
specials. They are preempted.
5
Bennett and the majority identify an invalid provision in
the confidentiality agreement. This provision has nothing to do
with this case. It is easily severable. This irrelevant and
severable provision is not a good reason to condemn this
arbitration agreement.
Paragraph eight in the confidentiality agreement purports
to prohibit Bennett from soliciting Global’s employees to
terminate their employment with Global.
This anti-raiding clause is unenforceable because it is not
limited to a bar on improper means. (AMN Healthcare, Inc. v.
Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 923, 936; cf.
ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017 [former employee may use general knowledge, skill, and
experience acquired in former employment in competition with a
former employer, but the former employee may not use
confidential information or trade secrets in doing so].)
The trial court declined to address the anti-raiding clause.
This was sensible for two reasons: irrelevant and severable.

                            23  

First, the anti-raiding clause is irrelevant. Its connection to
Bennett’s case is delicious fiction. Bennett worked at Global as
an “account associate” at a call center for six weeks. Her
complaint does not allege she then left to compete with Global.
The factual relationship between the anti-raiding clause and this
case is nil.
This analysis is not hypothetical. It compares Bennett’s
actual complaint to the actual text of the anti-raiding clause and
then questions how one logically relates to the other. Answer:
there is no actual relationship. This analysis of actualities is the
opposite of hypothetical.
Second, the anti-raiding clause is severable. The strong
legislative and judicial preference is to sever an offending term
and to enforce the balance of the agreement. The relevant
statute is Civil Code section 1599, which contemplates a judicial
refusal to enforce an entire agreement only when it is permeated
by unconscionability. (See Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 514.)
Courts may liberally sever any unconscionable portion of a
contract and enforce the rest when the illegality is collateral to
the contract’s main purpose, when it is possible to cure the
illegality by means of severance, and when enforcing the balance
of the contract would be in the interests of justice. (Ramirez,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 514.)
The illegality here is collateral to the main purpose of the
arbitration contract. Prohibiting Bennett from raiding Global’s
employees is unrelated to the purpose of arbitrating the Labor
Code allegations that Bennett has made against Global.
The proper course would be to cure this illegality by
severing it. Striking paragraph eight from the confidentiality

                             24  

agreement would leave the arbitration agreement intact. This
slice of the knife would be straight, clean, and easy.
Enforcing the balance of the agreement also is in the
interest of justice. The parties agreed that “[i]f any provision of
this [Arbitration] Agreement is determined to be void or
otherwise unenforceable, in whole or in part, such determination
shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement.”
It serves the spirit and letter of this clause to sever the anti-
raiding provision clause, which is unrelated to arbitration. (See
Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 517 [“if the contract contains a
severance clause, the court should take it into account as an
expression of the parties’ intent that an agreement curable by
removing defective terms should otherwise be enforced”].)
On the actual facts of this case, one can find no need to
deter Global from pursuing a scheme of widespread illegality.
The anti-raiding provision in paragraph eight is the lone problem
in an otherwise unobjectionable agreement. (See Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 517 [“the greater the number of unconscionable
provisions a contract contains the less likely it is that severance
will be the appropriate remedy”].)
To sum up, there was no substantive unconscionability (1)
that mattered on these facts and (2) that could not easily and
simply be severed. To reach the contrary conclusion of
substantive unconscionability requires the majority to employ a
collection of destructive weapons used only in arbitration cases.
This approach is not evenhanded.
D
The Cook decision, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 320–330,
displayed antipathy to arbitration of the kind that prompted
Justice Breyer to chide California courts for their intransigence

                            25  

on the topic. (See DIRECTV, supra, 577 U.S. at p. 53.) The
Supreme Court of the United States addressed California’s
continuing defiance of federal law. The “ ‘Supremacy Clause
forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law
because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize
the superior authority of its source.’ … The Federal Arbitration
Act is a law of the United States, and Concepcion is an
authoritative interpretation of that Act. Consequently, the
judges of every State must follow it.” (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court has heeded the direction of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Our Supreme Court
applies an equal-treatment rule. Under this guidance, Cook must
fall.
Pamela Cook sued the University of Southern California for
causes of action arising from her former employment at USC.
USC moved to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeal affirmed
the trial court’s denial of this motion. The court said the degree
of procedural unconscionability was low. (Cook, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 321.) Substantive unconscionability, on the
other hand, was present to an unacceptable degree for three
reasons: contract scope, contract duration, and lack of mutuality.
(Id. at pp. 321–328.) I treat each in turn.
First, the Cook opinion held that the “the agreement’s
broad scope is substantively unconscionable.” (Cook, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 325, italics added.) As noted above, however,
contract law has never contained a general doctrine of
“overbreadth” that limits the permissible scope of contracts. The
Cook decision cited unconscionability decisions holding “broad
scope” to be a problem. But all these decisions concerned
arbitration. (See id. at pp. 321–325.) That is what the equal-

