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加州上诉法院维持裁定,VXI 客服员工的仲裁协议不可执行

Bennett v. VXI Global Solutions

AI 导读

加州第二上诉区第八庭于 11 月 13 日维持洛杉矶县高等法院裁定,拒绝执行 VXI Global Solutions 与客服员工 Tracie Bennett 签署的仲裁协议。

变化判断

加州上诉法院维持原判,认定客服公司让新员工签的仲裁协议范围过宽、无限期且单方受益,不可分割,员工可直接起诉。

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2026年11月13日

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Bennett 诉 VXI Global Solutions

加州上诉法院

合并意见书


2026年11月13日提交
经认证可公开发布

加利福尼亚州上诉法院

             SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT  

                    DIVISION EIGHT  

TRACIE BENNETT, B346763

    Plaintiff and Respondent,     (Los Angeles County  
                                  Super. Ct. No. 23STCV24278)  
    v.  

VXI GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, LLC,

    Defendant and Appellant.  

  APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of  

洛杉矶县。David S. Cunningham III,法官。维持原判。
Lathrop GPM 的 Laura Reathaford 和 Jeffrey Richmond 代表
被告兼上诉人。
Lavi & Ebrahimian 的 Joseph Lavi、Jordan D. Bello 和
Brett Szmanda 代表原告兼被上诉人。
_________________________________
引言
被告 VXI Global Solutions, LLC(下称 Global)就初审法院驳回其强制仲裁动议的命令提起上诉。该动议要求对原告 Tracie Bennett 因其在该公司任职而产生的各项请求进行仲裁。初审法院认定双方之间的仲裁协议在程序上和实质上均显失公平,且该显失公平无法通过分割条款予以补救,因此拒绝执行该协议。我们维持原判。
尽管双方仲裁协议的签署过程仅涉及较低程度的程序性显失公平,但该协议包含若干实质上显失公平的条款,包括范围不合理地宽泛、期限不受限制,以及偏向 Global 及协议第三方受益人的不对等适用。由于该协议充斥着违法内容,且其显失公平无法通过分割条款予以补救,我们认定初审法院拒绝执行该协议并未滥用其裁量权。
背景
Global 在全国各地经营客户服务呼叫中心。Global 于 2023 年 2 月聘用仅有高中学历的 Bennett 担任客户专员。Bennett 为 Global 工作至 2023 年 4 月。
Global 聘用 Bennett 时,给了她一份约 100 页的新员工材料包,其中包含各种政策和表格。材料包中间夹有一份仲裁协议和一份保密协议。Bennett 明白,作为入职的一部分,她必须签署这两份协议。

                            2  

Bennett 签署了仲裁协议和保密协议,签署前没有咨询律师。Global 的公司法律顾问作证称,Bennett“在新员工入职培训期间有机会在签署前审阅新员工材料包”。
这份仲裁协议由 Global 起草,读起来却像是从 Bennett 的角度写的,其中相关部分写道:
“我认识到,在我受雇于公司期间或之后,我与[Global](下称‘公司’)之间可能产生分歧,这些分歧可能与我的雇佣有关,也可能无关。……[¶] 我理解,本协议中凡提及公司,均指公司及其所有过去和现在的合伙人、高管、董事和员工;所有子公司和关联实体,所有福利计划,福利计划的发起人、受托人、管理人、关联方,以及上述任何一方的所有继承人和受让人。
“1. 本协议涵盖的索赔。公司和我同意通过仲裁解决所有涉及公司及其任何过去或现在合伙人、高管、员工或代理人的个人索赔或争议,但下文第2段排除的除外,无论这些索赔或争议是否因我与公司的雇佣关系或雇佣关系的终止而引起(‘索赔’)。除第2段的排除项外,本协议涵盖的索赔包括但不限于:工资、奖金、佣金或任何其他形式报酬的索赔;违反任何明示或默示合同的索赔;侵权索赔;歧视或骚扰索赔,包括但不限于基于种族、性别、宗教、

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national origin, age, marital status, physical or mental disability,
medical condition or sexual orientation; claims for benefits; all
claims for violation of or damages under any federal, state or
other governmental law, statute, ordinance, Executive Order or
regulation; and claims by the Company for injunctive and/or
other equitable relief for, among other claims, unfair competition,
the use or unauthorized disclosure or misappropriation of trade
secrets or client information, the disclosure of any other
confidential information or the violation of any confidentiality
agreement which may be in effect between me and the Company.
“2. 本协议不涵盖的索赔。本协议不适用于也不涵盖我提出的以下索赔:工伤赔偿金或失业补偿金;基于员工养老金或福利计划提出的索赔(该等计划的条款可能包含仲裁或其他争议解决程序,在此情况下以该计划的规定为准);向任何行政或政府机构(例如,国家劳资关系委员会或平等就业机会委员会)提交的指控;以及任何依法不能提交仲裁的其他索赔。”
“5. 仲裁费用与成本。公司应在法律要求的最大范围内支付仲裁员的费用和成本。公司将按仲裁员可能认定必要的金额,预存该等仲裁员费用。除法律另有要求外,公司和我将各自承担自己的成本和律师费。
“6. 州际商业。我理解并同意,公司从事涉及州际商业的交易,且我的雇佣涉及该等商业。

                             4  

“7. 修改或撤销的要求。本协议只能通过由公司全体合伙人与本人签署的书面文件撤销或修改,且该书面文件须明确载明我们双方撤销或修改本协议的意图。
“8. 唯一且完整的协议。本协议是公司与本人就争议仲裁事项达成的完整协议(与任何养老金或福利计划相关的仲裁协议除外)。本协议取代此前或同期就该事项达成的一切口头或书面谅解。除本协议明确规定外,公司及本人都没有依赖任何关于本协议效力、可执行性或含义的口头或书面陈述。
“9. 解释。如果本协议的任何条款被认定全部或部分无效或在其他方面不可执行,该认定不影响本协议其余部分的有效性。”
“11. 条款的存续。本仲裁协议在我的雇佣关系终止后继续有效,并适用于任何索赔,无论该索赔是在我的雇佣关系或与公司的其他关系存续期间还是结束后产生或提出。”
最后,仲裁协议在其单独的签署页上写明:“公司与我确认,我们双方均已仔细阅读本协议,本人与公司之间就仲裁标的事项达成的一切谅解均载于本协议之中,……并且……我们在签署本协议之前有机会与我们自行选择的律师讨论本协议,且我们已在希望如此做的范围内利用了该机会。”

                            5  

Bennett 在签署仲裁协议的当天还签署了一份保密协议,其中相关条款规定:
“员工同意,员工披露或使用保密信息(仅为[Global]的利益或由非管理岗员工依据[《国家劳动关系法》]参与受保护的集体行动除外),均属不当行为,并将对[Global]造成不可弥补的损害。若员工不确定某项信息是否属于保密信息,员工应将其视为保密及专有信息处理。”
“员工同意,在其受雇期间及雇佣关系终止后一(1)年内,不会为竞争性业务招揽[Global]的任何员工,也不会诱导或试图诱导该等员工终止与[Global]的雇佣关系。”
“员工同意,员工违反本协议对[Global]造成的损害难以衡量,且该违约行为对[Global]造成的任何损害均难以计算。基于上述原因,金钱赔偿可能不足以弥补员工违反本协议给[Global]造成的损失。员工确认,除其可能享有的所有其他救济外,[Global]有权获得临时和永久禁令救济以执行本协议条款,且该等救济可在未事先实际通知、无需证明[Global]遭受实际损害的情况下授予。”
2023年10月,Bennett 对 Global 提起集体诉讼,提出10项诉讼请求,其中包括

                            6  

未支付最低工资和加班费,也未提供充足的用餐和休息时间。
Global 依据 Bennett 签署的仲裁协议,申请强制仲裁 Bennett 的诉求。Bennett 反对 Global 的动议,主张该协议在程序上和实质上均显失公平,且法院应拒绝执行该协议,因为协议系恶意起草并充斥违法内容,其显失公平之处若不重写条款便无法消除或限制。
初审法院驳回了 Global 的强制仲裁动议。作为先决问题,法院认定该仲裁协议受《联邦仲裁法》(FAA)(9 U.S.C. § 1 及以下)管辖。法院认定该协议具有较低程度的程序性显失公平,因为其属于附合合同。遵循 Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312(Cook)案的判决,初审法院认定该仲裁协议至少有两方面在实质上显失公平:(1) 协议范围不合理地过宽,因为它明确适用于与 Bennett 的雇佣无关的诉求;(2) 协议期限不合理地过长,因为它在 Bennett 的雇佣终止后仍然存续,且只能经 Bennett 与 Global 双方同意才能撤销或终止。法院驳回了 Bennett 关于该协议在实质上显失公平的其他主张,包括她声称该协议不当限制了她追索律师费的能力,并要求她放弃根据《私人总检察长法》寻求公共禁令和代表人诉讼的权利。

                            7  

依据 2004 年《私人总检察长法》(PAGA)(《劳动法典》第 2698 条及以下)。法院未
处理 Bennett 的以下主张:保密协议中的竞业限制条款和禁止招揽条款(她主张这些条款
应与仲裁协议一并解读)显失公平。尽管如此,法院认定仲裁协议不可执行,因为其
显失公平之处无法在不改写条款的情况下予以分割或限制。
Global 提起上诉。
讨论

  1. 一般法律原则
    如此处情形,当仲裁协议受《联邦仲裁法》(FAA)管辖时,该协议“有效、不可撤销且可强制执行,除非存在法律或衡平法上可使任何合同被撤销的理由”。(9 U.S.C. § 2。)一般适用的合同抗辩事由,如显失公平,可用于使仲裁协议无效,而不违反FAA。(OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125 (OTO);Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 650 (Viking River)。)
    “如果一方当事人在决定是否同意时缺乏有意义的选择,且合同包含对另一方当事人不合理有利的条款,则该合同显失公平。”(OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 125。)抗拒执行仲裁协议的一方负有证明显失公平的举证责任。(Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 492 (Ramirez)。)
    显失公平包括程序性要素和实质性要素。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 492。)程序性显失公平考察的是“‘合同谈判与订立的背景情况,重点关注因议价能力不平等而造成的压迫或突袭’”。(同上。)该要素通常通过证明协议是附合合同来确立,附合合同是由具有优势议价能力的一方强加并起草的标准化合同,仅留给另一方签署或拒绝的机会。(同上。)
    实质性显失公平关注的是“‘协议实际条款的公平性’”,考察协议是否会造成不公平或一边倒的结果。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)“实质上显失公平的合同条款‘以客观上不合理或出乎意料的方式重新分配风险’。”(同上。)
    要认定协议条款显失公平,程序性要素和实质性要素必须同时具备,但两者不必达到相同程度。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)法院采用滑动尺度分析,即合同条款在程序上越显失公平,认定该条款不可执行所需的实质性显失公平证据就越少,反之亦然。(同上。)显失公平的判定以合同订立时为准,“不能事后通过考虑缔约方当时并不知情的情况来加以解决”。(同上。)
    如此处情形,在证据无争议的情况下,对于初审法院以仲裁协议显失公平为由驳回仲裁申请的裁定,我们进行重新审查(de novo)。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)
    2. 仲裁协议与保密协议应一并解读
    作为先决问题,我们必须确定仲裁协议与保密协议是否应

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谈判与订立,重点关注因议价能力不平等而造成的压迫或突袭。’”(同上。)该要素通常通过证明协议是附合合同来确立,附合合同是由具有优势议价能力的一方强加并起草的标准化合同,仅留给另一方签署或拒绝的机会。(同上。)
实质性显失公平关注的是“‘协议实际条款的公平性’”,考察协议是否会造成不公平或一边倒的结果。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)“实质上显失公平的合同条款‘以客观上不合理或出乎意料的方式重新分配风险’。”(同上。)
要认定协议条款显失公平,程序性要素和实质性要素必须同时具备,但两者不必达到相同程度。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)法院采用滑动尺度分析,即合同条款在程序上越显失公平,认定该条款不可执行所需的实质性显失公平证据就越少,反之亦然。(同上。)显失公平的判定以合同订立时为准,“不能事后通过考虑缔约方当时并不知情的情况来加以解决”。(同上。)
如此处情形,在证据无争议的情况下,对于初审法院以仲裁协议显失公平为由驳回仲裁申请的裁定,我们进行重新审查(de novo)。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)
2. 仲裁协议与保密协议应一并解读
作为先决问题,我们必须确定仲裁协议与保密协议是否应

                            9  

在判断仲裁协议是否显失公平时,应当将这两份协议放在一起考量。我们的结论是应当如此。
根据《民法典》第1642条,涉及同一标的、且在同一交易中签署的独立协议,应当作为一份合同整体解释。
(§ 1642;Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 109
(Fuentes)。)“依据该规则,作为单一交易组成部分签署的文件应整体解释,即使它们并未明确相互援引。”(Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 490(Alberto)。)
仲裁协议与保密协议均被纳入Bennett的新员工入职材料包,并由Bennett在同一天签署。它们是在同一交易——即Bennett的入职——中签署的,且涉及相似的标的——Bennett与Global之间争议的解决。仲裁协议从广义上规定了Bennett与Global之间的争议应如何解决,而保密协议则除其他事项外,规定了就涉嫌违反保密协议而产生的争议应如何解决。
由于仲裁协议与保密协议是在同一交易中签署的,且涉及相似的标的,因此应当将它们放在一起解读。(Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 490–491。)不将这两份协议放在一起解读,“会人为地割裂双方的合同关系。将它们分开对待,无法反映双方所约定的整体争议解决流程。”(Id. at p. 491。)因此,保密协议中的显失公平将影响仲裁协议是否显失公平。(Ibid。)

                           10  

3. 程序性显失公平
原审法院认定,该仲裁协议的程序性显失公平程度较低,因为它是附合合同。Global 未对这一认定提出异议。Bennett 虽同意该协议属于附合合同,但主张“存在明显更严重的程序性显失公平”,因为她同时还提交了压迫与突袭的证据。正如我们所解释的,该协议的形成过程仅涉及较低程度的程序性显失公平。
附合合同通常至少包含较低程度的程序性显失公平。(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第 494 页。)是否需要进一步严格审查附合合同的公平性,取决于协议形成过程中所涉及的压迫与突袭程度。(Fuentes,前引,19 Cal.5th 第 104 页。)
当合同缺乏协商且没有实质性选择时,即存在压迫。(OTO,前引,8 Cal.5th 第 126 页。)与认定压迫相关的考量情形包括:较弱一方被给予考虑拟议合同的时间长短、该方被施加的签署拟议合同的压力大小与类型,以及拟议合同的篇幅与受质疑条款的长度和复杂程度。(同上,第 126–127 页。)
在此,除仲裁协议属于附合合同这一事实外,几乎没有证据表明存在额外的压迫。没有证据显示 Global 在短时间内向 Bennett 施压要求其签署协议。同样,也没有证据表明 Bennett 在签署前没有获得合理机会自行或借助律师审阅该协议。事实上,最后一页