                           26  

treatment rule forbids: inventing new state rules that apply only
in arbitration cases, where their effect is to the detriment of
arbitration. This version of the unconscionability doctrine
“singles out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment.”
(Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 248.) That is forbidden.
Second, Cook held the contract’s duration was
unacceptable: “The arbitration agreement specifically provides
that it will survive unless and until Cook and USC’s president
specifically terminate the agreement in a writing, signed by both
parties, which expressly mentions the arbitration agreement.”
(Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 326.) According to Cook, this
indefinite duration revealed fatal unconscionability. (Ibid.) This
holding is unsustainable, however, because—in practice—it preys
only upon arbitration. Contract law contains no general rule
bounding the duration of contracts. So far as the Cook decision
attempted to show, this duration objection has never driven
unconscionability holdings outside the arbitration field. I know
of no unconscionability holding outside the arbitration field that
espoused this logic. It is an arbitration special.
Third, the Cook opinion faulted the arbitration agreement
for its supposed lack of mutuality. Once again, however, the
opinion cited only arbitration cases as precedents for its
application of the unconscionability doctrine. (Cook, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 326–328.)
In sum, the Cook opinion applied a version of the
unconscionability doctrine that puts only arbitration on the
chopping block. Holdings like that invite a ninth reprimand from
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Later California state cases follow Cook. They magnify the
problem.

                           27  

E
So much for method. Now to results. The results are no
more evenhanded than the method.
This section takes up the empirical question of whether the
application of the unconscionability doctrine today in fact has
been evenhanded.
My approach is simple legal research: look up cases on
Westlaw, read them, sort them, and count them.
I have tried to use human intelligence. At any rate, I have
used no artificial intelligence. I suspect people with more wits
and resources could, using an array of tools, check and extend my
basic inquiry. Widespread and expanded research along these
lines would be desirable.
1
I inquire into the actions of courts because actions speak
louder than words.
The question is this: when California state courts use the
doctrine of unconscionability to impair or invalidate a contract,
how often is that contract about arbitration? For the years 2021
to 2025, the answer is: disproportionately often, and
overwhelmingly so.
For these years, and depending on exactly how we define
“unconscionability,” California courts used the unconscionability
doctrine to interfere with arbitration 79 percent to 90 percent of
the time. These percentages show a highly disproportionate
impact.
To rephrase, take the cases in which courts used
unconscionability to invalidate part or all of a contract. Question:
how often was that contract about arbitration? Answer: from 79
percent to 90 percent of the time. In other words, California

                            28  

courts target arbitration in the overwhelming supermajority of
the cases.
Put in yet other terms, recent California decisions have
disproportionately used the supposedly general doctrine of
unconscionability to focus on and to impair or extinguish a
particular kind of contract: arbitration.
This is not evenhandedness. This is antipathy to
arbitration. The antipathy is extreme.
2
My survey includes unpublished as well as published cases,
because California courts often impair an arbitration contract
without publishing their decisions. Nevertheless, an invalidated
contract is legally unenforceable whether or not the decision is
published. I cite unpublished cases, not to support some legal
assertion with their nonexistent legal authority, but to show the
reality of how California courts decide arbitration cases.
3
To repeat, lawyers, scholars, and empiricists on all sides of
the arbitration debate should scrutinize, critique, and expand the
following initial research foray.
Broome suggested California state courts began expressing
their hostility to arbitration in 1997. (See Broome, supra, 3
Hastings Bus. L.J. at pp. 49–50 & fn. 51, citing Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1547–1548.)
1997 was 29 years ago.
I have not attempted to tackle 29 years of data. I confine
my analysis to cases decided in 2021 to 2025, which is about all I
can manage for now.
For the sake of completeness, however, it would be
desirable to expand this inquiry to encompass the universe of

                            29  

data. Future parties to arbitration disputes may want to check
and expand my feeble effort. It would be ideal if scholars and
arms-length observers would join in.
4
My research method has been to search Westlaw for
California state cases with these queries and to obtain these
results:
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2021) returned 146 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2022) returned 135 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2023) returned 140 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2024) returned 152 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2025) returned 140 cases
These searches produced a total of 713 cases. I reviewed
the 713 cases to see in which courts used something like the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate part or all of a contract.
Why do I say something like the unconscionability doctrine?
As Professor Leff explained, a hallmark of the unconscionability
doctrine is its indefinite character. So I culled the 713 cases to
determine those in which courts were applying something like
this doctrine.
This effort required some judgment calls, and judgment
calls deserve explanation and justification. I invite scrutiny of
my judgment calls, which I hope readers conclude are reasonable
and which are at least explicit and therefore subject to open
debate.
In the interest of casting a wide net, then, I included cases
of the following four categories.
First, in In re Marriage of Valkov and Valkova (Feb. 15,
2022, B304187) 2022 WL 455279 [nonpub. opn.] (Valkov), the
court set aside a post-marital stipulated property division in a

                            30  

marital dissolution case. (Id. at p. *1.) The wife argued she was
under duress, the terms were unconscionable, and the husband
had unclean hands. (Id. at p. *10.) The appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s decision setting aside the stipulated property
division based on the finding the wife was under duress and on
other “equitable grounds.” (Id. at p. *11.) Thus, the court did not
explicitly state the stipulation was unconscionable. But this
analysis of “inherent equitable authority to set aside a stipulated
agreement” closely resembles an unconscionability holding, and
indeed the wife used that very word. (Id. at pp. *10, 11.) I
therefore include this case in my sample, despite the absence of
an express judicial embrace of the unconscionability doctrine.
Second, in an unlawful detainer action brought after a
foreclosure sale, the trial court found that a procedural
irregularity plus a grossly inadequate price meant it would be
“unconscionable” to allow a home loan lender to profit at the
home loan borrower’s expense from the lender’s “misleading
communications.” (Genova Capital, Inc. v. Field (July 21, 2022,
B303697) 2022 WL 2849079 [nonpub. opn.], at p. *8 (Genova).)
The court did not expressly invalidate any contract, but simply
denied the lender possession after the foreclosure sale, pending
an “unlimited quiet title action.” (Id. at p. *2.) This rule
specifically concerns real estate foreclosure sales, as explained in
Millennium Rock Mortgage Inc. v. T.D. Service Co. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 804, 809–810. Consequently, this rule is not a
general contract law doctrine. Yet this rule resembles
unconscionability analysis by focusing on the process of contract
formation and the substantive unfairness of the contractual
result. I include this case.

                             31  

Third, a series of decisions invalidated certain aspects of
contracts that the Dameron hospitals required patients to sign
before hospital admission. These decisions found aspects of these
contracts of adhesion to be unenforceable because the effects were
beyond the patients’ expectation. (See Dameron Hospital Assn. v.
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 530,
536, 543 (Dameron IV); Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern
Cal., Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971,
993–994 (Dameron III); Dameron Hospital Assn. v. United
Services Automobile Assn. (Jan. 5, 2022, C087225) 2022 WL
41914 [nonpub. opn.] at p. *8 (Dameron II); Dameron Hospital
Assn. v. Geico Casualty Co. (Oct. 4 2021, C086546) 2021 WL
4519651 [nonpub. opn.], at pp. *7–9 (Dameron I).) The decisions
did not self-consciously apply the doctrine of unconscionability or
cite unconscionability precedents. They used the word
“unconscionable” once, and then in a descriptive rather than a
doctrinal way. Yet their focus on both procedural and
substantive unfairness qualifies them as kin to the
unconscionability doctrine. I include these cases.
Fourth, in Razaqi v. Khurush (Nov. 21, 2025, C099636,
C101262) 2025 WL 3250832 [nonpub. opn.], at pp. *8–11
(Razaqi), the trial court awarded statutory fees and sanctions in
a family law matter after concluding that basing fees on the 40
percent contingency fee contract between the wife and her lawyer
would be unconscionable. The appellate court upheld the
statutory fees and sanctions but did not address
unconscionability. I include this decision because professional
regulation of attorney conduct, including sanctions for
“unconscionable” attorney behavior, seems to be a genre of
unconscionability analysis. It is difficult precisely to assess this

                            32  

case because the appellate court did not discuss or describe the
basis for the trial court’s unconscionability ruling. I hope to err
on the side of casting a wide net, however, so I include this case.
I also include cases where a court invalidates part of a
contract but then severs that part. This use of the
unconscionability doctrine destroys at least a part of the parties’
agreement.
On the other hand, some cases use some variant of the
word “unconscionability” but, in my view, are not applications of
the contract law doctrine of unconscionability.
In a couple of cases, for instance, courts found a party
would suffer “unconscionable injury” such that the statute of
frauds should not be applied to a contract; thus, the
unconscionability finding allowed the agreement to be enforced.
(E.g., Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 25–26; Twelve
Tribes of Israel, U.S.A., Inc. v. Barnum (Mar. 17, 2022, B299838)
2022 WL 804783 [nonpub. opn.], at p. *11.) This is the opposite
of the contract law defense of unconscionability, which annuls
contract enforcement. I exclude decisions of this sort.
In another category, courts determine whether default
judgment awards are “totally unconscionable and without
evidentiary justification.” In one case, the court found the
punitive damages award failed the standard because the party’s
financial condition was not sufficiently considered. (Brahms v.
Wilk (Sept. 20, 2022, G060250) 2022 WL 4393494 [nonpub. opn.],
at p. *5.) In another, the trial court vacated the attorney fees
portion of the default judgment award as unconscionable, but the
appellate court reversed. (Coastline JX Holdings LLC v. Letwak
& Bennett (May 16, 2022, G059646) 2022 WL 1534602 [nonpub.
opn.], at pp. *1, 2, 5.) These are not contract law cases; there is

                            33  

no contract to validate or invalidate. Rather, these appellate
courts were reviewing the propriety of trial court damage awards.
These are not applications of the contract law doctrine of
unconscionability. I exclude this type of opinion.
In yet another category, the court in Bai v. Rodeo
Concierge, Inc. (Aug. 31, 2022, B305596) 2022 WL 3908603
[nonpub. opn.] affirmed a holding that defendants had violated
statutes prohibiting unlawful car leasing laws: Penal Code
section 571, which outlaws certain types of car subleasing; and
Civil Code section 3343.5, which creates a private right of action
to enforce Penal Code section 571. (Id. at pp. *9–10.) The
combination of these statutes do arguably involve a form of
unconscionability, but they convert it from a contract law shield
into a tort law sword. Because this is not the contract law
defense of unconscionability, I exclude this case.
I exclude Northstar v. Apollo Couriers, Inc. (Aug. 28, 2025,
B334620) 2025 WL 2475253 [nonpub. opn.]. There the trial court
decided an arbitration contract was unenforceable under
California law, but the appellate court barely mentioned
unconscionability. Rather it affirmed primarily on the grounds of
an inadequate appellate presentation of the record. (Id. at pp.
*2–3.) Perhaps my judgment call is wrong, but I exclude this
case to err on the side of caution.
5
These parameters yield a sample of 100 decisions from
2021 to 2025. These 100 decisions are the cases in which
California courts invalidated contracts, in whole or in part, on
unconscionability grounds.
In this list, I count the dispute in Ramirez as just one case.
This case traveled up and down the appellate ladder and