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这份协议包含贝内特的签名,用清晰简单的语言写明:贝内特确认她“仔细阅读”了协议,Global与贝内特之间的“所有谅解”均已载入协议,且贝内特在签署协议前“有机会与律师讨论本协议”,并“在[她]希望的范围内利用了该机会”。
贝内特指出,有证据表明她只有高中学历,在本案签署协议时对仲裁和仲裁协议并不熟悉。然而,贝内特并未作证称她难以理解协议条款,也没有以其他方式解释她的教育程度如何限制了她理解协议条款的能力。
至于协议的长度和复杂程度,贝内特并未主张协议过长不合理。但她确实主张协议复杂、难以解析。我们不同意。虽然协议中有些句子很长——其中一句界定受涵盖请求的句子长达15行——但其语言并不特别复杂或难以理解。事实上,协议用清晰且相对简单的语言描述了受涵盖与排除的请求类型,并未充斥着“法条引用和法律术语”。(参见OTO,前引,8 Cal.5th at p. 128。)
总之,双方签署仲裁协议所涉及的程序性不合 conscience 程度较低。因此,要使协议不可执行,需要具备高度的实质性不合 conscience。(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)

                           12  

4. 实质性显失公平
“实质性显失公平分析‘审查的是合同条款的公平性’。这一分析‘确保合同,尤其是格式合同,不会强加那些被各种表述形容为“过于苛刻”[引注]、“不当压迫”[引注]、“片面到“ shock the conscience(震撼良知)””[引注],或“不公平地偏向一方”[引注]的条款。所有这些表述都指向一个核心观念:显失公平原则关注的不是“简单的老式亏本交易”[引注],而是“不合理地有利于更有权势一方”的条款。’”(Fuentes,前引,19 Cal.5th 第 106 页。)
初审法院认定仲裁协议有两个方面在实质上显失公平——其范围和期限。我们同意仲裁协议的范围和期限在实质上显失公平,但我们也认为协议的其他方面同样显失公平。我们逐一讨论各个方面。
4.1. 仲裁协议不合理的范围、无限制的期限以及失衡的适用在实质上显失公平
仲裁协议的开篇段落指出,Bennett 认识到她与 Global 之间“可能产生分歧”,且“这些分歧可能与[她的]雇佣关系有关,也可能无关”。协议随后规定,Bennett 必须仲裁“所有个人索赔或争议”,但协议其他部分排除的某些索赔除外,“无论这些索赔或争议是否源于[她]与公司的雇佣关系或[她]雇佣关系的终止”。协议还规定,它“在终止后仍然有效,

                             13  

[Bennett]的雇佣关系,并应适用于任何索赔,无论这些索赔是在[Bennett]与[Global]的雇佣关系或其他关系存续期间还是结束之后产生或提出;并且,除非双方签署书面协议,否则该条款不得修改或撤销。
将这些条款放在一起解读,仲裁协议的平实文义要求Bennett就其针对Global提出的任何索赔进行仲裁(明确排除的少数几类索赔除外),即使她的索赔与雇佣关系毫无关联,且是在她停止为公司工作很久之后才产生。换言之,该协议要求Bennett在余生中几乎就她可能针对公司提出的任何索赔进行仲裁,直至她与Global双方同意终止该协议。
另有多个法院认定,雇佣相关仲裁协议中的类似条款在实质上显失公平。(参见,例如,Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 321–325[协议要求无限期仲裁“ ‘所有索赔,无论是否源于雇员的大学雇佣关系、报酬或解雇’ ”];Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 91, 107–108[协议要求无限期仲裁“ ‘公司与本人之间任何及所有索赔、争议或纠纷,包括但不限于因’ ”招聘流程、雇佣或解雇“ ‘而产生或与之相关的索赔’ ”];Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 641, 654–656[协议要求无限期仲裁雇员可能针对雇主提出的“ ‘任何索赔’ ”,包括“ ‘当前已存在或将来可能产生的’ ”以及“ ‘任何及所有索赔’ ”]

                            14  

在雇佣关系之外,或在我们曾经、现在或未来可能有的任何其他互动/关系中产生的纠纷”)。
Global 并不否认,要求 Bennett 就与她的雇佣完全无关的索赔进行仲裁会显失公平,包括在她雇佣关系结束很久之后才产生或累积的索赔。相反,Global 主张,我们应当以这样一种方式来解读仲裁协议:将其适用范围仅限于与 Bennett 雇佣相关的索赔。
公司辩称,在协议签署之时,公司或 Bennett 期望协议的适用范围涵盖与她雇佣无关的索赔,是不合理的。Global 称,作为一家运营呼叫中心的公司,Bennett 与公司极不可能在 Bennett 的雇佣背景之外发生任何互动。Global 声称,这与 Cook 案的情形相去甚远——在 Cook 案中,原告雇员更有可能因与雇佣无关或发生在雇佣结束之后的行为而对被告大学(或反之)提出索赔。(参见 Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 318。)Global 断言,Bennett 或公司“实际发展出彼此之间与 Bennett 雇佣无关的索赔的可能性微乎其微”。
我们基于几个理由驳回这一论点。首先,它要求我们无视协议的条款。正如我们上文所述,协议明确规定 Bennett 必须仲裁“所有个人索赔或争议……无论这些索赔或争议是否源于[她]与公司的雇佣关系

                           15  

“以终止[她的]雇佣关系。”(斜体为原文所加。)如果要把协议解读为仅适用于与Bennett的雇佣关系相关的诉求,我们就必须无视这段斜体文字,或者把它当作多余内容。这样的解读“违反了合同解释的基本原则”。(Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 633, 647。)如果Global本意是让其仲裁协议仅适用于与Bennett的雇佣关系相关的诉求,比如源于她的聘用、她为公司工作、她的报酬或她的解雇的诉求,它完全可以采用这样的措辞。 第二,Global主张Bennett与公司之间几乎不可能产生与Bennett的雇佣关系无关的相互诉求,但仲裁协议中的另一条款削弱了这一论点,该条款以极其宽泛的方式界定公司。协议的第二段开头写道,Bennett“理解本协议中任何对[Global]的提及都将指公司及其所有过去和现在的合伙人、高管、董事和员工;所有子公司和关联实体,所有福利计划,福利计划的发起人、受托人、管理人、关联方以及其中任何一方的所有继承人和受让人。”(斜体为原文所加。)此外,协议第1段规定,Bennett同意仲裁“所有个人诉求或争议……涉及公司及其任何过去或现在的合伙人、高管、员工或代理人……”。(斜体为原文所加。)即使假定Bennett与Global之间产生与Bennett的雇佣关系无关的相互诉求的可能性微乎其微,当仲裁协议要求Bennett

                            16  

仲裁她针对一大类个人和实体提出的任何索赔。
Bennett 必须仲裁她针对 Global 过去或现在的员工、高管、管理人员和
代理人提出的任何索赔,这也产生了相互性问题,而相互性是评估合同是否显失公平的“首要
考量因素”。
(Alberto,前引,91 Cal.App.5th 第 492 页。)通过明确将 Global 定义为包括所有过去或现在的员工、高管、
管理人员和代理人,这些个人和实体成为协议的
第三方受益人。(Ronay Family
Limited Partnership 诉 Tweed 案(2013 年)216 Cal.App.4th 830, 839
[通过明确要求对公司“代理人和注册代表”的索赔进行仲裁,
仲裁条款旨在使”这些第三方受益]。)因此,
这些第三方可以强制 Bennett 仲裁她可能针对他们提出的任何索赔,
无论这些索赔是否与她的雇佣关系有关。(同上。)然而,
对于这些第三方受益人可能针对 Bennett 提出的索赔,情况并非如此,
即使这些索赔与她的雇佣关系无关。也就是说,Bennett 不能强制将
这些第三方受益人提出的索赔提交仲裁,除非首先
证明这些受益人接受了协议项下的某种利益。(Cook,前引,102 Cal.App.5th 第 328 页。)
因此,该协议为其第三方受益人创设了单方面的利益,
而 Global 并未试图基于任何正当的“‘商业现实’”来为该利益
辩护。
(Armendariz 诉 Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. 案(2000 年)
24 Cal.4th 83,第 117–118 页(Armendariz)。)
简言之,我们认定该仲裁协议在实质上显失公平,因为它要求 Bennett

                            17  

仲裁她针对 Global 及其所有过去或现在的员工、高管、管理人员和代理人提出的任何索赔,即使她的索赔与她的雇佣关系完全无关,并且要求她这样做,直到她和 Global 同意终止该协议。这样的要求以客观上不合理的方式将风险重新分配,有利于 Global 及其第三方受益人。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 493。)
4.2. 保密协议在实质上显失公平
Bennett 还主张,保密协议的禁令救济条款和竞业禁止条款在实质上显失公平。我们同意。
如果合同条款“授权强势方在未证明发布禁令所需全部基本要素的情况下获得禁令救济”,则该条款在实质上显失公平。(Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 451 (Lange)。)之所以如此,是因为此类条款缺乏相互性,并且超出了雇主对“安全边际”的正当需求。(Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 492。)
在本案中,保密协议规定 Bennett 同意,她未经授权披露或使用 Global 的保密信息“将构成不当行为,并会对”Global“造成不可弥补的损害”。保密协议还规定,Global“将有权获得临时和永久禁令救济以执行”该协议,并且“此类救济可在没有事先实际通知且无需证明”公司“遭受实际损害的情况下授予”。换言之,保密协议使 Global 有权就 Bennett 对协议条款的任何违反获得禁令救济,而无需公司证明不可弥补的

                            18  

损害。(参见 Jay Bharat Developers, Inc. v. Minidis (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 437, 446[不可弥补的损害是法院在决定是否签发
禁令时必须考虑的因素之一]。)由于 Global 未能就一项免除其证明
签发禁令所必需的基本要素之义务的合同条款
指出任何正当的商业理由,
该保密协议中的禁令救济条款
在实质上显失公平。(Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 449–451。)
该协议的不招揽条款同样
显失公平。《商业与职业法典》第 16600 条
规定,“任何限制他人从事任何合法职业、行业或业务的合同
”均属无效。
(AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 923, 935 (AMN)。)依据该法条,
雇主一般不得通过合同禁止前
雇员招揽雇主其他雇员或客户的业务。(Id. at pp. 936–939。)
存在一项例外:
不招揽禁令与前雇员使用非法手段招揽业务
相关联,例如使用雇主的商业秘密或保密信息。
(ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017。)
本案中,保密协议载明 Bennett
“同意……在其受雇期间及
该雇佣关系终止后一(1)年内,
她不会为竞争性业务招揽 [Global] 的任何雇员,
也不会诱使或试图诱使
该等雇员终止与 [Global] 的雇佣关系。”
由于该条款并不限于限制 Bennett 使用非法

                            19  

意味着向 Global 员工招揽业务,该约定无效。
(AMN,前引,28 Cal.App.5th 第 936–939 页。)
由于我们必须将仲裁协议与保密协议一并解读,保密协议中竞业限制与禁令救济条款在实质上的不合理性,进一步导致仲裁协议在实质上亦属不合理。
4.3. 结论
综合考量仲裁协议与保密协议,我们认定仲裁协议存在高度的实质性不合理。据此,我们无需再处理 Bennett 关于协议中其他条款亦构成实质性不合理的论点。接下来,我们将分析初审法院拒绝执行该协议是否正确。
5. 可分性
根据《民法典》第 1670.5 条第 (a) 款,若合同或合同的任何条款构成不合理,初审法院可以:(1)“拒绝执行合同”;(2) 剔除不合理条款并“执行合同的其余部分”;或 (3)“限制任何不合理条款的适用,以避免产生不合理的结果”。(参见 Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第 513 页。)
在决定是否执行一份不合理的合同时,法院应考虑其“‘核心目的……是否沾染了违法性’”。(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第 516 页。)若确实如此,该不合理性便无法补救,法院应拒绝执行合同。(同上。)在分析的这一阶段,“并无明确规则要求法院在合同含有一项以上不合理

                            20  

(同上)不过,“可以公允地说,合同中的不合理条款越多,
以分割方式处理就越不可能成为适当的救济。”(同上,
第517页。)
如果合同的核心目的并未沾染违法性,法院就应判断能否通过
分割或限缩不合理条款来消除合同的不合理性。(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第516页。)如果
法院无法在不增加或改写合同条款的情况下消除这种不合理性,就“应当拒绝执行
该合同”。(同上)“法院不能‘改写协议并强加双方均未同意的
条款’。”(同上)
对于初审法院拒绝执行不合理合同或分割其问题条款的决定,
我们按滥用裁量权标准进行审查。(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第513页。)
尽管初审法院没有详细论述其为何拒绝执行双方的仲裁
协议,但它认定,无法在不改写协议的情况下消除该协议的
核心不合理性——即其范围过宽。正如我们所解释的,法院
认定该协议的不合理性无法在不改革或改写其条款的情况下
消除,这一判断是正确的。我们还解释了该协议为何沾染违法性,并且基于这一
额外理由,法院拒绝执行该协议并未滥用裁量权。(参见 D'Amico v. Board of Medical
Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18–19 [我们审查的是初审法院的
裁定,而非其理由]。)
尽管并不存在仅凭不合理条款的数量就使仲裁协议
不可执行的明确规则,但条款数量越多,

                            21  

显失公平的条款越多,“以解除合同作为救济方式的可能性就越小。”(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第517页。)在本案中,我们已认定,该协议与保密协议一并解读时,至少包含五项实体上显失公平的条款,数量相当可观。此外,仲裁协议的核心机制之一充斥着越权与不公——即要求 Bennett 就她可能对 Global 以及一个界定宽泛的第三方受益人群体提出的所有现在及将来的请求进行仲裁,无论这些请求是否与她的雇佣关系有任何关联,也无论是否在她雇佣关系结束很久之后才产生,而且没有任何对等要求迫使这些第三方受益人将其可能对 Bennett 提出的任何请求(无论是否与雇佣相关)提交仲裁。由于显失公平之处渗透于整个仲裁协议,初审法院正确地拒绝执行该协议。(Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第516页。)
即使仲裁协议未受违法性污染,其显失公平之处也无法在不改写协议条款的情况下予以分割或限制。诚然,保密协议中有问题的部分——禁令救济条款与禁止招揽条款——可以在不根本改变仲裁协议的情况下予以分割。但仲裁协议本身所包含的显失公平条款则不能如此处理。
例如,Global 主张我们可以从协议中删除“且这些差异可能与[Bennett的]雇佣有关或无关”以及“无论这些请求或争议是否源于[Bennett的]”这些表述。

                             22  

雇佣关系”,以确保该协议仅适用于与贝内特(Bennett)的雇佣关系相关或由此产生的索赔。我们不同意。
协议其余部分的措辞并不会将其范围仅限于与雇佣相关的索赔。相反,在删除 Global 提出的措辞后,协议现在将规定其适用于涉及 Global 的“所有个人索赔或争议”。从字面上看,该措辞仍将涵盖涉及 Global 的任何索赔,包括与贝内特的雇佣关系无关的索赔。要适当地限制协议的范围,我们需要添加措辞,要求双方仅就与雇佣相关的索赔进行仲裁。正如我们已经解释的那样,法院不能重写合同或向其添加条款以消除其不合情理之处。(Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 516。)
简而言之,我们得出结论,初审法院在认定仲裁协议的核心不合情理之处不可分割并拒绝执行该协议时,并未滥用其自由裁量权。
6. 我们对不合情理的分析不被 FAA 优先适用
最后,异议方主张,我们运用不合情理原则使双方的仲裁协议无效,这一做法被 FAA(《联邦仲裁法》)优先适用。异议方主张,通过拒绝执行双方的仲裁协议,我们的裁决以及其他类似裁决,例如 Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 312,表现出“对仲裁的反感”,这违反了 FAA 和美国最高法院要求州法院“将仲裁协议‘置于与所有其他合同平等的地位’”的先例。(Kindred Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark (2017)
581 U.S. 246, 248(Kindred Nursing)。)该规则禁止州法院“单独挑出仲裁协议予以不利对待