                            34  

culminated in nullification of the arbitration contract in Ramirez
v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1297,
1308. Despite the multiple opinions, Ramirez remains but one
case about just one contract.
6
Of these 100 decisions that used something like
unconscionability reasoning to impair or invalidate contracts,
how many cases involved arbitration? The answer is 79:
1. Alvarez v. Altamed Health Services Corp. (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 572
2. Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists,
Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552
3. Fisher v. MoneyGram Intern., Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.4th 1084 4. Cruz v. Calop Business Systems (Mar. 30, 2021
B306688) 2021 WL 1205631 [nonpub. opn.]
5. De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services,
LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 476
6. Bouarich v. Comerica Management Co., Inc. (May 5,
2021 B302958) 2021 WL 1782995 [nonpub. opn.]
7. Veitenhans v. Hikvision USA, Inc. (May 27, 2021
B302552) 2021 WL 2153773 [nonpub. opn.]
8. Salgado v. Carrows Restaurants, Inc. (June 1, 2021
B304799) 2021 WL 2199436 [nonpub. opn.]
9. D’Avella v. Overhill Farms, Inc. (Oct. 26, 2021
B303644) 2021 WL 4958910 [nonpub. opn.]
10. Nunez v. Cycad Management LLC (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 276
11. Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center,
Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643

                            35  

12. Borisoff v. Pullman Group, LLC (Jan. 11, 2022,
B297162, B298972, B299796) 2022 WL 99257
[nonpub. opn.]
13. Williams v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (Apr. 29,
2022, A162007) 2022 WL 1284194 [nonpub. opn.]
14. Sellers v. World Fin. Group, Inc. (June 23,
2022, D078934) 2022 WL 2254998 [nonpub. opn.]
15. Mirzoyan v. W. Coast Wound & Skin Care Inc.
(June 28, 2022, B310901) 2022 WL 2314478 [nonpub.
opn.]
16. Shekarchi v. Fischbach (June 28, 2022,
B311989) 2022 WL 2314551 [nonpub. opn.]
17. Ojeda v. Vahi, Inc. (Aug. 16, 2022, B313717)
2022 WL 3367500 [nonpub. opn.]
18. Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 1035
19. Navas v. Fresh Venture Foods, LLC (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 626
20. Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 292
21. Ramos v. Monschein Industries, Inc. (Dec. 19,
2022, F083299) 2022 WL 17752221 [nonpub. opn.]
22. Patterson v. AVX Design & Integration (Jan. 19,
2023, B313948) 2023 WL 312212 [nonpub. opn.]
23. Herlitz v. Capital Senior Living, Inc. (Jan. 24,
2023, C097245) 2023 WL 367782 [nonpub. opn.]
24. Mendez v. WTMG, Inc. (Feb. 3, 2023, C095759)
2023 WL 1459930 [nonpub. opn.]
25. Rodriguez v. Jonathan Club (Feb. 24, 2023,
B317622) 2023 WL 2202680 [nonpub. opn.]

                   36  

26. Platt, LLC v. OptumRx, Inc. (Mar. 15, 2023,
A163061) 2023 WL 2507259 [nonpub. opn.]
27. Murrey v. Super. Ct. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1223
28. Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1035
29. Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th 482
30. Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1280
31. Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 1041
32. Barraza v. Tesla, Inc. (Apr. 11, 2023, A165347)
2023 WL 2887547 [nonpub. opn.]
33. Rice v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (May
9, 2023, B316079) 2023 WL 3314990 [nonpub. opn.]
34. Nathaniel v. Greene Motors, Inc. (May 25, 2023,
A165056) 2023 WL 3638790 [nonpub. opn.]
35. Herrera v. Behavioral Systems Southwest, Inc.
(June 27, 2023, G061702) 2023 WL 4195766 [nonpub.
opn.]
36. King v. Baker Petrolite LLC (June 29, 2023,
B321248) 2023 WL 4246784 [nonpub. opn.]
37. Sawyer v. KeHE Distributors, Inc. (July 12,
2023, E078024) 2023 WL 4484440 [nonpub. opn.]
38. Bonilla v. Reiter Berry Farms, Inc. (Aug. 28,
2023, H050268) 2023 WL 5525877 [nonpub. opn.]
39. Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC
LLC (Oct. 30, 2023, A165800) 2023 WL 7125117
[nonpub. opn.]