                             23  

treatment.”(同上)相反,法院只能以“ ‘在法律上或衡平法上存在的、可用于撤销任何合同的理由’ ”来认定仲裁协议无效。(DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (2015) 577 U.S. 47, 54(DIRECTV),引用 9 U.S.C. § 2。)正如我们在下文所解释的,FAA 在本案中并不优先于显失公平原则的适用。
在 Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109(Sonic)一案中,加利福尼亚州最高法院驳回了与异议意见所提关切类似的一项担忧。在该案中,法院讨论了在 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339–341(Concepcion)之后,显失公平原则适用于仲裁协议时的可行性。(参见 Sonic,第 1142–1145 页。)
加利福尼亚州最高法院在讨论开头“指出,在 Concepcion 之后,显失公平仍然是针对强制仲裁申请的有效抗辩。Concepcion 引用 FAA 的保留条款,重申 FAA‘允许仲裁协议“基于在法律上或衡平法上存在的、可用于撤销任何合同的理由”被宣告不可执行’(Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1746],引用 9 U.S.C. § 2),包括‘ “普遍适用的合同抗辩,例如欺诈、胁迫或显失公平……”[引文]’(Concepcion, at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1746])。”(Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1142–1143。)加利福尼亚州最高法院重申,“长期以来,执行普通法的法院的恰当职责就是确保交易条款不会不合理地苛刻、压迫性或片面。”(同上,第 1143 页。)
随后,加利福尼亚州最高法院讨论了 Concepcion 和 FAA 对州显失公平规则施加了哪些限制,

                             24  

这些规则同样适用于仲裁协议。(Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at pp. 1143–1144。)法院解释称,州的不合理规则“不得在表面上歧视
仲裁,且必须不偏不倚地执行。”(Id. at p. 1143。)
此类规则也不得“即使表面上不具有歧视性,……
通过施加程序性要求来不利于仲裁的适用,这些要求‘干涉
仲裁的基本属性’,尤其是其‘“更低的成本、更高的效率和
速度,以及选择专家裁决者来解决
专业争议的能力。”’”(Ibid., quoting Concepcion, supra,
563 U.S. at p. 348。)
值得注意的是,法院解释称,“不‘干涉
仲裁的基本属性’的州法律规则
(Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1748])不
涉及 Concepcion 对州不合理规则的限制。”
(Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1143。)法院
指出,这意味着“表面上中立的州法律规则不会仅因其不偏不倚的适用
‘会对仲裁协议产生不成比例的影响’而被优先适用。
(Concepcion,
at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1747]。)根据 Concepcion,当州法律
规则的影响达到干涉仲裁基本属性的程度时,该规则即被优先适用。
(Id. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at
p. 1748]。)”(Sonic, at p. 1144。)
法院列举了一些仲裁协议因“与仲裁的基本属性毫无
关系”的原因而被认定为不合理的例子。(Sonic,
supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1144。)例如,法院此前
“认定仲裁上诉的 50,000 美元门槛不合理,该门槛在雇佣合同
争议中明显偏向被告。”(Ibid., citing Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003)

                            25  

29 Cal.4th 1064,第1071–1074页。)法院还援引了两项上诉法院的判决。第一项判决“认定一份含有损害赔偿限额条款的仲裁协议显失公平,依据该条款,‘客户甚至连获得完整救济的理论可能性都不存在’”。(Sonic案,第1144页,援引Harper诉Ultimo案(2003年)113 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1407。)第二项判决“认定一份仲裁协议显失公平,该协议除其他内容外,‘要求[雇员]在[雇主]于程序中胜诉时承担[雇主]的律师费,却未赋予其在自身胜诉时收回自己律师费的权利’”。(Sonic案,第1144页,援引Ajamian诉CantoCO2e, L.P.案(2012年)203 Cal.App.4th 771,第799–800页。)
加州最高法院解释称,这些例子表明“显失公平原则的核心关切在于‘ “ ‘一方当事人缺乏有意义的选择,同时合同条款不合理地偏向另一方当事人’ ” ’”。(Sonic案,前引,57 Cal.4th at p. 1145。)“这些条款包括‘损害谈判过程完整性或以其他方式违反公共利益或公共政策的条款;试图以不被允许的方式改变法律原本施加的基本义务的条款(通常属于附合合同或格式条款性质)、附属细则条款,或旨在否定非起草方合理预期的条款,或与价格或交易其他核心方面相关的、不合理且出人意料地苛刻的条款’”。(同上。)
法院重申,“在Concepcion案之后,法院可以继续对仲裁协议适用显失公平原则”。(Sonic案,前引,57 Cal.4th at p. 1145。)“正如《联邦仲裁法》在其保留条款(9 U.S.C. § 2)中所设想的那样,法院可以

                            26  

审查附合仲裁协议的条款,以判断其是否不合理的单方偏向。法院在适用显失公平原则时,不得强制推行与仲裁基本属性相悖的程序规则,即便这些规则“因无关理由而可取”。(同上,引自 Concepcion,前引,563 U.S. 第351页。)
异议意见主张,在美国最高法院作出 Concepcion 之后的系列仲裁裁决后,Sonic 案的这一部分“不可能有效”。我们不同意异议意见对 Sonic 案的批评。
即便假定 Sonic 案关于显失公平原则可适用性的论述仅为附带意见,加州最高法院的附带意见也应予遵循,这一点已属定论,尤其是在 Sonic 案中法院对相关问题进行了详尽分析的情况下。(Aviles-Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 981, 990。)异议意见未指出加州最高法院或美国最高法院有任何判例,我们亦未发现任何判例,明确质疑或推翻 Sonic 案中关于 Concepcion 之后加州显失公平原则仍可适用的论述。
事实上,加州最高法院继续遵循 Sonic 案的该部分论述,并且就在2024年,还将显失公平原则适用于受《联邦仲裁法》管辖的仲裁协议。(参见,例如,OTO,前引,8 Cal.5th 第123–138页 [2019年判决遵循 Sonic 案,以显失公平为由拒绝执行仲裁协议];Ramirez,前引,16 Cal.5th 第492–519页 [2024年判决认定仲裁协议在程序上和实质上

                              27  

(……显失公平,并重申《联邦仲裁法》并不优先于
加州显失公平原则。)
就连第九巡回法院也继续适用加州的
显失公平原则,拒绝执行受《联邦仲裁法》
管辖的仲裁协议。(见 Ronderos v. USF
Reddaway(第九巡回法院,2024 年)114 F.4th 1080,第 1094–1099 页(Ronderos);
Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.(第九巡回法院,2024 年)
120 F.4th 670,第 680–689 页。)而在其中至少一份判决中,
合议庭多数意见援引了上文讨论的 Sonic 案相关部分,
驳回了与本案异议意见所提主张类似的优先适用论点。(见 Ronderos,第 1103 页,援引 Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th 第 1142–1145 页。)值得注意的是,这些第九
巡回法院判决认定仲裁协议无效,依据的是在
仲裁语境中更为常见的显失公平的单方条款,这一思路与
Sonic 案中法院认可的思路一致。(例如见 Ronderos,第
1094–1099 页[拒绝执行这样一份仲裁协议:
(1)仅对雇员施加在仲裁中提起请求的一年时效期间;
(2)允许雇主在法院对雇员提起禁令救济请求];
Heckman,第 681–689 页[拒绝执行这样一份仲裁
协议,其中规定了以下有利于起草方的条款:
(1)显失公平的单方大规模仲裁程序;
(2)对仲裁中的证据开示和书状提交施加过度限制;
(3)显失公平的单方对仲裁员裁决提起上诉的权利;
以及(4)显失公平的单方仲裁员选任程序]。)
基于上述理由,我们继续遵循 Sonic 案以及
加州最高法院其他近期判决,这些判决认定本州
的显失公平原则仍可作为有效的抗辩事由,对抗

                            28  

受《联邦仲裁法》(FAA)管辖的仲裁协议。(参见 Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455–
456[我们通常受加州最高法院判决的约束]。)
我们同样不同意异议意见的主张,即 Concepcion 案以及美国最高法院
其他涉及仲裁的判决,削弱了我们将显失公平原则适用于本案当事人
仲裁协议的做法。在 Concepcion 案中,法院审议了《联邦仲裁法》
是否优先于加州的一项规则,该规则使消费者仲裁协议中的某些
集体弃权条款构成显失公平。(参见 Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 340–341。)
法院指出,尽管显失公平是“一项通常被认为具有普遍适用性的原则”,
但法院不能依赖“‘仲裁协议的独特性,作为州法认定执行该协议
显失公平的依据’”。(Id. at p. 341。)
随后,法院裁定,加州禁止集体弃权的规则被《联邦仲裁法》
优先适用。(Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 344–352。)
法院的分析重点在于,此类规则如何“干扰仲裁的基本属性,
从而形成与《联邦仲裁法》不一致的制度”。(Id. at p. 344。)
法院解释说,“从双方仲裁转为集体仲裁,牺牲了仲裁的主要
优势——其非正式性——并使程序更慢、成本更高,且比最终判决
更容易产生程序上的混乱。”(Id. at p. 348。)据法院所言,
“集体仲裁要求程序上的正式性”,超出个人仲裁通常涉及的
程度,因为如果“程序过于非正式”,正当程序方面的考量将

                           29  

阻止缺席的集体成员受仲裁约束。(同上,第349页。)法院还指出,“集体仲裁大大增加了被告的风险”,因为它把风险提升到超出有限上诉审查下通常的个别仲裁所涉的程度。(同上,第350–351页。)由于加利福尼亚州的集体弃权规则“‘构成对实现和执行国会全部目的与目标的障碍’”,法院认定该规则违背了FAA的目标。(同上,第352页。)
尽管Concepcion案的优先适用分析聚焦于加利福尼亚州的反集体弃权规则如何创设了一种“干扰仲裁基本属性”的程序(Concepcion,前引,563 U.S. 第344页;另见同上,第344–352页),但异议意见却把重点放在最高法院在该意见前一部分的观察上,即某些表面上中立的州规则可能“对仲裁协议产生不成比例的影响”(Concepcion,第342页)。随后,异议意见进行了一项统计分析,以说明过去五年中加利福尼亚州法院如何利用显失公平原则使仲裁协议无效的比例高于其他类型的合同。异议意见声称,这些统计数据表明,加利福尼亚州法院适用显失公平原则的方式不利于仲裁,因而被FAA优先适用。
但最高法院在Concepcion案中注意到了类似的趋势,至少是2011年加利福尼亚州存在的趋势,而且它并未否定我们法院将显失公平原则普遍适用于受FAA管辖的仲裁协议。具体而言,法院观察到,“加利福尼亚州法院更有可能认定仲裁合同显失公平,而非其他合同。”(Concepcion,前引,563 U.S. 第342页。)

                             30  

法院指出,这些统计数据“并非决定性的”,因此不能据此抢先阻止我们的法院在仲裁协议中适用该原则。(同上)异议方没有援引任何最高法院的判决,我们也不知道有哪个判决此后抢先适用或以其他方式削弱了加州显失公平原则在仲裁协议中的一般适用。事实上,最高法院仍然承认,根据《联邦仲裁法》,显失公平仍是仲裁协议的一项可行抗辩。(参见 Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. 650 [“‘法院可以基于‘一般适用的合同抗辩’(如欺诈或显失公平)使仲裁协议无效,但不能基于‘仅适用于仲裁或其含义源自仲裁协议本身’的法律规则’”]。)异议方援引的美国最高法院其他判决,均推翻了加州要求某些类别索赔必须提供司法或行政论坛的规则,或排除了在仲裁中放弃提起集体或代表诉讼权利的规则。(参见,例如,Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1 [要求对根据特许投资法提起的索赔进行司法审理的法规];Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483 [允许在法院提起工资追讨诉讼的法规,无论是否有仲裁此类索赔的协议];Preston v. Ferrer (2008) 552 U.S. 346 [授予州劳工专员对当事人同意仲裁的问题专属管辖权的法规];DIRECTV, supra, 577 U.S. 47 [法院继续使用在 Concepcion 案中被推翻的集体弃权规则];Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176 [用于认定存在歧义的合同解释原则

                            31  

仲裁条款规定进行集体仲裁];Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. 639[该规则认定,仅针对某些劳动违法行为中代表性索赔的个别组成部分而订立的仲裁协议无效]。)此外,Kindred Nursing 案裁定,FAA 优先于肯塔基州的一项规则,该规则规定:如果仲裁协议未经明确授权放弃本人诉诸法院权利的主体或代表签署,则不可执行。(见 Kindred Nursing, supra, 581 U.S. 246。)所有这些判决都否定了州创设的规则,这些规则要么在某些情形下对仲裁施加一概禁止,要么施加与“仲裁的基本属性”不一致的程序,并造成“与 FAA 不一致的机制”。(Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 344。)
这些判决均不阻止法院对加州关于认定显失公平及显失公平条款可分割性的标准进行“直接适用”。(Ronderos, supra, 114 F.4th at p. 1103。)“执行普通法的法院的正当职责仍然是确保交易条款不会不合理地苛刻、压迫性或单方面。”(Sonic, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1143。)
异议意见所收集的统计数据也不能表明加州法院利用显失公平来单独针对仲裁。黑体字法律表明,附合合同无论是否包含仲裁条款,都特别容易受到显失公平抗辩的挑战;而经协商的合同,即使包含仲裁条款,也很少受到此类抗辩。

                            32  

As noted above, any successful unconscionability defense
requires that a litigant establish both procedural and substantive
unconscionability. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 492–493.)
Because virtually all adhesive contracts are procedurally
unconscionable, a signatory to such a contract, as was the case
here, will generally be able to meet this prong. (Baltazar v.
Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244 (Baltazar).)
Negotiated contracts, on the other hand, are rarely procedurally
unconscionable. (Ibid.) Unconscionability, therefore, has little
application to negotiated contracts. For these reasons,
unconscionability is a contract defense that is well suited for
challenging adhesive, but not negotiated, contracts. (See, e.g.,
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989)
211 Cal.App.3d 758, 769 [non-arbitration case noting the
“significant overlap” between adhesive contracts and the
unconscionability doctrine]; California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of
America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 214 (California Grocers
Assn.) [non-arbitration case explaining that “[t]he notion of
‘procedural’ unconscionability merely addresses the question
whether a contract is adhesive”].)
Adhesion contracts are a common vessel for arbitration
provisions. For instance, such provisions often appear in
employment and consumer contracts, which businesses typically
present to employees and consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. (See Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 115–116.) It
follows, then, that unconscionability is a common defense to
motions to compel arbitration that are based on adhesive
employment or consumer contracts.
But arbitration provisions also appear in non-adhesive
negotiated contracts. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College

                            33  

Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1446–1448
[appeal from order compelling college district and faculty
association to arbitrate their claims under an arbitration
provision included in an arms’ length bargaining agreement].)
Yet those contracts rarely are struck down as unconscionable
because only in unusual cases will there exist procedural
unconscionability when both parties to the contract have strong,
if not equal, bargaining power. Indeed, our Supreme Court has
recognized that there is no procedural unconscionability in
“contracts that have been freely negotiated by roughly equal
parties.” (Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1244.) Instead, other
types of defenses or challenges to the enforceability of a
contract—like impossibility, illegality, rescission, mistake, and
frustration of purpose—are better suited for challenging arms’
length contracts because those doctrines do not require a showing
of procedural unconscionability. (See Civ. Code, § 1441
[requirements for voiding contractual provisions due to
impossibility of performance]; Civ. Code, § 1608 [requirements for
voiding contract as illegal]; Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b)
[requirements for unilaterally rescinding a contract]; Meyer v.
Benko (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 937, 944 [requirements for proving
affirmative contract defense of unilateral mistake of fact]; Dorn v.
Goetz (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 407, 410–413 [requirements for
establishing frustration of purpose defense to enforcement of a
contract].) It is, therefore, unsurprising that some contractual
defenses, like unconscionability, will have broader application in
an adhesive context, while other defenses will more broadly apply
in non-adhesive contexts.
Consequently, adhesive contracts, regardless of whether
they include arbitration provisions, have long been a target of

                            34  

unconscionability challenges. (See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co. of New York (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862, 879 [non-arbitration case
noting that for adhesive contracts, “California courts have long
been disinclined to effectuate clauses of limitation of liability
which are … unconscionable”]; Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
(2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 589 and cases discussed therein [non-
arbitration cases applying unconscionability analyses to forum
selection clauses contained in recreational vehicle manufacturers’
adhesive warranty agreements]; California Grocers Assn., supra,
22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 214–217 [non-arbitration case noting that
the “preliminary question” for court’s unconscionability analysis
“is whether we have a contract of adhesion”].)
In addition, our Legislature has made orders denying
motions to compel arbitration immediately appealable, a
procedural posture advantaging parties seeking to enforce
arbitration agreements. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a).)
As a result, unconscionability challenges to adhesive contracts
that contain arbitration provisions more frequently make their
way to California’s appellate courts. This procedural quirk that
treats unsuccessful attempts to enforce arbitration provisions
more favorably than other appeals, in turn, generates more
appellate decisions on this topic than it would for other cases. In
contrast, parties litigating unconscionability or other contractual
theories outside of the arbitration context typically cannot appeal
until the entirety of their case has been resolved via a demurrer,
summary judgment, or trial because of California’s one final
judgment rule. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).)
Relatedly, for contract defenses outside of the fast track
that the Legislature has created for orders denying motions to
compel arbitration, the parties will have far greater opportunity

                            35  

to reach resolution and avoid any appeal at all. Indeed, it would
appear that forum disputes, like disputes over the enforcement of
arbitration provisions, are less likely to resolve through
settlement than other types of contractual disputes, where the
disputes primarily revolve around money. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that appeals addressing whether adhesive arbitration
provisions are unconscionable are relatively common in the
California appellate docket, while unconscionability decisions for
other contract cases are harder to find.
Put simply, arbitration provisions appear in both adhesive
and negotiated contracts. But only those provisions that are
included in adhesive contracts generally will be susceptible to
unconscionability challenges. The difference between these two
types of cases is that one involves adhesive contracts while the
other does not. California’s courts, therefore, are not singling out
arbitration for disfavored treatment under the unconscionability
doctrine. They simply are applying the unconscionability
doctrine in a manner consistent with its purpose—as a defense to
adhesive contracts.
Finally, the dissent accuses us of inventing “hypothetical”
concerns to justify our substantive unconscionability analysis,
even though the dissent engages in the same analysis to conclude
the confidentiality agreement’s nonsolicitation clause is
unenforceable without any evidence that Bennett has engaged in
conduct that could implicate that clause. An unconscionability
analysis requires courts to evaluate legality at the time the
contract is created—i.e., before either party has had an
opportunity to perform under its terms. (See Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 493.)

                             36  

In sum, our analysis of the parties’ arbitration agreement
in this case applies these well-settled and generally applicable
rules of unconscionability. The arbitration provision in this case
is unconscionable because it is part of an adhesive employment
contract that secures arbitration indefinitely. The provision also
compels Bennett to arbitrate claims that are wholly unrelated to
her employment with Global, against a wide range of people and
entities that are not her employer, and it does not give her a
reciprocal right to compel those third parties to arbitrate any
claims they may bring against her. It also imposes an illegal
nonsolicitation provision on Bennett and allows Global to secure
injunctive relief against Bennett without proving irreparable
harm. As our case law shows, the law gives parties with superior
bargaining power significant leeway to draft adhesive contracts
that include arbitration provisions. (See, e.g., Tiri v. Lucky
Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 243–250 [rejecting
unconscionability challenge to delegation clause in adhesive
arbitration agreement because the clause did not lack mutuality,
as it required both sides to arbitrate any disputes between them];
Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 894–897
[rejecting unconscionability challenge to adhesive arbitration
agreement’s delegation clause]; Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd.,
LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 178–185 [severing
unconscionable attorney fees provision but otherwise rejecting
unconscionability challenge to arbitration agreement because it
included a bilateral arbitration requirement binding both
parties].) The law does not, however, permit stronger parties to
draft adhesive contracts that are oppressively harsh or unfairly
one-sided. (See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 571, 585, citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.

                            37  

(1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817–818.) The contract in this case fails
this basic test.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Global’s motion to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Bennett shall recover her costs on appeal.

                                        VIRAMONTES, J.  



 I CONCUR:  



                   STRATTON, P. J.  




                           38  

WILEY, J., Dissenting:

   The majority opinion uses a prohibited state law method to  

invalidate federally protected arbitration. The Supreme Court of
the United States prohibits this method because of its negative
and highly disproportionate impact on arbitration. (See AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 341–342
(Concepcion).) The majority opinion invites preemption—again.
California courts have developed a special branch of the
general unconscionability doctrine to squelch arbitration
whenever we state judges think the details of arbitration need
regulating. The doctrine is at odds with general California
contract law. This special branch arose only in, and it applies
only to, arbitration.
This branch of California law is an arbitration special.
That is, it is a state contract law rule that applies only to, or that
derives its meaning from the fact that the subject is, arbitration.
Federal law preempts a state rule like that. Instead, state
contract law rules must be generally applicable and not specific to
arbitration cases.
This is the rule of equal treatment. (Hohenshelt v. Superior
Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 327 (Hohenshelt).)
There is no equal treatment in this case. The majority
takes apart this arbitration contract using a 20-pound
sledgehammer found nowhere else in general contract law.
California state arbitration law and the supreme federal
preemption power have been butting heads for years. In these
collisions, California state law always loses.
Our record is dispiriting. Consider our defeats:

                              1  

1. Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 16–17
[preempting California arbitration law];
2. Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 491 (Perry)
[same];
3. Preston v. Ferrer (2008) 552 U.S. 346, 349–350, 355–
356, 359 (Preston) [same];
4. Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at pp. 337–338, 352
[same];
5. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC v. Fowler (2014)
571 U.S. 1189 [preempting California arbitration law;
petition for writ of certiorari granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded for further consideration
in light of American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant (2013) 570 U.S. 228];
6. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (2015) 577 U.S. 47, 53
(DIRECTV) [preempting California arbitration law,
and scolding California state courts for intransigence
on arbitration];
7. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 587 U.S. 176, 189
(Lamps Plus) [preempting California arbitration
law]; and
8. Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 649, 662 (Viking River) [same].
From 1984 through 2022, a span of less than 40 years,
there have been eight arbitration preemptions. On average,
there has been one every four or five years. The last one was in
2022, so a believer in simple averages might predict another one
soon. I write in the hopes that California state law will draw
back from this brink.

                            2  

I
Tracie Bennett worked at VXI Global Solutions, LLC for
less than two months. When her employment ended, she filed a
class action against Global. She alleged 10 standard class action
employment claims: minimum wage, meal and rest breaks, and
so forth. Global moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court
denied the motion.
Additional facts are scanty because each party filed but one
skeletal declaration in the trial court. The employer’s declaration
had only six substantive sentences. Bennett’s declaration also
was brief.
We do know Bennett’s job title was “account associate” and
she worked at Global for about six weeks. We do not know if she
was fired or whether she quit.
Bennett stated her education ended with her high school
diploma.
Global ran telephone call centers and handled calls for its
clients. The operations are spread across the United States. We
do not know much else about the company: its size, its affiliated
entities, if any, or whether it does anything besides operate call
centers.
The details of contract formation also are sparse.
The agreement reported, with our italics, Bennett and
Global acknowledged “that we have had an opportunity to discuss
this Agreement with attorneys of our choice prior to signing it
and we have used that opportunity to the extent we wish to do so.”
The employer stated “Plaintiff Bennett received a new-hire
packet. As with all new hires, Plaintiff Bennett was provided
with the opportunity during the new hire orientation to review

                             3  

the new hire packet before signing it.” Bennett signed the
included arbitration agreement on February 28, 2023.
Global did not pressure Bennett to sign. Bennett did not
claim Global rushed her with a tight deadline, or used
intimidation, or the like. Bennett averred she was required to
sign the documents by a certain date, but she does not say when
she got the documents.
Bennett apparently had the opportunity to consult a lawyer
but decided against it. She swore in her declaration that “I did
not have any assistance from an attorney to review the hiring
documents, including the arbitration agreement, before I signed
the documents.”
Nothing suggests Global restricted Bennett’s access to
counsel.
We do not know whether the materials Global presented
Bennett were paper copies or whether everything was online.
Neither do we know if there was face-to-face interaction during
the process, or whether it was partly or entirely remote.
The parties’ agreement states that Global engaged in
interstate commerce and that Bennett’s employment involved
interstate commerce. This point is vital, because it opened the
door to preemptive federal scrutiny.
The trial court denied Global’s motion to compel
arbitration. First, it determined the Federal Arbitration Act
governed the contract. Then it ruled “the degree of procedural
unconscionability is low.” The trial court decided the contract
was substantively unconscionable and the offending defects could
not be severed.
The trial court did not accept all of Bennett’s arguments
about substantive unconscionability. It rejected her claims that

                           4  

the agreement altered Bennett’s entitlement to attorney fees, or
that it waived either her representative PAGA claims or her right
to seek a public injunction. The court also ruled the jury waiver
was not overbroad.
II
The contracts were not unconscionable. The levels of
procedural and substantive unconscionability were low. One
provision in the confidentiality agreement ran afoul of state law
but had nothing to do with arbitration or with the facts of this
case. The trial court easily and conventionally should have
severed this provision. I would remand for the trial court to send
the case to arbitration.
Two flaws infect the majority’s contrary approach: (1) a
harsh and arbitration-specific method, (2) which leads to results
that interfere with arbitration to a far greater extent than with
any other kind of contract.
The harsh method faults this contract on grounds that are
used nowhere else in contract law: scope, duration, clause-by-
clause demands for mutuality in hypothetical situations, and
restrictive severance of objectionable but irrelevant contract
terms. After putting this contract through this arbitration-
specific wringer, the disproportionate result then is predictable.
“California’s courts have been more likely to hold contracts to
arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts.” (Concepcion,
supra, 563 U.S. at p. 342, internal quotations omitted.) I survey
recent cases to illustrate this forbidden consequence.
A
The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving
the existence of an arbitration agreement. (Adolph v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1128.) Global

                            5  

established the arbitration agreement exists. Bennett does not
dispute she signed it.
Unconscionability is a venerable and desirable contract law
doctrine. The doctrine is about someone using oppressive power
over another to force them into an unfair deal.
An antebellum exemplar arose when the ship Richmond, a
whaling vessel, ran aground in arctic waters 5,000 miles from the
nearest port. Winter was near, meaning sea ice soon would crush
the ship and destroy its full cargo of valuable oil. The only three
ships in the neighborhood rescued the crew. These other whaling
ships did not have full holds. With the supposed assent of the
Richmond’s master, the other three captains held an “auction”
and bought the Richmond’s oil for cents on the dollar. Once back
home, however, the owner of the Richmond sued to void the so-
called auction and to recover the true market value of the oil.
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed this “auction”
contract was unconscionable: “The contrivance of an auction sale,
under such circumstances, where the master of the Richmond
was hopeless, helpless, and passive—where there was no market,
no money, no competition—where one party had absolute power,
and the other no choice but submission—where the vendor must
take what is offered or get nothing—is a transaction which has no
characteristic of a valid contract.” (Post v. Jones (1857) 60 U.S. 150, 159.)
As the party opposing enforcement of the contract, Bennett
bore the burden of establishing her claim of unconscionability.
She had to show unfairness both in the procedure by which her
contract was formed and the substance of its terms. (Fuentes v.
Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 99 (Fuentes).)

                            6  

This distinction between procedural and substantive
unconscionability is fundamental. Yale Professor Arthur Allen
Leff devised it in his landmark article, Unconscionability and the
Code—The Emperor’s New Clause (1967) 115 U.Pa. L.Rev. 485,
487, 488, 489, 509 (Leff).
As Professor Peters wrote, since Leff’s 1967 article, “no one
has ever again been able to address the problem of
unconscionability without incorporating the watershed
distinctions” Leff created. (Peters, Arthur Leff as a Scholar of
Commercial and Contract Law (1981) 91 Yale L.J. 230, 231.)
Leff critiqued the 21 years of effort—1941 to 1962—the
American Law Institute spent trying to clarify the concept of
unconscionability. Leff famously concluded ALI’s decades of work
resulted only in “amorphous unintelligibility.” To boot, Leff
condemned the ALI’s commentary accompanying that work on
unconscionability as irrelevant. (Leff, supra, 115 U.Pa. L.Rev. at
p. 488.) The Restatement’s entire formulation of
unconscionability, Leff charged, was vacuous. (Id. at p. 541.)
Leff concluded “it is easy to say nothing with words.” (Id. at p.
559.)
Leff’s penetrating analysis retains its power. For instance,
he mercilessly dissected Judge Skelly Wright’s much-cited
unconscionability decision in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co. (D.C. Cir. 1965) 350 F.2d 445. (Leff, supra, 115
U.Pa. L.Rev. at pp. 551–557.) I have looked, and to my
knowledge no one has rebutted Leff’s scathing critique.
Historically, then, the doctrine of unconscionability has
been a difficult creature to identify and capture. “[S]cholars
uniformly describe unconscionability as an ambiguous and
undefinable concept.” (Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of

                            7  

the Doctrine of Unconscionability (2003) 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513,
1514; see also 1513–1514 [after well over one hundred law review
articles, legal scholars believed “they were unable to provide
courts with a “reasoned elaboration of what is unconscionable”].)
More than half a century later, however, some things are
clear.
A written arbitration agreement is valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except on grounds for the revocation of any contract.
This principle establishes an equal-treatment rule: a court may
invalidate an arbitration agreement based on generally
applicable contract defenses, but the court may not formulate
rules that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.
(Hohenshelt, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 341; see also Kindred
Nursing Centers L.P. v. Clark (2017) 581 U.S. 246, 248 (Kindred)
[federal law preempts state rules that single out arbitration
agreements for disfavored treatment].)
The equal-treatment rule means California courts may not
create unconscionability rules that apply only in arbitration
cases. The highest courts of our state and nation condemn that
sort of selective contract law. The law requires Bennett to
advance generally applicable arguments, not ones specific to
arbitration contracts.
B
The trial court was right to find “the degree of procedural
unconscionability is low.”
Global apparently gave Bennett a meaningful opportunity
to review the written material, given that the burden was on
Bennett and she offered no contrary evidence. Bennett thus had
ample time to consider the contract. Global did not block Bennett