                  37  

40. Mena v. Muscolino Inventory Services, Inc.
(Nov. 16, 2023, B321559) 2023 WL 7852745 [nonpub.
opn.]
41. Hutcheson v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. (Oct.
31, 2023, A166376) 2023 WL 7143186 [nonpub. opn.]
42. Smith v. Folsom Investors, L.P. (Dec. 20, 2023,
C097549) 2023 WL 8794888 [nonpub. opn.]
43. Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 312
44. Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 633
45. Monroy v. Donsuemor, Inc. (Mar. 12, 2024,
A167487) 2024 WL 1068436 [nonpub. opn.]
46. Johnston v. Sensei AG Holdings, Inc. (Mar. 5,
2025, B334773) 2025 WL 703258 [nonpub. opn.]
47. Arnold v. Antelope Manufactured Home
Community (Mar. 13, 2024, C097244) 2024 WL
1081934 [nonpub. opn.]
48. Brooks v. Emer (Mar. 14, 2025, B334409) 2025
WL 812149 [nonpub. opn.]
49. Agundez v. Do & Co Los Angeles, Inc. (Apr. 14,
2025, B334775) 2025 WL 1098414 [nonpub. opn.]
50. Alvarado v. Charter Communications, LLC
(July 11, 2025, B334578) 2025 WL 1910952 [nonpub.
opn.]
51. Pike v. True Bullion, LLC (May 1, 2024,
B324634) 2024 WL 1903203 [nonpub. opn.]
52. Guerrero v. TruConnect Communications, Inc.
(May 8, 2024, B324938) 2024 WL 2044023 [nonpub.
opn.]

                  38  

53. Dopp v. Now Optics, LLC (May 20, 2024,
D081665) 2024 WL 2265759 [nonpub. opn.]
54. Rainier v. Paradise Chevrolet Cadillac (Jun 7,
2024, E079647, E080308) 2024 WL 2873688 [nonpub.
opn.]
55. Fredeen v. California Cemetery and Funeral
Services, LLC (Jun. 11, 2024, B326031) 2024 WL
2930024 [nonpub. opn.]
56. Xing v. Winn Inc. (Oct. 20, 2025, G063980)
2025 WL 2952340 [nonpub. opn.]
57. Weisfeiler v. ByteDance Inc. (June 20, 2025,
A168006) 2025 WL 1720606 [nonpub. opn.]
58. Helfet v. Motive Energy, Inc. (Jul 1, 2024,
B331359) 2024 WL 3243710 [nonpub. opn.]
59. Booker v. Charter Communications, LLC (July
11, 2025, B322813) 2025 WL 1910954 [nonpub. opn.]
60. Jackson v. Faraday & Future, Inc. (Jul. 24,
2024, B328046) 2024 WL 3517465 [nonpub. opn.]
61. Lodes v. Transmodus Corp. (Jul. 31, 2024,
B332111) 2024 WL 3588890 [nonpub. opn.]
62. Libra Securities Holdings, LLC v. Robles (Aug.
11, 2025, B338602) 2025 WL 2304745 [nonpub. opn.]
63. Perez v. It Works Marketing, Inc. (Aug. 28,
2024, A168331) 2024 WL 3963524 [nonpub. opn.]
64. Anderson v. Thrive Social Equity Manager VII,
LLC (Sep. 24, 2024, B329181) 2024 WL 4282162
[nonpub. opn.]
65. Yeganeh v. Amerisave Mortg. Corp. (Oct. 21,
2024, G062668) 2024 WL 4532654 [nonpub. opn.]

                  39  

66. Gonzalez v. Aten Technology, Inc. (Oct. 21,
2025, G064777) 2025 WL 2962200 [nonpub. opn.]
67. Becerra v. Charter Communications, Inc. (Oct.
31, 2025, B333509) 2025 WL 3041780 [nonpub. opn.]
68. Bonzell v. Retirement Capital Strategies, Inc.
(Nov. 25, 2024, H052392) 2024 WL 4903598 [nonpub.
opn.]
69. Sanchez v. Super. Ct. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
615
70. Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1297
71. Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 1009
72. Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1311
73. Young v. Refrigeration Supplies Distributor
(Dec. 15, 2025, G064837) 2025 WL 3628506 [nonpub.
opn.]
74. Rodriguez v. BW Supplies, LLC (Dec. 16, 2025,
B340191) 2025 WL 3639524 [nonpub. opn.]
75. Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 327
76. Rahme v. Bicycle Casino, L.P. (Dec. 30, 2025,
B340203) 2025 WL 3764784 [nonpub. opn.]
77. Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center
Medical Group, Inc. (Dec. 15, 2025, F088971) 2025
WL 3628510 [nonpub. opn.], review granted Mar. 25,
2026, S294710
78. Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (Dec. 22, 2025,
A170983) review den. and opn. ordered nonpub. Apr.

                  40  

1, 2026, S295055 [assuming nondisclosure agreement
provisions connected to arbitration agreement were
unconscionable]
79. Chelico v. TJB Gearys, LLC (Dec. 15, 2025,
B331570) 2025 WL 3628320 [nonpub. opn.]

Of the 100 cases, 21 did not involve arbitration:

  1. In re Marriage of Stull (Feb. 4, 2021, E071912) 2021
    WL 389212 [nonpub. opn.] (Stull) [a family law court
    found aspects of a postmarital contract to be
    unconscionable]

  2. Dameron I, supra, 2021 WL 4519651 [nonpub. opn.]
    [hospital admission contracts, as explained above]

  3. Smart Corner Owners Assn. v. CJUF Smart Cover
    LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 439 (Smart Corner)
    [condominium HOA case]

  4. Knapp v. Ginsburg (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 504
    (Knapp) [premarital contract]

  5. Dameron II, supra, 2022 WL 41914 [nonpub. opn.]
    [hospital admission contracts, as explained above]

  6. Valkov, supra, 2022 WL 455279 [nonpub. opn.]
    [postmarital contract, as explained above]

  7. In re Marriage of Zucker (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1025
    (Zucker) [premarital contract]

  8. Dameron III, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 971 [hospital
    admission contracts, as explained above]

  9. In re Marriage of Lukowski & Wieting (Apr. 30, 2024,
    G062678) 2024 WL 1873033 [nonpub. opn.]
    (Lukowski) [premarital contract]

                   41
    

10. Genova, supra, 2022 WL 2849079 [nonpub.
opn.] [foreclosure sale, as explained above]
11. Last v. Super. Ct. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 30
(Last) [premarital contract]
12. Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 808 (Lathrop) [Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act (Song-Beverly) (Civ. Code, § 1790 et
seq.)]
13. The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP (Nov.
14, 2024, B327404) 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 336 [nonpub.
opn.] (Comedy Store) [commercial rental agreement,
disapproved by EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 58, 84, fn. 7]
14. Pelascini v. Airstream, Inc. (May 29, 2025,
A169686) 2025 WL 1537776 [nonpub. opn.], review
granted Sept. 17, 2025, S291386 (Pelascini) [Song-
Beverly case]
15. Hardy v. Forest River, Inc. (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 450, review granted Apr. 30, 2025,
S289309 (Hardy) [Song-Beverly case]
16. Dameron IV, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th 530
[hospital admission contracts, as explained above]
17. Severo v. Forest River, Inc. (Aug. 5, 2025,
B336863) 2025 WL 2218061 [nonpub. opn.], review
granted Oct. 29, 2025, S292374 (Severo) [Song-
Beverly case]
18. Johnson v. Forest River RV, Inc. (Aug. 22, 2025,
D085014) 2025 WL 2426456 [nonpub. opn.] (Johnson)
[Song-Beverly case]

                   42  

19. Wonacott v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (Sept. 23,
2025, C099248, C100189) 2025 WL 2701567 [nonpub.
opn.], review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S293617
(Wonacott) [Song-Beverly case]
20. Razaqi, supra, 2025 WL 3250832 [nonpub.
opn.] [trial court concluded contract between the wife
and her lawyer was unconscionable, as explained
above]
21. Kim v. Airstream, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
201 (Kim) [Song-Beverly case]
8
I summarize the breakdown between the 79 arbitration
cases and the 21 non-arbitration cases in this table.
Type of Number Case name
contract of
invalidations

   Arbitration               79                79 cases listed above  

  Song-Beverly               7                 Lathrop, Pelascini, Hardy,  

warranties Severo, Johnson, Wonacott, Kim

  Hospital                   4                 Dameron I, II, III & IV  

admission

   Premarital                4                Knapp, Zucker, Last,  
                                         Lukowski  

   Postmarital               2                 Stull, Valkov  




                            43  

Real estate 1 Genova
foreclosure

   Condo HOA                1                  Smart Corner  

   40% attorney fee         1                  Razaqi  




  Commercial                1                  Comedy Store  

forum selection clause

                              9  
   Because 79 is 79 percent of 100, we see that, when  

California courts used unconscionability analysis to impair or
destroy a contract, that contract concerned arbitration 79 percent
of the time.
This is a disproportionate use of the unconscionability
doctrine. The disproportion disfavors arbitration.
Indeed, the 79 percent understates the disproportionality,
because I have included 12 decisions that apply specialty statutes
in the sample of 100 cases. The pertinent comparison, however,
would be cases applying the generally applicable contract
doctrine of unconscionability. It would be logical to subtract
these specialty statute cases to get a truer measure of the actual
use of the general doctrine.
What is a specialty statute? The California Legislature has
enacted a number of special-purpose unconscionability statutes.
These statutes define the concept of unconscionability in
particular settings. These special-purpose statutes are entirely

                           44  

proper under the rule of equal treatment because they do not
imperil the federal protection of arbitration.
I list three specialty statutes.
a
One familiar specialty statute is the 1970 Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act. This statute establishes a non-waivable
implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for retail sales of
consumer goods. (Civ. Code, §§ 1792, 1792.1.) The law also
covers sales of new motor vehicles. (Civ. Code, § 1793.22.) In
some respects, the scope of this law is disputed and will be
resolved by the California Supreme Court. (See, e.g., Lathrop,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 808, review granted Jan. 15, 2025,
S287893; Kim, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th 201; Diaz v. Thor Motor
Coach, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 589, review granted May 13,
2026, S295851.) The Legislature has been active in adjusting the
particular boundaries of this specialty law. (See, e.g., Letter from
Governor Newsom to the Members of the California State
Assembly (Sep. 29, 2024) <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2024/09/AB-1755-SIGNING-Message.pdf> [as of
Nov. 8, 2026], archived at https://perma.cc/ZFX7-GRUK.)
Some courts have used the word “unconscionability” in
connection with this warranty statute. (See, e.g., Kim, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at pp. 209–220.)
Warranties have been a long-standing focus of the
unconscionability doctrine. (E.g. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. (1960) 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, cited in Sonic-
Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1143; Leff, supra, at pp. 523–
524 [discussing Henningsen].)
Concurring Justice Staniforth gave a pungent and
enduring statement of the unconscionability doctrine in a leading