                            8  

from asking questions about the agreement. Neither did it tell
her to hurry up. Bennett reported neither surprise nor high-
pressure tactics. The font was easily readable. There was no
language barrier. The contract language was straightforward:
the words were not complex and there were no 900-word
paragraphs. (Cf. Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 104–105
[agreement was one mammoth paragraph of about 900 words
squeezed into about three vertical inches of text].)
The contract was a form, but that does not change this
assessment. The form is Global’s, as its logo at the top makes
clear. We can presume Global presented its form to Bennett on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis: even if she had tried, Bennett would
have been powerless to bargain over terms. Absent evidence on
this point, of which there is none, this presumption accords with
common experience. Some employees enjoy strong bargaining
positions, but they are the exceptions and not the rule. (See, e.g.,
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)
24 Cal.4th 83, 115 (Armendariz); Lab. Code, § 515, subd. (a).)
Form contracts often are pejoratively called contracts of
adhesion. But they could just as well be called contracts of
convenience.
“Form contracts have social utility. ‘Through advance
knowledge on the part of the enterprise offering the contract that
its relationship with each individual consumer or offeree will be
uniform, standard and fixed, the device of form contracts
introduces a degree of efficiency, simplicity, and stability. When
such contracts are used widely, the savings in cost and energy
can be substantial. An additional benefit is that the goods and
services which are covered by these contracts are put within the
reach of the general public, whose sheer size might prohibit

                             9  

widespread distribution if the necessary contractual relationships
had to be individualized. Transactional costs, and therefore the
possible prices of these goods and services, are reduced. [¶] In
short, form contracts appear to be a necessary concomitant of a
sophisticated, mass-consumption economy. They have social and
economic utility.’ ” (Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 818, fn. 15; see also Leff, supra, p. 504; Karl Llewellen, Book
Review (1939) 52 Harv. L.Rev. 700, 701.)
Half a century ago, the scholarly view was that “Standard
form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine
percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have
difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than
by standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they
probably never have. But if they are active, they contract by
standard form several times a day. Parking lot and theater
tickets, package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas
station credit card purchase slips are all standard form
contracts.” (Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power (1971) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 529.)
This view is dated. In the last 50 years, forms have become
more common because technology, prominently including the
internet, has continued to drive down transaction costs. In 2026,
many buyers want one-click transactions that get the item here
by 11 a.m. tomorrow. The idea of devoting time to customizing a
contract may strike the typical 2026 consumer as bothersome at
best.
This point is profound: for most modern commerce, for
most people, for most of the time, all contracts are forms. A
major reason is convenience. This is not some trick a cabal of
corporations foisted on protesting consumers. It is what people

                            10  

generally want, because people generally prefer spending less
time studying transactions and spending more time doing things
they enjoy.
Nevertheless, California law holds that some procedural
unconscionability exists in every standardized contract that,
“imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity
to adhere to the contract or reject it.” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th
at p. 103.)
Some procedural unconscionability existed. The court
correctly assessed its level as low.
Citing Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16
Cal.5th 478, 492, 494 (Ramirez), Bennett concedes, as she must,
that the simple existence of an adhesion contract establishes only
a low degree of procedural unconscionability.
Bennett nevertheless launches many attacks on the form of
the contract, and then she does the same for the substance of the
contract. I will treat the full multitude of Bennett’s complaints
because their profusion is so typical of the way modern California
counsel are accustomed to attacking every conceivable detail of
arbitration contracts. California trial judges handling a civil
docket are familiar with this gamut, on both procedural and
substantive grounds. The majority opinion picks out some
offerings on this menu ultimately to craft a punishing method of
review that exists only when arbitration is the issue. The
common result is predictable: death to you, arbitration.
Bennett argues the font size was too small. The record
shows the text is easily readable, however, and different from the
“nearly unreadable” font size in the Fuentes case. (Fuentes,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 100; see also Fuentes v. Empire Nissan,

                            11  

Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 919, 923 [“strikingly minute,” “tiny
and blurred,” “largely unreadable”].)
If we assume Global gave Bennett material online, then
small font was irrelevant because the interested reader can use a
device to enlarge text on the screen. (See Basith v. Lithia Motors,
Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 951, 955 [“Technology made the online
image adjustable. Viewers could use a bigger monitor or
keyboard strokes to magnify the size of the words”].)
If we assume the materials were hard copies, then there
exists a tradeoff between font size and document size: larger
fonts use up more paper. The font is small on an average grocery
receipt, for instance, because the store wants to fit a lot of useful
information on a scrap of paper. The same goes for prescription
printouts and medication labels. These small fonts are not
unfair. They are typical and rational.
The font in Global’s agreement was Arial 9.2. This font size
is innocuous. It is larger font than in the heading of decisions
from this court explaining the prohibition on citing unpublished
opinions. It is larger than footnotes in the Official California
Reports, which are in 9 point font. According to the most recent
U.S. Government Publishing Office Style Manual published in
2016 (see p. 307), federal agencies generally set footnotes in 7, 8,
or 9 point font (<https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/GPO-
STYLEMANUAL-2016/pdf/GPO-STYLEMANUAL-2016.pdf> [as
of Nov. 8, 2026], archived at https://perma.cc/WLU5-LB3Z]; cf.
21 C.F.R. § 101.2(c) [federal regulations on food labeling require
information to “appear prominently and conspicuously, but in no
case may the letters and/or numbers be less than one-sixteenth
inch in height”].)

                             12  

Bennett cites no non-arbitration case holding Arial 9.2 to be
a procedurally unconscionable contract font size. This font size
argument fails.
Bennett likewise asserts the arbitration agreement was
“buried” in 100 pages of documents Global gave her. “Buried” is
pejorative. Bennett does not identify material Global gave her
that was unnecessary filler designed only to discourage curiosity.
Employers are rarely faulted for giving new hires too much
information about the new job.
The employer highlighted the importance of the arbitration
agreement. It included its proposed contract as an appendix to
other materials. It required her to sign this three-page
document. Global also required Bennett to sign a confidentiality
agreement. These signature requirements emphasized the
importance of these two contracts and distinguished them from
accompanying materials.
Bennett also argues she had a high school diploma only and
was unfamiliar with the topic of arbitration. Her briefing
characterizes the arbitration agreement as “complex, including
statutory references and legal jargon … .” The record debunks
the supposed semantic complexity of this document. For a
legally-binding document, this wording is pedestrian. It is
neither see-Spot-run nor unnecessarily prolix.
No general contract rule states the contracting process is
suspect when one side writes down legalistic language and the
other side lacks a college degree. Were that true, it would cast
unwarranted doubt, for instance, on many real estate
transactions and car loans.
In short, the trial court properly rated the level of
procedural unconscionability as low. I agree with my colleagues

                            13  

in the majority on this point. The level of procedural
unconscionability was as close to zero as any form can get.
Procedurally, then, this contract was just like what everyone uses
all the time.
C
There was no substantive unconscionability (1) that
mattered on these facts and (2) that could not easily and simply
be severed.
The trial court faulted two aspects of the deal: scope and
duration. Bennett endorses these criticisms and piles on many
more. The majority accepts some of these points, adds others,
and ignores the rest. Again I go through the panoply because
this mass of special attacks is standard in California arbitration
law today. California judges have lived in this atmosphere so
long that we mistake it for normal, even though it utterly departs
from general contract law.
1
The trial court ruled the scope of the contract was unfair
because it covered non-employment as well as employment
claims. This, however, was not overly harsh or so one-sided that
it shocks the conscience. It was not even close.
Bennett claimed the contract was unfair because it was
“overbroad in scope.” General contract law, however, has never
contained a doctrine of “overbreadth.” The contrary is true. The
familiar principle of contract law is to allow parties to determine
the scope of their relationship. (E.g., Civ. Code, § 1636 [interpret
contracts to effectuate the mutual intention of the parties].)
This freedom to construct a world of private ordering allows
parties to make their own law tailored to their particular plans.
Bennett does not elaborate or defend the notion that courts

                            14  

generally will oversee the “proper” scope of all contracts.
Bennett’s notion is another arbitration-specific invention running
hard against the grain of general contract law.
Apart from the non-existence of a general overbreadth
doctrine, Bennett in particular fails to explain what was unfair
about this contract’s scope. She offers three speculative
hypotheticals: her conceivable slip-and-fall in the Global parking
lot outside of work hours; an imaginary mishap as a customer of
one of Global’s call centers; and a theoretical plaintiff suing a co-
worker at Global for “claims unrelated to her employment, like
defamation, conversion, stalking, assault, or other common
claims … .” The majority endorses Bennett’s attack.
This scope is not unfair. Contracts commonly have a scope
that is sweeping. Standard settlement contracts, for instance,
commonly attempt to expand their scope to the maximum extent
the English language permits.
For instance, encompassing words like the following are
routine in non-arbitration contracts, as every experienced trial
judge will recognize: “claimants, for themselves and each of their
present and former heirs, trustees, executors, administrators,
partners, sureties, employees, attorneys, agents, representatives,
predecessors, successors, and assigns.” These people
“unconditionally and irrevocably waive, release, and forever
discharge the defendant and each of its present, former and
future parents, predecessors, successors, assignees, affiliates,
subsidiaries, principals, shareholders, joint ventures, officers and
directors, attorneys, agents, representatives, and employees from
and against any and all past and present claims (including
subrogation claims), counterclaims, actions, causes of action,
lawsuits, fees, costs, losses, controversies, promises, demands, or

                             15  

liabilities, of whatever kind or character, whether known or
unknown.”
Lawyers often generate, and trial courts often encounter,
these feats of semantic indulgence. The drafting lawyers are
trying to visualize every possible circumstance and to capture
them all. That is not unfair. It is customary and usual, because
clients commonly want the deal to cover every eventuality, no
matter how remote or outlandish the prospect might seem at
first. Lawyers write this way because experience has taught the
profession to be prudent and detail-oriented. Clients want
competent contract attorneys who anticipate problems and plug
potential holes.
Bennett cites a number of cases to support her claim. Later
I discuss Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 312 (Cook). This and all the other unconscionability
precedents Bennett or the majority cite are arbitration cases.
None manifests an equal-treatment rule.
In sum, Bennett’s scope argument founders.
The majority does not attempt to show its scope critique
appears anywhere in contract law outside of arbitration. This
scope critique is an arbitration special. It is not evenhanded.
2
Bennett argues the agreement was unfair because of its
duration: it survived her employment and could be revoked or
modified only in a writing signed by Bennett and all of Global’s
partners. The indefinite nature of the contract’s duration, she
contends, shows it was unfair.
Nonsense.
No general contract law doctrine holds that indefinite
contract duration is unfair. General law is to the contrary.

                           16  

Parties often strike deals that are to remain in place indefinitely
or until all parties agree to end them.
Alternatively, parties may specify their contracts have a
lengthy duration, or courts may interpret the contract to imply
such a term. (E.g., RMR Equipment Rental, Inc. v. Residential
Fund 1347, LLC (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 383, 386 [long term water
requirements contract]; Lura v. Multaplex, Inc. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 410, 413–414 [long term employee commission
contract]; Thomson v. Hodgson (9th Cir. 2025) 150 F.4th 1097,
1105–1107 [long term musical royalties contract].)
Long lasting arrangements are commonplace throughout
the economy and over the breadth of general contract law. Long
term relationships—made binding by long term contracts—can be
important for the parties by helping them to achieve long term
goals.
When parties embark on an enormous venture, the time
frame can stretch far into the future. Dams, power plants,
underground subways, towering skyscrapers, enormous
cathedrals, mighty bridges: the planned duration can stretch
over many decades.
The duration of associated contracts can match the
mammoth scale of these projects. Contract law lets people think
big. It makes spectacular achievements possible by enforcing
reliable trust over the very long run. This aspect of contract law
has tremendous utility. It enables our civilization to construct
what is monumental and enduring.
In the context of this case, it can be rational for the parties
to set a duration that extends past the end date of employment.
Trial judges familiar with employment lawsuits know many are
filed after employment ended, as in this case. What then would

                             17  

be the logical end date for an employment contract? That would
depend on the statute of limitations, whether there might be
estoppel or tolling of the statute for some reason, and whether
these and other relevant doctrines might evolve in the future.
The parties may believe these matters cannot be predicted with
certainty. A sensible conclusion would be to extend the contract
until all sides are satisfied its purpose has run its course. If the
relationship ends, the contract may become moot as a practical
matter. Then no one need do anything.
For these reasons, the duration of this contract was logical.
This term corresponded to the situation and the interests at
stake. It was not unfair.
Flexibility about duration is another aspect of the freedom
of contract. The contrary view is peculiar to arbitration.
The majority does not attempt to show its duration critique
appears anywhere in contract law outside of arbitration. This
duration critique is an arbitration special. It is not evenhanded.
3
The majority joins with Bennett by faulting this arbitration
contract because it lacks mutuality. The majority asserts this
issue of mutuality arises because “Bennett must arbitrate any
claim she has against Global’s past or present employees, officers,
administrators, and agents.” The result makes these other
people into third party beneficiaries of this contract, reasons the
majority, and hypothetically these others can force Bennett into
arbitration while she would not be able to do the same to them.
“The agreement, therefore, creates a one-sided benefit in favor of
its third-party beneficiaries,” concludes the majority. This is a
fatal offense to the paramount consideration of mutuality,
concludes the majority.

                            18  

This concern is strictly hypothetical. It has no basis in the
facts Bennett alleged in her complaint. The majority thus
invents a hypothetical mutuality concern to invalidate this
arbitration contract.
This technique is powerfully destructive. It also has no
parallel in general contract law.
General contract law does not require mutuality. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that, “[i]f the
requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional
requirement of
(a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss,
disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee; or
(b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or
(c) ‘mutuality of obligation.’ ” (Rest. (2d) Contracts § 79,
italics added.)
Mutuality is not a general contract law rule. (See, e.g., 3
Williston of Contracts (4th ed. 2026 May 2026 Update) § 7:22.)
Recall that line about the peppercorn being enough.
(https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/chappell-v-nestle.php.)
The unconscionability doctrine is centrally concerned with
overall contract unfairness that shocks the conscience, but the
majority offers no example of an unconscionability case—outside
the arbitration context, that is—where a court goes through the
contract in search of hypothetical problems to destroy the deal.
Demanding equivalence in the values exchanged for every
clause, for every imaginable hypothetical case, increases the
power of California courts to regulate arbitration to our
standards of fairness.
No other branch of contract law, however, uses imaginary
hypotheticals to flyspeck contracts to death.

                             19  

Justice Kagan condemned a method that “hypothesized a
slim set of both patently objectionable and utterly fanciful”
situations as a method of disfavoring arbitration. (Kindred,
supra, 581 U.S. at p. 253.) That style of analysis “reveals the
kind of ‘hostility to arbitration’ that led Congress to enact the
[Federal Arbitration Act].” (Id. at p. 254, citing Concepcion,
supra, 563 U.S., at 339.) “And doing so only makes clear the
arbitration-specific character of the rule, much as if it were made
applicable to arbitration agreements and black swans.” (Ibid.)
Stephen Broome wrote in 2006 that the “mutuality test
evidences an overt bias against arbitration by the California
courts … .” (Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts Are
Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act (2006) 3 Hastings Bus.
L.J. 39, 40 (Broome).) The Supreme Court of the United States
cited Broome’s article. (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S at p. 342.)
The majority does not attempt to show its hypothetical
mutuality critique appears anywhere in contract law outside of
arbitration. This hypothetical mutuality critique is an
arbitration special. It is not evenhanded.
4
Bennett argues the confidentiality agreement lacks
mutuality because it permits Global to seek injunctive relief, “but
requires that Bennett concede factors favoring injunctive relief,
i.e., agree that disclosure would cause irreparable harm, agree
that any damages would be difficult to measure for a breach that
injunctive relief be granted, agree that injunctive relief be
granted, and agree that [Global] is entitled to immediate
injunctive relief.” The majority endorses this argument.

                            20  

For the sake of argument, I will assume it is proper to read
the arbitration contract and the confidentiality contract as one.
This attack still fails. Global’s interest in getting injunctive
relief for trade secret violations was valid and typical. The only
authority Bennett or the majority muster are arbitration cases.
Bennett and the majority cannot identify a rule of general
applicability that casts doubt on a trade secret holder’s power to
include provisions of this kind in its confidentiality agreements.
Global’s interest in protecting its trade secrets was
legitimate. Injunctive relief is a key way to protect trade secrets.
The primary purpose of California’s trade secret law is to
promote and reward innovation and technological development
and to maintain commercial ethics. (DVD Copy Control Assn.,
Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 878 (Bunner).)
“Injunctions issued under California’s trade secret law
serve significant government interests. The logic of the law of
trade secrets recognizes that private parties invest extensively in
certain information that loses its value when published to the
world at large. Trade secret law thus creates a property right
defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his
interest from disclosure to others. By doing so, it allows the trade
secret owner to reap the fruits of its labor and protects the
owner’s moral entitlement to these fruits. Trade secrets thus
have been recognized as a constitutionally protected intangible
property interest. By creating a limited property right in
information, trade secret law creates an incentive for investment
in innovation. Trade secret law prompts innovators to proceed
with the discovery and exploitation of their inventions. Without
trade secret protection, organized scientific and technological

                              21  

research could become fragmented, and society as a whole would
suffer.” (Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 880–881.)
“Trade secret law also maintains standards of commercial
ethics. It minimizes the inevitable cost to the basic decency of
society when one steals from another. It thereby recognizes that
good faith and honest, fair dealing is the life and spirit of the
commercial world.” (Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
“[P]rohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets acquired by
improper means is the only way to preserve the property interest
created by trade secret law and its concomitant ability to
encourage invention.” (Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
A trade secret is a peculiar kind of property because its
only value consists in keeping it private. The right to exclude
others thus is central to the definition of this property interest.
(Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
Once the information constituting a trade secret is
disclosed to others, the holder of the trade secret has lost its
property interest in the information. “The protection of trade
secrets and the benefits to research and development derived
from the government’s recognition of this property right depend
on the judiciary’s power to enjoin disclosures by those who know
or have reason to know of their misappropriation.” (Bunner,
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881, italics added.)
There is no less restrictive way of protecting an owner’s
constitutionally recognized property interest in its trade secrets.
(Bunner, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 881.)
Injunctive relief thus is central to trade secret protection.
As a trade secret holder, Global’s contractual effort to make this
remedy readily available to it was usual and proper.

                            22  

Once again, Bennett’s only authorities for attacking these
provisions are decisions about arbitration agreements. (See
Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 486–487,
492–493 (Alberto) [arbitration case]; Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 233 [same]; Carmona v. Lincoln
Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 78
[same].)
If there is a general rule disfavoring contractual efforts to
make injunctive relief more easily available in trade secret cases,
Bennett has not identified it. She gives us only arbitration
specials. They are preempted.
5
Bennett and the majority identify an invalid provision in
the confidentiality agreement. This provision has nothing to do
with this case. It is easily severable. This irrelevant and
severable provision is not a good reason to condemn this
arbitration agreement.
Paragraph eight in the confidentiality agreement purports
to prohibit Bennett from soliciting Global’s employees to
terminate their employment with Global.
This anti-raiding clause is unenforceable because it is not
limited to a bar on improper means. (AMN Healthcare, Inc. v.
Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 923, 936; cf.
ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017 [former employee may use general knowledge, skill, and
experience acquired in former employment in competition with a
former employer, but the former employee may not use
confidential information or trade secrets in doing so].)
The trial court declined to address the anti-raiding clause.
This was sensible for two reasons: irrelevant and severable.

                            23  

First, the anti-raiding clause is irrelevant. Its connection to
Bennett’s case is delicious fiction. Bennett worked at Global as
an “account associate” at a call center for six weeks. Her
complaint does not allege she then left to compete with Global.
The factual relationship between the anti-raiding clause and this
case is nil.
This analysis is not hypothetical. It compares Bennett’s
actual complaint to the actual text of the anti-raiding clause and
then questions how one logically relates to the other. Answer:
there is no actual relationship. This analysis of actualities is the
opposite of hypothetical.
Second, the anti-raiding clause is severable. The strong
legislative and judicial preference is to sever an offending term
and to enforce the balance of the agreement. The relevant
statute is Civil Code section 1599, which contemplates a judicial
refusal to enforce an entire agreement only when it is permeated
by unconscionability. (See Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 514.)
Courts may liberally sever any unconscionable portion of a
contract and enforce the rest when the illegality is collateral to
the contract’s main purpose, when it is possible to cure the
illegality by means of severance, and when enforcing the balance
of the contract would be in the interests of justice. (Ramirez,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 514.)
The illegality here is collateral to the main purpose of the
arbitration contract. Prohibiting Bennett from raiding Global’s
employees is unrelated to the purpose of arbitrating the Labor
Code allegations that Bennett has made against Global.
The proper course would be to cure this illegality by
severing it. Striking paragraph eight from the confidentiality

                             24  

agreement would leave the arbitration agreement intact. This
slice of the knife would be straight, clean, and easy.
Enforcing the balance of the agreement also is in the
interest of justice. The parties agreed that “[i]f any provision of
this [Arbitration] Agreement is determined to be void or
otherwise unenforceable, in whole or in part, such determination
shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this Agreement.”
It serves the spirit and letter of this clause to sever the anti-
raiding provision clause, which is unrelated to arbitration. (See
Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 517 [“if the contract contains a
severance clause, the court should take it into account as an
expression of the parties’ intent that an agreement curable by
removing defective terms should otherwise be enforced”].)
On the actual facts of this case, one can find no need to
deter Global from pursuing a scheme of widespread illegality.
The anti-raiding provision in paragraph eight is the lone problem
in an otherwise unobjectionable agreement. (See Ramirez, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 517 [“the greater the number of unconscionable
provisions a contract contains the less likely it is that severance
will be the appropriate remedy”].)
To sum up, there was no substantive unconscionability (1)
that mattered on these facts and (2) that could not easily and
simply be severed. To reach the contrary conclusion of
substantive unconscionability requires the majority to employ a
collection of destructive weapons used only in arbitration cases.
This approach is not evenhanded.
D
The Cook decision, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 320–330,
displayed antipathy to arbitration of the kind that prompted
Justice Breyer to chide California courts for their intransigence

                            25  

on the topic. (See DIRECTV, supra, 577 U.S. at p. 53.) The
Supreme Court of the United States addressed California’s
continuing defiance of federal law. The “ ‘Supremacy Clause
forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law
because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize
the superior authority of its source.’ … The Federal Arbitration
Act is a law of the United States, and Concepcion is an
authoritative interpretation of that Act. Consequently, the
judges of every State must follow it.” (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court has heeded the direction of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Our Supreme Court
applies an equal-treatment rule. Under this guidance, Cook must
fall.
Pamela Cook sued the University of Southern California for
causes of action arising from her former employment at USC.
USC moved to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeal affirmed
the trial court’s denial of this motion. The court said the degree
of procedural unconscionability was low. (Cook, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 321.) Substantive unconscionability, on the
other hand, was present to an unacceptable degree for three
reasons: contract scope, contract duration, and lack of mutuality.
(Id. at pp. 321–328.) I treat each in turn.
First, the Cook opinion held that the “the agreement’s
broad scope is substantively unconscionable.” (Cook, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 325, italics added.) As noted above, however,
contract law has never contained a general doctrine of
“overbreadth” that limits the permissible scope of contracts. The
Cook decision cited unconscionability decisions holding “broad
scope” to be a problem. But all these decisions concerned
arbitration. (See id. at pp. 321–325.) That is what the equal-

                           26  

treatment rule forbids: inventing new state rules that apply only
in arbitration cases, where their effect is to the detriment of
arbitration. This version of the unconscionability doctrine
“singles out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment.”
(Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 248.) That is forbidden.
Second, Cook held the contract’s duration was
unacceptable: “The arbitration agreement specifically provides
that it will survive unless and until Cook and USC’s president
specifically terminate the agreement in a writing, signed by both
parties, which expressly mentions the arbitration agreement.”
(Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 326.) According to Cook, this
indefinite duration revealed fatal unconscionability. (Ibid.) This
holding is unsustainable, however, because—in practice—it preys
only upon arbitration. Contract law contains no general rule
bounding the duration of contracts. So far as the Cook decision
attempted to show, this duration objection has never driven
unconscionability holdings outside the arbitration field. I know
of no unconscionability holding outside the arbitration field that
espoused this logic. It is an arbitration special.
Third, the Cook opinion faulted the arbitration agreement
for its supposed lack of mutuality. Once again, however, the
opinion cited only arbitration cases as precedents for its
application of the unconscionability doctrine. (Cook, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at pp. 326–328.)
In sum, the Cook opinion applied a version of the
unconscionability doctrine that puts only arbitration on the
chopping block. Holdings like that invite a ninth reprimand from
the Supreme Court of the United States.
Later California state cases follow Cook. They magnify the
problem.

                           27  

E
So much for method. Now to results. The results are no
more evenhanded than the method.
This section takes up the empirical question of whether the
application of the unconscionability doctrine today in fact has
been evenhanded.
My approach is simple legal research: look up cases on
Westlaw, read them, sort them, and count them.
I have tried to use human intelligence. At any rate, I have
used no artificial intelligence. I suspect people with more wits
and resources could, using an array of tools, check and extend my
basic inquiry. Widespread and expanded research along these
lines would be desirable.
1
I inquire into the actions of courts because actions speak
louder than words.
The question is this: when California state courts use the
doctrine of unconscionability to impair or invalidate a contract,
how often is that contract about arbitration? For the years 2021
to 2025, the answer is: disproportionately often, and
overwhelmingly so.
For these years, and depending on exactly how we define
“unconscionability,” California courts used the unconscionability
doctrine to interfere with arbitration 79 percent to 90 percent of
the time. These percentages show a highly disproportionate
impact.
To rephrase, take the cases in which courts used
unconscionability to invalidate part or all of a contract. Question:
how often was that contract about arbitration? Answer: from 79
percent to 90 percent of the time. In other words, California

                            28  

courts target arbitration in the overwhelming supermajority of
the cases.
Put in yet other terms, recent California decisions have
disproportionately used the supposedly general doctrine of
unconscionability to focus on and to impair or extinguish a
particular kind of contract: arbitration.
This is not evenhandedness. This is antipathy to
arbitration. The antipathy is extreme.
2
My survey includes unpublished as well as published cases,
because California courts often impair an arbitration contract
without publishing their decisions. Nevertheless, an invalidated
contract is legally unenforceable whether or not the decision is
published. I cite unpublished cases, not to support some legal
assertion with their nonexistent legal authority, but to show the
reality of how California courts decide arbitration cases.
3
To repeat, lawyers, scholars, and empiricists on all sides of
the arbitration debate should scrutinize, critique, and expand the
following initial research foray.
Broome suggested California state courts began expressing
their hostility to arbitration in 1997. (See Broome, supra, 3
Hastings Bus. L.J. at pp. 49–50 & fn. 51, citing Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1547–1548.)
1997 was 29 years ago.
I have not attempted to tackle 29 years of data. I confine
my analysis to cases decided in 2021 to 2025, which is about all I
can manage for now.
For the sake of completeness, however, it would be
desirable to expand this inquiry to encompass the universe of

                            29  

data. Future parties to arbitration disputes may want to check
and expand my feeble effort. It would be ideal if scholars and
arms-length observers would join in.
4
My research method has been to search Westlaw for
California state cases with these queries and to obtain these
results:
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2021) returned 146 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2022) returned 135 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2023) returned 140 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2024) returned 152 cases
● unconscionab! & DATE(=2025) returned 140 cases
These searches produced a total of 713 cases. I reviewed
the 713 cases to see in which courts used something like the
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate part or all of a contract.
Why do I say something like the unconscionability doctrine?
As Professor Leff explained, a hallmark of the unconscionability
doctrine is its indefinite character. So I culled the 713 cases to
determine those in which courts were applying something like
this doctrine.
This effort required some judgment calls, and judgment
calls deserve explanation and justification. I invite scrutiny of
my judgment calls, which I hope readers conclude are reasonable
and which are at least explicit and therefore subject to open
debate.
In the interest of casting a wide net, then, I included cases
of the following four categories.
First, in In re Marriage of Valkov and Valkova (Feb. 15,
2022, B304187) 2022 WL 455279 [nonpub. opn.] (Valkov), the
court set aside a post-marital stipulated property division in a

                            30  

marital dissolution case. (Id. at p. *1.) The wife argued she was
under duress, the terms were unconscionable, and the husband
had unclean hands. (Id. at p. *10.) The appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s decision setting aside the stipulated property
division based on the finding the wife was under duress and on
other “equitable grounds.” (Id. at p. *11.) Thus, the court did not
explicitly state the stipulation was unconscionable. But this
analysis of “inherent equitable authority to set aside a stipulated
agreement” closely resembles an unconscionability holding, and
indeed the wife used that very word. (Id. at pp. *10, 11.) I
therefore include this case in my sample, despite the absence of
an express judicial embrace of the unconscionability doctrine.
Second, in an unlawful detainer action brought after a
foreclosure sale, the trial court found that a procedural
irregularity plus a grossly inadequate price meant it would be
“unconscionable” to allow a home loan lender to profit at the
home loan borrower’s expense from the lender’s “misleading
communications.” (Genova Capital, Inc. v. Field (July 21, 2022,
B303697) 2022 WL 2849079 [nonpub. opn.], at p. *8 (Genova).)
The court did not expressly invalidate any contract, but simply
denied the lender possession after the foreclosure sale, pending
an “unlimited quiet title action.” (Id. at p. *2.) This rule
specifically concerns real estate foreclosure sales, as explained in
Millennium Rock Mortgage Inc. v. T.D. Service Co. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 804, 809–810. Consequently, this rule is not a
general contract law doctrine. Yet this rule resembles
unconscionability analysis by focusing on the process of contract
formation and the substantive unfairness of the contractual
result. I include this case.