                            45  

California warranty case: “No experienced farmer would spend
$32,000 for equipment which could not process his tomatoes
before they rot and no fair and honest merchant would sell such
equipment with representations negated in its own sales
contract.” (A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 497; see also id. at pp. 485–493 [majority
analysis].)
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act did not create a
contract law doctrine of general application. For that reason, the
appropriate course is to exclude the seven Song-Beverly cases
from our sample of general-purpose unconscionability decisions.
b
A second specialty statute is Family Code section 1615.
This statute is entitled “Unenforceable agreements;
unconscionability; voluntariness.” The italics are mine.
This statute deals exclusively with premarital agreements,
and their enforceability—or, more accurately, their
unenforceability. The statute’s obvious concern is that, before a
wedding, one side has more resources and may railroad the low-
resource side into an extremely unfair deal. The Legislature
decreed these premarital agreements are presumptively
involuntary and therefore unenforceable unless a court finds, in
writing or on the record, the statute’s exacting requirements have
been satisfied. (See Last, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 38–40; see
also Knapp, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 531–534.)
There are four decisions in this category, as the table
summarized: Knapp; Zucker; Last; and Lukowski.
c
A third specialized doctrine of unconscionability stems from
Civil Code section 5986, which concerns “common interest

                           46  

developments” like condominium complexes. The Legislature
passed this law to stop a condo developer from taking advantage
of its ability, early in the formation of condominium associations,
to insert provisions into covenants, conditions, and restrictions
that shield the developer from suits by a condo homeowners
association for construction defects. (Smart Corner, supra, 64
Cal.App.5th at p. 463.) The Smart Corner decision used the word
“unconscionable” when analyzing issues in this specialized
statutory area. (E.g., id., at pp. 451–471.) Smart Corner is the
lone case in this category.
We are concerned with none of these specialty statutes.
Our focus is strictly on the supposedly general contract law
doctrine of unconscionability.
10
The earlier list of 100 included 12 specialty cases: seven
Song-Beverly cases, four premarital contracts, and one
condominium case. Subtracting these 12 specialty cases from 100
reduces our list to 88. This correction yields a 90 percent rate,
because 79 arbitration cases out of a total of 88 rounds to 90
percent.
In sum, this record shows California courts use the
unconscionability doctrine in an overwhelmingly targeted way:
to go after arbitration.
F
I comment on nine specific reactions the majority opinion
offers to my dissent.
In essence, the overall reaction is to cite many California
arbitration precedents and say but this is how we always do it in
arbitration cases. That is the problem.

                            47  

1
My respected and beloved colleagues cite Sonic-Calabasas
A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1144 (Sonic-Calabasas).
The state court holding in Sonic-Calabasas supports my
view. That holding was that the California Supreme Court was
wrong in its earlier decision because that earlier decision was
preempted by the federal equal treatment rule. (Sonic-Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th. at pp. 1139–1142.) The equal treatment rule is
controlling, as I have tried to demonstrate. I have applied it.
The majority opinion departs from it.
In dicta, the state court decision in Sonic-Calabasas also
stated (with my emphasis) that a facially neutral state-law rule is
not preempted simply because its evenhanded application would
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.
(Sonic-Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1144, citing Concepcion,
at p. 341–342, 131 S.Ct. at p. 1747.)
This 2013 dictum cannot be valid under the 2017 opinion of
Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 248.
The reach of federal preemption is always a question of
federal law. (Cf. Sandler v. Modernizing Medicine, Inc. (9th Cir.
2026) 170 F.4th 1209, 1213 (Modernizing Medicine) [“To have
state law (rather than federal law) control the content of that rule
in a way that disfavors arbitration would subject it to FAA
preemption”].) To support a proposition of federal law in this
context requires an authoritative federal citation. Sonic-
Calabasas was not a federal citation.
The 2013 dictum is counter to Kindred’s equal treatment
rule. The dictum asserts a facially neutral state-law rule is not
preempted simply because its evenhanded application would have
a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.

                            48  

An application is not evenhanded if its impact is
disproportionate.
As Justice Kagan wrote, the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against
arbitration. The Act also “displaces any rule that covertly
accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh
so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration
agreements.” (Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 251, italics added.)
States may not apply generally applicable contract defenses “ ‘in
a fashion that disfavors arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. 255, citing
Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S., at p. 341.)
What explains a supposedly evenhanded application of a
rule that “oh so coincidentally” lands so hard on arbitration?
(Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 251, italics added.) The obvious
reason is that we do not like arbitration and we want to rein it in
according to our special California state standards.
2
The majority opinion says a procedural quirk explains why
appellate courts get so many arbitration cases. I agree we get
many arbitration cases. But why do we impair or invalidate
them so disproportionately? The procedural quirk cannot explain
that. Hostility to arbitration, instantiated in a uniquely
punishing method of review, does explain that.
3
The majority opinion finds comfort in like-minded decisions
from the Ninth Circuit. I am doubtful the Ninth Circuit can be
counted as a consistent fan of our state court approach to
arbitration. (See Modernizing Medicine, supra, 170 F.4th at p.
1213 [“The district court thus erred in allowing state-court cases
(purporting to apply state law) to dictate the outcome here”]; cf.