                             31  

Third, a series of decisions invalidated certain aspects of
contracts that the Dameron hospitals required patients to sign
before hospital admission. These decisions found aspects of these
contracts of adhesion to be unenforceable because the effects were
beyond the patients’ expectation. (See Dameron Hospital Assn. v.
Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 530,
536, 543 (Dameron IV); Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern
Cal., Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971,
993–994 (Dameron III); Dameron Hospital Assn. v. United
Services Automobile Assn. (Jan. 5, 2022, C087225) 2022 WL
41914 [nonpub. opn.] at p. *8 (Dameron II); Dameron Hospital
Assn. v. Geico Casualty Co. (Oct. 4 2021, C086546) 2021 WL
4519651 [nonpub. opn.], at pp. *7–9 (Dameron I).) The decisions
did not self-consciously apply the doctrine of unconscionability or
cite unconscionability precedents. They used the word
“unconscionable” once, and then in a descriptive rather than a
doctrinal way. Yet their focus on both procedural and
substantive unfairness qualifies them as kin to the
unconscionability doctrine. I include these cases.
Fourth, in Razaqi v. Khurush (Nov. 21, 2025, C099636,
C101262) 2025 WL 3250832 [nonpub. opn.], at pp. *8–11
(Razaqi), the trial court awarded statutory fees and sanctions in
a family law matter after concluding that basing fees on the 40
percent contingency fee contract between the wife and her lawyer
would be unconscionable. The appellate court upheld the
statutory fees and sanctions but did not address
unconscionability. I include this decision because professional
regulation of attorney conduct, including sanctions for
“unconscionable” attorney behavior, seems to be a genre of
unconscionability analysis. It is difficult precisely to assess this

                            32  

case because the appellate court did not discuss or describe the
basis for the trial court’s unconscionability ruling. I hope to err
on the side of casting a wide net, however, so I include this case.
I also include cases where a court invalidates part of a
contract but then severs that part. This use of the
unconscionability doctrine destroys at least a part of the parties’
agreement.
On the other hand, some cases use some variant of the
word “unconscionability” but, in my view, are not applications of
the contract law doctrine of unconscionability.
In a couple of cases, for instance, courts found a party
would suffer “unconscionable injury” such that the statute of
frauds should not be applied to a contract; thus, the
unconscionability finding allowed the agreement to be enforced.
(E.g., Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 25–26; Twelve
Tribes of Israel, U.S.A., Inc. v. Barnum (Mar. 17, 2022, B299838)
2022 WL 804783 [nonpub. opn.], at p. *11.) This is the opposite
of the contract law defense of unconscionability, which annuls
contract enforcement. I exclude decisions of this sort.
In another category, courts determine whether default
judgment awards are “totally unconscionable and without
evidentiary justification.” In one case, the court found the
punitive damages award failed the standard because the party’s
financial condition was not sufficiently considered. (Brahms v.
Wilk (Sept. 20, 2022, G060250) 2022 WL 4393494 [nonpub. opn.],
at p. *5.) In another, the trial court vacated the attorney fees
portion of the default judgment award as unconscionable, but the
appellate court reversed. (Coastline JX Holdings LLC v. Letwak
& Bennett (May 16, 2022, G059646) 2022 WL 1534602 [nonpub.
opn.], at pp. *1, 2, 5.) These are not contract law cases; there is

                            33  

no contract to validate or invalidate. Rather, these appellate
courts were reviewing the propriety of trial court damage awards.
These are not applications of the contract law doctrine of
unconscionability. I exclude this type of opinion.
In yet another category, the court in Bai v. Rodeo
Concierge, Inc. (Aug. 31, 2022, B305596) 2022 WL 3908603
[nonpub. opn.] affirmed a holding that defendants had violated
statutes prohibiting unlawful car leasing laws: Penal Code
section 571, which outlaws certain types of car subleasing; and
Civil Code section 3343.5, which creates a private right of action
to enforce Penal Code section 571. (Id. at pp. *9–10.) The
combination of these statutes do arguably involve a form of
unconscionability, but they convert it from a contract law shield
into a tort law sword. Because this is not the contract law
defense of unconscionability, I exclude this case.
I exclude Northstar v. Apollo Couriers, Inc. (Aug. 28, 2025,
B334620) 2025 WL 2475253 [nonpub. opn.]. There the trial court
decided an arbitration contract was unenforceable under
California law, but the appellate court barely mentioned
unconscionability. Rather it affirmed primarily on the grounds of
an inadequate appellate presentation of the record. (Id. at pp.
*2–3.) Perhaps my judgment call is wrong, but I exclude this
case to err on the side of caution.
5
These parameters yield a sample of 100 decisions from
2021 to 2025. These 100 decisions are the cases in which
California courts invalidated contracts, in whole or in part, on
unconscionability grounds.
In this list, I count the dispute in Ramirez as just one case.
This case traveled up and down the appellate ladder and

                            34  

culminated in nullification of the arbitration contract in Ramirez
v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1297,
1308. Despite the multiple opinions, Ramirez remains but one
case about just one contract.
6
Of these 100 decisions that used something like
unconscionability reasoning to impair or invalidate contracts,
how many cases involved arbitration? The answer is 79:
1. Alvarez v. Altamed Health Services Corp. (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 572
2. Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists,
Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552
3. Fisher v. MoneyGram Intern., Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.4th 1084 4. Cruz v. Calop Business Systems (Mar. 30, 2021
B306688) 2021 WL 1205631 [nonpub. opn.]
5. De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services,
LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 476
6. Bouarich v. Comerica Management Co., Inc. (May 5,
2021 B302958) 2021 WL 1782995 [nonpub. opn.]
7. Veitenhans v. Hikvision USA, Inc. (May 27, 2021
B302552) 2021 WL 2153773 [nonpub. opn.]
8. Salgado v. Carrows Restaurants, Inc. (June 1, 2021
B304799) 2021 WL 2199436 [nonpub. opn.]
9. D’Avella v. Overhill Farms, Inc. (Oct. 26, 2021
B303644) 2021 WL 4958910 [nonpub. opn.]
10. Nunez v. Cycad Management LLC (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 276
11. Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center,
Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643

                            35  

12. Borisoff v. Pullman Group, LLC (Jan. 11, 2022,
B297162, B298972, B299796) 2022 WL 99257
[nonpub. opn.]
13. Williams v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (Apr. 29,
2022, A162007) 2022 WL 1284194 [nonpub. opn.]
14. Sellers v. World Fin. Group, Inc. (June 23,
2022, D078934) 2022 WL 2254998 [nonpub. opn.]
15. Mirzoyan v. W. Coast Wound & Skin Care Inc.
(June 28, 2022, B310901) 2022 WL 2314478 [nonpub.
opn.]
16. Shekarchi v. Fischbach (June 28, 2022,
B311989) 2022 WL 2314551 [nonpub. opn.]
17. Ojeda v. Vahi, Inc. (Aug. 16, 2022, B313717)
2022 WL 3367500 [nonpub. opn.]
18. Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 1035
19. Navas v. Fresh Venture Foods, LLC (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 626
20. Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 292
21. Ramos v. Monschein Industries, Inc. (Dec. 19,
2022, F083299) 2022 WL 17752221 [nonpub. opn.]
22. Patterson v. AVX Design & Integration (Jan. 19,
2023, B313948) 2023 WL 312212 [nonpub. opn.]
23. Herlitz v. Capital Senior Living, Inc. (Jan. 24,
2023, C097245) 2023 WL 367782 [nonpub. opn.]
24. Mendez v. WTMG, Inc. (Feb. 3, 2023, C095759)
2023 WL 1459930 [nonpub. opn.]
25. Rodriguez v. Jonathan Club (Feb. 24, 2023,
B317622) 2023 WL 2202680 [nonpub. opn.]

                   36  

26. Platt, LLC v. OptumRx, Inc. (Mar. 15, 2023,
A163061) 2023 WL 2507259 [nonpub. opn.]
27. Murrey v. Super. Ct. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1223
28. Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1035
29. Alberto, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th 482
30. Haydon v. Elegance at Dublin (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1280
31. Hasty v. American Automobile Assn. (2023) 98
Cal.App.5th 1041
32. Barraza v. Tesla, Inc. (Apr. 11, 2023, A165347)
2023 WL 2887547 [nonpub. opn.]
33. Rice v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (May
9, 2023, B316079) 2023 WL 3314990 [nonpub. opn.]
34. Nathaniel v. Greene Motors, Inc. (May 25, 2023,
A165056) 2023 WL 3638790 [nonpub. opn.]
35. Herrera v. Behavioral Systems Southwest, Inc.
(June 27, 2023, G061702) 2023 WL 4195766 [nonpub.
opn.]
36. King v. Baker Petrolite LLC (June 29, 2023,
B321248) 2023 WL 4246784 [nonpub. opn.]
37. Sawyer v. KeHE Distributors, Inc. (July 12,
2023, E078024) 2023 WL 4484440 [nonpub. opn.]
38. Bonilla v. Reiter Berry Farms, Inc. (Aug. 28,
2023, H050268) 2023 WL 5525877 [nonpub. opn.]
39. Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC
LLC (Oct. 30, 2023, A165800) 2023 WL 7125117
[nonpub. opn.]

                  37  

40. Mena v. Muscolino Inventory Services, Inc.
(Nov. 16, 2023, B321559) 2023 WL 7852745 [nonpub.
opn.]
41. Hutcheson v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. (Oct.
31, 2023, A166376) 2023 WL 7143186 [nonpub. opn.]
42. Smith v. Folsom Investors, L.P. (Dec. 20, 2023,
C097549) 2023 WL 8794888 [nonpub. opn.]
43. Cook, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 312
44. Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 633
45. Monroy v. Donsuemor, Inc. (Mar. 12, 2024,
A167487) 2024 WL 1068436 [nonpub. opn.]
46. Johnston v. Sensei AG Holdings, Inc. (Mar. 5,
2025, B334773) 2025 WL 703258 [nonpub. opn.]
47. Arnold v. Antelope Manufactured Home
Community (Mar. 13, 2024, C097244) 2024 WL
1081934 [nonpub. opn.]
48. Brooks v. Emer (Mar. 14, 2025, B334409) 2025
WL 812149 [nonpub. opn.]
49. Agundez v. Do & Co Los Angeles, Inc. (Apr. 14,
2025, B334775) 2025 WL 1098414 [nonpub. opn.]
50. Alvarado v. Charter Communications, LLC
(July 11, 2025, B334578) 2025 WL 1910952 [nonpub.
opn.]
51. Pike v. True Bullion, LLC (May 1, 2024,
B324634) 2024 WL 1903203 [nonpub. opn.]
52. Guerrero v. TruConnect Communications, Inc.
(May 8, 2024, B324938) 2024 WL 2044023 [nonpub.
opn.]

                  38  

53. Dopp v. Now Optics, LLC (May 20, 2024,
D081665) 2024 WL 2265759 [nonpub. opn.]
54. Rainier v. Paradise Chevrolet Cadillac (Jun 7,
2024, E079647, E080308) 2024 WL 2873688 [nonpub.
opn.]
55. Fredeen v. California Cemetery and Funeral
Services, LLC (Jun. 11, 2024, B326031) 2024 WL
2930024 [nonpub. opn.]
56. Xing v. Winn Inc. (Oct. 20, 2025, G063980)
2025 WL 2952340 [nonpub. opn.]
57. Weisfeiler v. ByteDance Inc. (June 20, 2025,
A168006) 2025 WL 1720606 [nonpub. opn.]
58. Helfet v. Motive Energy, Inc. (Jul 1, 2024,
B331359) 2024 WL 3243710 [nonpub. opn.]
59. Booker v. Charter Communications, LLC (July
11, 2025, B322813) 2025 WL 1910954 [nonpub. opn.]
60. Jackson v. Faraday & Future, Inc. (Jul. 24,
2024, B328046) 2024 WL 3517465 [nonpub. opn.]
61. Lodes v. Transmodus Corp. (Jul. 31, 2024,
B332111) 2024 WL 3588890 [nonpub. opn.]
62. Libra Securities Holdings, LLC v. Robles (Aug.
11, 2025, B338602) 2025 WL 2304745 [nonpub. opn.]
63. Perez v. It Works Marketing, Inc. (Aug. 28,
2024, A168331) 2024 WL 3963524 [nonpub. opn.]
64. Anderson v. Thrive Social Equity Manager VII,
LLC (Sep. 24, 2024, B329181) 2024 WL 4282162
[nonpub. opn.]
65. Yeganeh v. Amerisave Mortg. Corp. (Oct. 21,
2024, G062668) 2024 WL 4532654 [nonpub. opn.]

                  39  

66. Gonzalez v. Aten Technology, Inc. (Oct. 21,
2025, G064777) 2025 WL 2962200 [nonpub. opn.]
67. Becerra v. Charter Communications, Inc. (Oct.
31, 2025, B333509) 2025 WL 3041780 [nonpub. opn.]
68. Bonzell v. Retirement Capital Strategies, Inc.
(Nov. 25, 2024, H052392) 2024 WL 4903598 [nonpub.
opn.]
69. Sanchez v. Super. Ct. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
615
70. Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc.
(2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1297
71. Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 1009
72. Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1311
73. Young v. Refrigeration Supplies Distributor
(Dec. 15, 2025, G064837) 2025 WL 3628506 [nonpub.
opn.]
74. Rodriguez v. BW Supplies, LLC (Dec. 16, 2025,
B340191) 2025 WL 3639524 [nonpub. opn.]
75. Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 327
76. Rahme v. Bicycle Casino, L.P. (Dec. 30, 2025,
B340203) 2025 WL 3764784 [nonpub. opn.]
77. Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center
Medical Group, Inc. (Dec. 15, 2025, F088971) 2025
WL 3628510 [nonpub. opn.], review granted Mar. 25,
2026, S294710
78. Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (Dec. 22, 2025,
A170983) review den. and opn. ordered nonpub. Apr.

                  40  

1, 2026, S295055 [assuming nondisclosure agreement
provisions connected to arbitration agreement were
unconscionable]
79. Chelico v. TJB Gearys, LLC (Dec. 15, 2025,
B331570) 2025 WL 3628320 [nonpub. opn.]