                            49  

Lamps Plus, supra, 587 U.S. 176, 182–189 [reversing the Ninth
Circuit by preempting its application of California state law].)
4
The majority opinion quotes Concepcion’s description of
Broome’s 2006 statistics as “not definitive.” Indeed they were
not definitive. And neither are my percentages of 79 percent to
90 percent definitive, for they stem merely from 713 recent cases
rather than from an analysis of all decisions in the relevant
universe. But while not definitive, these numbers are suggestive.
They suggest disproportionate hostility to arbitration. I invite
others to offer improved quantitative analyses.
5
The majority opinion states “unconscionability is a contract
defense that is well-suited for challenging adhesive, but not
negotiated, contracts.” This does not explain why, in a state
where, for decades, some 30 million people are constantly buying
and selling all manner of goods and services by means of form
contracts that are take-it-or-leave-it, it is only the arbitration
contracts that bear the brunt of appellate displeasure.
6
The majority opinion cites cases to show California courts
do not always use the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate
arbitration agreements. This is true. They just attack
arbitration on an overwhelmingly disproportionate basis, as
compared to every other kind of contract. The practice is not
always and uniformly fatal. It is just more fatal, more often,
than anywhere else in contract law. It is an arbitration special.
7
The majority opinion cites Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty
Co. of New York (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 (Steven). This classic

                            50  

unconscionability case shows how far the majority diverges from
a general application of that doctrine.
A man bought a vending machine life insurance contract at
the airport and died when the plane crashed. The insurance
company refused to pay his widow because of some technicalities
about whether his flight was “scheduled.” This venerable opinion
shows a generally applicable approach to the unconscionability
doctrine: simple judicial revulsion at the unfairness of a
contract’s result. (See Steven, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“we
conclude that this requirement in the circumstances of this case
cannot fairly be enforced against [the widow]”]; id. at p. 879
[“Does not such a provision approach a trap for the unwary
purchasing public?”].)
This conventional unconscionability holding does not
scrutinize either the overbreadth or the duration of the contract.
Nor does it invent and examine hypotheticals about how the
contract would be lopsided on facts different than those in the
case.
The Steven decision is an excellent example of the
unconscionability doctrine. That decision shows the majority, in
its drive to regulate arbitration, departs from general principles
of contract law.
8
The majority opinion cites California Grocers Association v.
Bank of America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 214 (Grocers). This
decision powerfully proves my point: the majority has abandoned
general principles of contract law.
Grocers held a bank’s contract, established when a
depositor opened an account, was not unconscionable when it set
the bank’s fee for returned checks at $3.00 per returned check.

                            51  

(Grocers, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 215–217.) There was no
duration problem: the decision never mentioned duration, even
though the duration of the contract apparently was unlimited.
There was no scope problem either, even though the bank
charged this fee for returned checks of many different kinds. Nor
was there a mutuality problem, even though the Bank’s fee was
twice its cost of $1.50. (Id. at pp. 211–212.) The trial court had
limited the bank’s permissible fee to the cost of $1.50 plus a
reasonable profit margin of 15 percent, yielding a maximum fee
of $1.73. (Id. at p. 212.) The Court of Appeal reversed this
ruling. The court did not require mutuality. It did not inquire
whether, for every contract clause, each side got an even deal.
The court did not use a fine-toothed comb to go through every
contractual provision in a search for hypothetical problems.
That is what the majority opinion does here—when the
contract concerns arbitration. There is no parallel to its
punishing method in general contract law. The Grocers decision
illustrates this point.
9
The majority opinion cites Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 758 (Dean Witter). This
mainstream unconscionability case is another benchmark
showing how far the majority has traveled from general contract
law. The plaintiff sued the stock brokerage house of Dean Witter
for imposing a form contract about fees when the plaintiff opened
his brokerage account. The contract apparently was unlimited
duration. The stock broker conceded for purposes of argument
that its fees were too high. (Id. at p. 768.) The court showed no
interest in constructing hypotheticals that could show unfairness

                            52  

on facts unrelated to the case at hand. The court rejected the
unconscionability doctrine. (Id. at pp. 766–772.)
The main point of the court’s analysis was a lengthy
demonstration that no oppression exists when buyers can go to
alternative sellers. (See Dean Witter, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 766–772.) I completely agree. (See Diaz v. Thor Motor
Coach, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 589, 601–605, review granted
May 13, 2026 S295851 [dis. opn. of Wiley, J.].)
Dean Witter illustrates how unconscionability analysis
works in general contract law. This standard gauges how far the
majority opinion has gone astray.
G
When measured by their actions rather than by their
words, California courts from 2021 to 2025 were intensely hostile
to arbitration. About 79 percent to 90 percent of the time—
depending on exactly how we define the perpetually vague
doctrine of “unconscionability”—we state court judges have taken
a doctrine of supposedly general application and applied it to
eliminate or disrupt arbitration.
The difference between 79 percent and 90 percent does not
matter. Both figures show the extreme disproportionality we see
in practice. Any way you count it, the application of the
unconscionability doctrine has been highly selective and
extremely disproportionate from 2021 to 2025. The main target,
overwhelmingly, is arbitration.
As the Supreme Court of the United States observed in
Concepcion, “the judicial hostility towards arbitration that
prompted the [Federal Arbitration Act] had manifested itself in a
great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration
against public policy. [Citation.] And although these statistics

                           53  

are not definitive, it is worth noting that California’s courts have
been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable
than other contracts.” (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 342,
italics added, internal quotations omitted.)
“Concepcion teaches that we must be alert to new devices
and formulas that would achieve much the same result today.”
(Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 509, italics
added.)
I dissent from the majority’s use of devices and formulas
that disfavor arbitration.

                                       WILEY, J.  




                             54  

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