Of the 100 cases, 21 did not involve arbitration:

  1. In re Marriage of Stull (Feb. 4, 2021, E071912) 2021
    WL 389212 [nonpub. opn.] (Stull) [a family law court
    found aspects of a postmarital contract to be
    unconscionable]

  2. Dameron I, supra, 2021 WL 4519651 [nonpub. opn.]
    [hospital admission contracts, as explained above]

  3. Smart Corner Owners Assn. v. CJUF Smart Cover
    LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 439 (Smart Corner)
    [condominium HOA case]

  4. Knapp v. Ginsburg (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 504
    (Knapp) [premarital contract]

  5. Dameron II, supra, 2022 WL 41914 [nonpub. opn.]
    [hospital admission contracts, as explained above]

  6. Valkov, supra, 2022 WL 455279 [nonpub. opn.]
    [postmarital contract, as explained above]

  7. In re Marriage of Zucker (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1025
    (Zucker) [premarital contract]

  8. Dameron III, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 971 [hospital
    admission contracts, as explained above]

  9. In re Marriage of Lukowski & Wieting (Apr. 30, 2024,
    G062678) 2024 WL 1873033 [nonpub. opn.]
    (Lukowski) [premarital contract]

                   41
    

10. Genova, supra, 2022 WL 2849079 [nonpub.
opn.] [foreclosure sale, as explained above]
11. Last v. Super. Ct. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 30
(Last) [premarital contract]
12. Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 808 (Lathrop) [Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act (Song-Beverly) (Civ. Code, § 1790 et
seq.)]
13. The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP (Nov.
14, 2024, B327404) 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 336 [nonpub.
opn.] (Comedy Store) [commercial rental agreement,
disapproved by EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 58, 84, fn. 7]
14. Pelascini v. Airstream, Inc. (May 29, 2025,
A169686) 2025 WL 1537776 [nonpub. opn.], review
granted Sept. 17, 2025, S291386 (Pelascini) [Song-
Beverly case]
15. Hardy v. Forest River, Inc. (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 450, review granted Apr. 30, 2025,
S289309 (Hardy) [Song-Beverly case]
16. Dameron IV, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th 530
[hospital admission contracts, as explained above]
17. Severo v. Forest River, Inc. (Aug. 5, 2025,
B336863) 2025 WL 2218061 [nonpub. opn.], review
granted Oct. 29, 2025, S292374 (Severo) [Song-
Beverly case]
18. Johnson v. Forest River RV, Inc. (Aug. 22, 2025,
D085014) 2025 WL 2426456 [nonpub. opn.] (Johnson)
[Song-Beverly case]

                   42  

19. Wonacott v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (Sept. 23,
2025, C099248, C100189) 2025 WL 2701567 [nonpub.
opn.], review granted Dec. 30, 2025, S293617
(Wonacott) [Song-Beverly case]
20. Razaqi, supra, 2025 WL 3250832 [nonpub.
opn.] [trial court concluded contract between the wife
and her lawyer was unconscionable, as explained
above]
21. Kim v. Airstream, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
201 (Kim) [Song-Beverly case]
8
I summarize the breakdown between the 79 arbitration
cases and the 21 non-arbitration cases in this table.
Type of Number Case name
contract of
invalidations

   Arbitration               79                79 cases listed above  

  Song-Beverly               7                 Lathrop, Pelascini, Hardy,  

warranties Severo, Johnson, Wonacott, Kim

  Hospital                   4                 Dameron I, II, III & IV  

admission

   Premarital                4                Knapp, Zucker, Last,  
                                         Lukowski  

   Postmarital               2                 Stull, Valkov  




                            43  

Real estate 1 Genova
foreclosure

   Condo HOA                1                  Smart Corner  

   40% attorney fee         1                  Razaqi  




  Commercial                1                  Comedy Store  

forum selection clause

                              9  
   Because 79 is 79 percent of 100, we see that, when  

California courts used unconscionability analysis to impair or
destroy a contract, that contract concerned arbitration 79 percent
of the time.
This is a disproportionate use of the unconscionability
doctrine. The disproportion disfavors arbitration.
Indeed, the 79 percent understates the disproportionality,
because I have included 12 decisions that apply specialty statutes
in the sample of 100 cases. The pertinent comparison, however,
would be cases applying the generally applicable contract
doctrine of unconscionability. It would be logical to subtract
these specialty statute cases to get a truer measure of the actual
use of the general doctrine.
What is a specialty statute? The California Legislature has
enacted a number of special-purpose unconscionability statutes.
These statutes define the concept of unconscionability in
particular settings. These special-purpose statutes are entirely

                           44  

proper under the rule of equal treatment because they do not
imperil the federal protection of arbitration.
I list three specialty statutes.
a
One familiar specialty statute is the 1970 Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act. This statute establishes a non-waivable
implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for retail sales of
consumer goods. (Civ. Code, §§ 1792, 1792.1.) The law also
covers sales of new motor vehicles. (Civ. Code, § 1793.22.) In
some respects, the scope of this law is disputed and will be
resolved by the California Supreme Court. (See, e.g., Lathrop,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 808, review granted Jan. 15, 2025,
S287893; Kim, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th 201; Diaz v. Thor Motor
Coach, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 589, review granted May 13,
2026, S295851.) The Legislature has been active in adjusting the
particular boundaries of this specialty law. (See, e.g., Letter from
Governor Newsom to the Members of the California State
Assembly (Sep. 29, 2024) <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2024/09/AB-1755-SIGNING-Message.pdf> [as of
Nov. 8, 2026], archived at https://perma.cc/ZFX7-GRUK.)
Some courts have used the word “unconscionability” in
connection with this warranty statute. (See, e.g., Kim, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at pp. 209–220.)
Warranties have been a long-standing focus of the
unconscionability doctrine. (E.g. Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. (1960) 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, cited in Sonic-
Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1143; Leff, supra, at pp. 523–
524 [discussing Henningsen].)
Concurring Justice Staniforth gave a pungent and
enduring statement of the unconscionability doctrine in a leading

                            45  

California warranty case: “No experienced farmer would spend
$32,000 for equipment which could not process his tomatoes
before they rot and no fair and honest merchant would sell such
equipment with representations negated in its own sales
contract.” (A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 473, 497; see also id. at pp. 485–493 [majority
analysis].)
The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act did not create a
contract law doctrine of general application. For that reason, the
appropriate course is to exclude the seven Song-Beverly cases
from our sample of general-purpose unconscionability decisions.
b
A second specialty statute is Family Code section 1615.
This statute is entitled “Unenforceable agreements;
unconscionability; voluntariness.” The italics are mine.
This statute deals exclusively with premarital agreements,
and their enforceability—or, more accurately, their
unenforceability. The statute’s obvious concern is that, before a
wedding, one side has more resources and may railroad the low-
resource side into an extremely unfair deal. The Legislature
decreed these premarital agreements are presumptively
involuntary and therefore unenforceable unless a court finds, in
writing or on the record, the statute’s exacting requirements have
been satisfied. (See Last, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 38–40; see
also Knapp, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 531–534.)
There are four decisions in this category, as the table
summarized: Knapp; Zucker; Last; and Lukowski.
c
A third specialized doctrine of unconscionability stems from
Civil Code section 5986, which concerns “common interest

                           46  

developments” like condominium complexes. The Legislature
passed this law to stop a condo developer from taking advantage
of its ability, early in the formation of condominium associations,
to insert provisions into covenants, conditions, and restrictions
that shield the developer from suits by a condo homeowners
association for construction defects. (Smart Corner, supra, 64
Cal.App.5th at p. 463.) The Smart Corner decision used the word
“unconscionable” when analyzing issues in this specialized
statutory area. (E.g., id., at pp. 451–471.) Smart Corner is the
lone case in this category.
We are concerned with none of these specialty statutes.
Our focus is strictly on the supposedly general contract law
doctrine of unconscionability.
10
The earlier list of 100 included 12 specialty cases: seven
Song-Beverly cases, four premarital contracts, and one
condominium case. Subtracting these 12 specialty cases from 100
reduces our list to 88. This correction yields a 90 percent rate,
because 79 arbitration cases out of a total of 88 rounds to 90
percent.
In sum, this record shows California courts use the
unconscionability doctrine in an overwhelmingly targeted way:
to go after arbitration.
F
I comment on nine specific reactions the majority opinion
offers to my dissent.
In essence, the overall reaction is to cite many California
arbitration precedents and say but this is how we always do it in
arbitration cases. That is the problem.

                            47  

1
My respected and beloved colleagues cite Sonic-Calabasas
A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1144 (Sonic-Calabasas).
The state court holding in Sonic-Calabasas supports my
view. That holding was that the California Supreme Court was
wrong in its earlier decision because that earlier decision was
preempted by the federal equal treatment rule. (Sonic-Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th. at pp. 1139–1142.) The equal treatment rule is
controlling, as I have tried to demonstrate. I have applied it.
The majority opinion departs from it.
In dicta, the state court decision in Sonic-Calabasas also
stated (with my emphasis) that a facially neutral state-law rule is
not preempted simply because its evenhanded application would
have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.
(Sonic-Calabasas, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1144, citing Concepcion,
at p. 341–342, 131 S.Ct. at p. 1747.)
This 2013 dictum cannot be valid under the 2017 opinion of
Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 248.
The reach of federal preemption is always a question of
federal law. (Cf. Sandler v. Modernizing Medicine, Inc. (9th Cir.
2026) 170 F.4th 1209, 1213 (Modernizing Medicine) [“To have
state law (rather than federal law) control the content of that rule
in a way that disfavors arbitration would subject it to FAA
preemption”].) To support a proposition of federal law in this
context requires an authoritative federal citation. Sonic-
Calabasas was not a federal citation.
The 2013 dictum is counter to Kindred’s equal treatment
rule. The dictum asserts a facially neutral state-law rule is not
preempted simply because its evenhanded application would have
a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.

                            48  

An application is not evenhanded if its impact is
disproportionate.
As Justice Kagan wrote, the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts any state rule discriminating on its face against
arbitration. The Act also “displaces any rule that covertly
accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh
so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration
agreements.” (Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 251, italics added.)
States may not apply generally applicable contract defenses “ ‘in
a fashion that disfavors arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. 255, citing
Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S., at p. 341.)
What explains a supposedly evenhanded application of a
rule that “oh so coincidentally” lands so hard on arbitration?
(Kindred, supra, 581 U.S. at p. 251, italics added.) The obvious
reason is that we do not like arbitration and we want to rein it in
according to our special California state standards.
2
The majority opinion says a procedural quirk explains why
appellate courts get so many arbitration cases. I agree we get
many arbitration cases. But why do we impair or invalidate
them so disproportionately? The procedural quirk cannot explain
that. Hostility to arbitration, instantiated in a uniquely
punishing method of review, does explain that.
3
The majority opinion finds comfort in like-minded decisions
from the Ninth Circuit. I am doubtful the Ninth Circuit can be
counted as a consistent fan of our state court approach to
arbitration. (See Modernizing Medicine, supra, 170 F.4th at p.
1213 [“The district court thus erred in allowing state-court cases
(purporting to apply state law) to dictate the outcome here”]; cf.

                            49  

Lamps Plus, supra, 587 U.S. 176, 182–189 [reversing the Ninth
Circuit by preempting its application of California state law].)
4
The majority opinion quotes Concepcion’s description of
Broome’s 2006 statistics as “not definitive.” Indeed they were
not definitive. And neither are my percentages of 79 percent to
90 percent definitive, for they stem merely from 713 recent cases
rather than from an analysis of all decisions in the relevant
universe. But while not definitive, these numbers are suggestive.
They suggest disproportionate hostility to arbitration. I invite
others to offer improved quantitative analyses.
5
The majority opinion states “unconscionability is a contract
defense that is well-suited for challenging adhesive, but not
negotiated, contracts.” This does not explain why, in a state
where, for decades, some 30 million people are constantly buying
and selling all manner of goods and services by means of form
contracts that are take-it-or-leave-it, it is only the arbitration
contracts that bear the brunt of appellate displeasure.
6
The majority opinion cites cases to show California courts
do not always use the unconscionability doctrine to invalidate
arbitration agreements. This is true. They just attack
arbitration on an overwhelmingly disproportionate basis, as
compared to every other kind of contract. The practice is not
always and uniformly fatal. It is just more fatal, more often,
than anywhere else in contract law. It is an arbitration special.
7
The majority opinion cites Steven v. Fidelity and Casualty
Co. of New York (1962) 58 Cal.2d 862 (Steven). This classic

                            50  

unconscionability case shows how far the majority diverges from
a general application of that doctrine.
A man bought a vending machine life insurance contract at
the airport and died when the plane crashed. The insurance
company refused to pay his widow because of some technicalities
about whether his flight was “scheduled.” This venerable opinion
shows a generally applicable approach to the unconscionability
doctrine: simple judicial revulsion at the unfairness of a
contract’s result. (See Steven, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 876 [“we
conclude that this requirement in the circumstances of this case
cannot fairly be enforced against [the widow]”]; id. at p. 879
[“Does not such a provision approach a trap for the unwary
purchasing public?”].)
This conventional unconscionability holding does not
scrutinize either the overbreadth or the duration of the contract.
Nor does it invent and examine hypotheticals about how the
contract would be lopsided on facts different than those in the
case.
The Steven decision is an excellent example of the
unconscionability doctrine. That decision shows the majority, in
its drive to regulate arbitration, departs from general principles
of contract law.
8
The majority opinion cites California Grocers Association v.
Bank of America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 214 (Grocers). This
decision powerfully proves my point: the majority has abandoned
general principles of contract law.
Grocers held a bank’s contract, established when a
depositor opened an account, was not unconscionable when it set
the bank’s fee for returned checks at $3.00 per returned check.

                            51  

(Grocers, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 215–217.) There was no
duration problem: the decision never mentioned duration, even
though the duration of the contract apparently was unlimited.
There was no scope problem either, even though the bank
charged this fee for returned checks of many different kinds. Nor
was there a mutuality problem, even though the Bank’s fee was
twice its cost of $1.50. (Id. at pp. 211–212.) The trial court had
limited the bank’s permissible fee to the cost of $1.50 plus a
reasonable profit margin of 15 percent, yielding a maximum fee
of $1.73. (Id. at p. 212.) The Court of Appeal reversed this
ruling. The court did not require mutuality. It did not inquire
whether, for every contract clause, each side got an even deal.
The court did not use a fine-toothed comb to go through every
contractual provision in a search for hypothetical problems.
That is what the majority opinion does here—when the
contract concerns arbitration. There is no parallel to its
punishing method in general contract law. The Grocers decision
illustrates this point.
9
The majority opinion cites Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 758 (Dean Witter). This
mainstream unconscionability case is another benchmark
showing how far the majority has traveled from general contract
law. The plaintiff sued the stock brokerage house of Dean Witter
for imposing a form contract about fees when the plaintiff opened
his brokerage account. The contract apparently was unlimited
duration. The stock broker conceded for purposes of argument
that its fees were too high. (Id. at p. 768.) The court showed no
interest in constructing hypotheticals that could show unfairness

                            52  

on facts unrelated to the case at hand. The court rejected the
unconscionability doctrine. (Id. at pp. 766–772.)
The main point of the court’s analysis was a lengthy
demonstration that no oppression exists when buyers can go to
alternative sellers. (See Dean Witter, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 766–772.) I completely agree. (See Diaz v. Thor Motor
Coach, Inc. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 589, 601–605, review granted
May 13, 2026 S295851 [dis. opn. of Wiley, J.].)
Dean Witter illustrates how unconscionability analysis
works in general contract law. This standard gauges how far the
majority opinion has gone astray.
G
When measured by their actions rather than by their
words, California courts from 2021 to 2025 were intensely hostile
to arbitration. About 79 percent to 90 percent of the time—
depending on exactly how we define the perpetually vague
doctrine of “unconscionability”—we state court judges have taken
a doctrine of supposedly general application and applied it to
eliminate or disrupt arbitration.
The difference between 79 percent and 90 percent does not
matter. Both figures show the extreme disproportionality we see
in practice. Any way you count it, the application of the
unconscionability doctrine has been highly selective and
extremely disproportionate from 2021 to 2025. The main target,
overwhelmingly, is arbitration.
As the Supreme Court of the United States observed in
Concepcion, “the judicial hostility towards arbitration that
prompted the [Federal Arbitration Act] had manifested itself in a
great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration
against public policy. [Citation.] And although these statistics

                           53  

are not definitive, it is worth noting that California’s courts have
been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable
than other contracts.” (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 342,
italics added, internal quotations omitted.)
“Concepcion teaches that we must be alert to new devices
and formulas that would achieve much the same result today.”
(Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 584 U.S. 497, 509, italics
added.)
I dissent from the majority’s use of devices and formulas
that disfavor arbitration.

                                       WILEY, J.  




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